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ABSTRACT
In our field, scholarly literature contends that women win a similar percentage of
the vote and raise a similar amount of money as their male opponents when they
campaign (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al.
1994; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Burrell 1985; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Welch
et al. 1985). However, women are still underrepresented at all levels of government and
this may be a function of biases in the campaign finance network that have gone largely
undetected. Differences may be more readily apparent at the sub-national level and
among particular classes of donors. Using descriptive and OLS regression analysis, I
examine the differences between male and female state legislative candidates in total
campaign receipts from various financiers, but more importantly I examine the
subcategories of contributions from political parties, businesses, labor unions, and
ideological interest groups. Although there may be few differences between male and
female candidates in total contributions, these differences may be expressed among
particular types of donors. In addition, I analyze campaign contribution size and
campaign self-finance in order to determine whether gender also factors into these
aspects of the campaign process. Using data from 24 state legislatures and two electoral
cycles (1997-1998 and 1999-2000) I explore these questions among incumbents,
challengers and open seat candidates in both contested and uncontested races.
After conducting my analysis, I find gender is often a statistically significant
predictor of the total amount of contributions received, as well as the percentage
contributed to one‘s own campaign, and the percentage received from small donors.
However, I find that candidate status plays a mediating role in shaping campaign receipts.
In short, in many cases, female incumbents raise less but female open seat contestants
xii

raise more. Also, I find that women tend to raise a larger portion of their campaign
contributions from donors contributing $200 or less but that they also tend to contribute
less to their own campaigns. In addition to gender effects, I also find that a host of other
factors play a role in determining how much a candidate raises and contributes.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PUZZLE OF AGGREGATE FINANCIAL PARITY AND
WOMEN’S UNDER-REPRESENTATION
American politics is at once a story of equality and inequality. The Nineteenth
Amendment sparked the expansion of our electorate and gave previously disenfranchised
women the right to vote. Along with practicing the right to vote, women have become far
more active in other types of political activity, such as writing their members of
Congress, signing a petition, or running for office (Conway 2001).
In 1994, the National Women‘s Political Caucus examined the success rates of
male and female candidates competing in general elections for all major political offices
(state house, state senate, U.S. House, U.S. Senate and the governorship) over a six-year
period (1986 to 1992) (Newman 1994). The resulting report famously concluded that
gender1 did not hamper a woman‘s chances of being successful and that ―when women
run, women win‖ (Newman, 1994). Subsequent studies have reached the same
conclusion (Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al. 1994). Yet,
despite these achievements, massive inequalities still exist. Women remain descriptively
underrepresented at both the state and federal level.
In the 111th congressional session, women make up approximately 18% of the
U.S. House of Representatives and approximately 17% of the U.S. Senate (―Women
Representatives‖ 2009). Although these numbers represent record highs in both bodies
according to the Center for American Women and Politics (2008), they are nowhere near
demographic parity. The same is true at the sub-national level, where few state
legislatures come close to having equal numbers of women and men (Sanchez 2005).

1

Although sex is a biological characteristic and gender is a social construct I choose to use gender
throughout the document in place of sex. I argue this term better represents the context of this dissertation
since I am exploring how socially constructed roles and characteristics affect behavior on the part of the
donor and candidate.
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Table 1.1 illustrates the level of female representation in each of the lower state
houses across all 50 states. The states that I include in my latter analysis chapters are in
bold. The table makes a comparison of the level of representation in 2000 (one of the
electoral periods under examination here) and, again, in 2010 (the most recent electoral
period). In addition, the table shows the percentage change in representation between the
two time periods and also provides information on the level of professionalism across all
50 states. In this manner, it should be apparent that my sample of 24 states is
representative of many of these different contexts.
Table 1.1: Percentage of Female State Legislators in Lower Chambers in 2000 and
2010
State
Oklahoma
Alabama
Louisiana
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
North Dakota
Virginia
Delaware
South Dakota
Indiana
West Virginia
Nebraska2
Ohio
Georgia
Wyoming
Wisconsin
Missouri
Rhode Island
Florida
Utah
2

2000 % of Women
in State House
9%
8%
19%
12%
13%
12%
17%
20%
15%
22%
14%
14%
20%
24%
22%
20%
20%
20%
23%
26%
27%
24%

2010 % of Women
in State House
12%
12%
13%
13%
14%
15%
16%
18%
18%
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%
21%
21%
22%
22%
22%
23%
23%
24%

%
Level of
Difference Professionalism
3%
Hybrid
4%
Hybrid
-6%
Hybrid
1%
Professional
1%
Hybrid
3%
Hybrid
-1%
Hybrid
-2%
Citizen
3%
Hybrid
-2%
Hybrid
6%
Citizen
6%
Citizen
0%
Citizen
-4%
Hybrid
-1%
Professional
1%
Citizen
2%
Citizen
2%
Professional
-1%
Hybrid
-3%
Citizen
-4%
Hybrid
0%
Citizen

Nebraska is a unicameral legislature and the percentage denotes the percentage of women in this chamber.
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Table 1.1 Continued

State
Alaska
Oregon
California
Mississippi
Arkansas
Michigan
Texas
Massachusetts
Idaho
Iowa
Arizona
Kansas
New York
Montana
Washington
Maine
Nevada
Illinois
Minnesota
New Mexico
New Jersey
North Carolina
Maryland
Connecticut
Hawaii
Vermont
New Hampshire
Colorado
Total

2000 % of Women
in State House
20%
32%
25%
13%
19%
28%
19%
26%
30%
20%
42%
32%
24%
29%
38%
24%
40%
27%
26%
30%
20%
20%
33%
31%
24%
31%
32%
34%
23%

2010 % of Women
in State House
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
26%
26%
28%
28%
28%
29%
30%
30%
31%
31%
32%
33%
33%
33%
34%
34%
35%
37%
37%
38%
25%

%
Level of
Difference Professionalism
5%
Hybrid
-7%
Hybrid
0%
Professional
12%
Hybrid
6%
Citizen
-3%
Professional
6%
Hybrid
-1%
Professional
-4%
Citizen
6%
Hybrid
-14%
Hybrid
-4%
Hybrid
4%
Professional
0%
Citizen
-8%
Hybrid
6%
Citizen
-9%
Citizen
4%
Professional
6%
Hybrid
3%
Citizen
13%
Professional
13%
Hybrid
1%
Hybrid
3%
Hybrid
11%
Hybrid
6%
Citizen
5%
Citizen
4%
Hybrid
2%

This table demonstrates that there is a large amount of variation across the states
in terms of the percentage of women in the lower state house. In both time periods,
women make up at least eight percent of the legislature in every state but never attain
more then 42 percent of the total seats. The lowest levels of representation can be found
in Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, where the
3

percentage of women in the legislature does not rise above 15% in either time period. On
the other hand, in Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Vermont and Washington, the percentage of women in the legislature does not
fall below 30% in either time period. However, it is important to keep in mind the
number of women exceed one-third (or 33%) of the legislature in only nine states.
Comparing the time periods one can see that the percentage of women increases in 29
states while it decreases in 17 states.
The greatest gains in female representation have taken place in Mississippi, North
Carolina, New Jersey, and Hawaii where women have increased their share of seats in the
legislature by more then 10% over the last 10 years. On the other hand, the level of
female representation has declined the most in Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon
and Louisiana. The largest decline is in Arizona where a woman‘s share of legislative
seats was reduced by 14%. When female representation dips below the national average,
it may be indicative of an unfriendly electoral environment where women are less likely
to be recruited, to receive positive news coverage, or to be as politically interested and
ambitious. As such, this may have repercussions for their ability to raise money and to
run a competitive campaign.
When women compete for office in states where representation levels are low,
they may be especially strategic about when they decide to throw their hat in the ring.
Darcy et al. (1994), Fulton et al. (2006) and Palmer and Simon (2001) argue that women
are less likely to run as sacrificial lambs and more likely to enter a race as an open seat
contestant, as a challenger against a weak incumbent, or when partisan tides are most
favorable. In this manner, their chances of winning should be increased as they can
compete on a more level playing field. One important research question is whether
4

women tend to be more strategic about when they run. In Table 1.2 I attempt to answer
this question by examining the number and percentage of women who compete as
incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates in contested races across each state in
my analysis. The percentages represent the number of women who constitute a particular
category compared to the number of men. So, for instance, in Alaska, there are seven
female incumbents and 28 male incumbents, resulting in women making up 20% of all
contested incumbents.
Table 1.2: Number and Percentage of Women by Type of Race and State
State
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
New Mexico
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
Total

Incumbent
Percent
20%
25%
32%
40%
11%
21%
37%
26%
16%
11%
23%
30%
26%
27%
38%
22%
32%
13%
23%
19%
22%
25%
35%
15%
24%

Number
7
23
17
25
12
21
20
26
16
7
38
40
55
37
21
23
14
26
12
12
16
23
41
13
545

Challenger
Percent Number
43%
15
26%
24
36%
19
43%
27
20%
22
24%
24
33%
18
27%
27
19%
19
16%
10
28%
46
27%
35
27%
56
23%
31
32%
18
22%
23
27%
12
24%
47
21%
11
15%
9
10%
7
29%
27
24%
28
22%
19
25%
574

Open Seat
Percent Number
32%
7
31%
35
34%
27
27%
27
18%
8
24%
11
23%
5
23%
7
18%
6
10%
3
25%
26
28%
47
31%
21
23%
19
28%
9
30%
38
38%
35
32%
17
29%
7
17%
3
24%
10
17%
8
28%
17
24%
13
27%
406

There are a number of things that can be surmised from this table. First, women
do appear to be acting strategically, at least in one sense. In looking at the number of
5

women in open seat races, one can see that the highest numbers of entry correspond to
the states that have enacted term limits (California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan,
Ohio and Oregon). In running a difference of means test between female open seat
candidates in term limited and non term limited states, I find that the mean difference
between these groups is statistically significant (t=2.67). Thus, it appears that women are
taking advantage of these opportunities and contesting at higher rates. They may assume
that various electoral obstacles will be less pronounced when they can avoid running
against a strong incumbent. Second, the table illustrates that women constitute similar
levels across the three categories of candidates. Some notable exceptions to this are
Alaska, Georgia and Pennsylvania, where the percentage of challengers who are women
is more than double the percentage of incumbents who are women. Given that more
women are located in these pipeline races, one might expect the number of women
legislators to increase. On the other hand, one can see that in Texas, women comprise a
much higher percentage of the incumbents than challengers. While this means that
women in Texas run from a position of strength given all the advantages that incumbents
enjoy, it also means that the pipeline for future women officeholders is not as full. Third,
although the number of women in open seat races is not as high as those running as
challengers or incumbents, they do make up the largest percentage of women competing
as compared to men in any category. This suggests that women are indeed running in
elections where their opportunities for success are higher (Smith and Fox 2001; Gaddie
and Bullock 1997; Burrell 1994).
Although it is important to know the distribution of women across types of races,
it is also useful to get a sense of how successful women are when they run. According to
a report by the National Women‘s Political Caucus, women win when they run. This
6

report reached this conclusion after examining federal and state elections between 1986
and 1992. But, is this assessment still accurate in 2000? In Table 1.3, I present analysis
that shows the total number of women who ran during the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, as
well as the number of women who were elected in 2000. The table is sorted by the
percentage of women who were elected.
Table 1.3: Number of Women Running and Elected in 2000 by State
State
Pennsylvania
Alaska
California
Ohio
Indiana
Oregon
Minnesota
Maine
Michigan
Florida
Utah
Wisconsin
Colorado
Iowa
New Mexico
Idaho
Washington
Illinois
Kentucky
Georgia
Tennessee
Texas
Missouri
Rhode Island
Total

Number Elected in
2000
25
8
20
22
14
19
35
36
31
32
18
20
22
20
21
21
37
32
12
36
17
29
38
26
591

Number Ran
in 2000
63
19
46
51
31
38
67
68
57
58
33
36
37
34
34
33
58
49
16
45
21
36
56
28
1,014

Percentage
Elected
40%
42%
43%
43%
45%
50%
52%
53%
54%
55%
55%
56%
59%
59%
62%
64%
64%
65%
75%
80%
81%
81%
83%
93%
58%

Clearly, across each state house under analysis, women run at higher rates than
they are elected. However, in all but six states, women are more likely to win than to
lose when they run and over all they average a 58% rate of success. In particular, women
7

tend to be most successful in getting elected in Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Rhode
Island, Tennessee and Texas, while they face the most difficulty in Alaska, California,
Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Now that we have a better sense of the level of women‘s representation, how that
level has changed over time, and where women tend to concentrate their electoral energy,
its time to switch gears and examine the theoretical underpinnings of women‘s
underrepresentation. In other words, why do not women run for office at the same rate as
men do and why has the percentage of women in state legislative office reached a plateau
in recent years?
Theoretical Explanations for Women’s Under-Representation
Previous research points to a number of explanations for why women are underrepresented within the political establishment. First, scholars point to sociological
theories, arguing that women were often kept from gaining the skills, education and
experience necessary to pursue office until the passage of Title VII in 1964 and the 1972
Higher Education Amendments (Conway 2001). Today, women have more access to the
educational and occupational paths necessary to be successful and are more likely to have
a career outside of the home; however, women are still outnumbered in the types of
professions that normally serve as a conduit to office (Clark 1994; Darcy et al. 1994). In
addition, many cultural stereotypes and social norms still persist in our society.
Contemporary women are even now more likely to be the primary caregiver for their
children and to carry the burden of domestic responsibilities (Robinson and Godbey
1999; Dubeck 1976; Gertzog 1979; Welch 1978; Dodson 1997; Elder 2004).
In a national survey of potential male and female candidates conducted by Fox
and Lawless (2004b) the authors find, ―Women who live with a spouse or partner are
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nine times more likely than men to be responsible for more of the household tasks; the
numbers are similar for childcare arrangements‖ (p. 6). They conclude that women who
are primarily responsible for household tasks are 15% less likely to consider a bid than
those who rely on their partner to do the majority of the household workload (Fox and
Lawless 2004b). These demands, coupled with the demands of the workplace, may make
it far more difficult for women to run and to receive the support of their families when
they are pondering a bid for office. It may also make it more difficult for women with
children to receive support from voters and the media because the general impression is
that these candidates should make their family their main concern. As a result, women
with children may postpone a bid for office at least until they are older (Moncrief et al.
2001; Darcy et al. 1994).
Doing differently could open female candidates up to outside criticism, especially
if their children are young or have special needs. A case in point: when Sarah Palin ran
for the office of Vice-President as the Republican nominee in 2008 she was frequently
criticized for doing so because of her responsibility as a mother to her five children. The
same criticism was only infrequently levied on President Barack Obama despite his
having two young children of his own. This has resulted in some critics arguing that
there is a double standard in the media and in society (Estrich 2008).
Women may also face discouragement in running for office on a variety of other
fronts or for reasons beyond familial responsibility. Although studies have found that
similarly situated men and women are as likely to be successful when they run for office,
they have not found that women and men vote for female candidates at the same rate
(Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; and Dolan 2006). For instance, an October 2007 press
release from the University of Iowa described the poll results for the leading Democratic
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candidates in the 2008 election. Hillary Clinton had the highest projected vote
percentage among women (33% to Obama‘s‘ 26.5% and Edwards‘s 16.8%) while she
was the furthest behind among men (at 22.5% compared to Edwards‘s 25% and
Obama‘s‘ 26.7%). Since women are more likely to value descriptive representation and
to identify ideologically with other women (or to share feminist attitudes or policy
beliefs), it is not surprising that women are more accepting or approving of female
candidates, at least some of the time (Rosenthal, 1995a; Dolan 2006). However, like all
voters, women also consider other factors (incumbency, party affiliation, etc.) when
choosing a candidate and these may not always put women out on top (Dolan 2006). In
primary elections, where party is not an available cue, gender may affect voters as they
make assumptions about candidate issue positions, traits, and viability (Butler 2006;
Koch 2000; McDermott 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Brown et al. 1993; Huddy and
Terkildsen 1993). Although this could potentially benefit women, Butler (2006) finds
that women must actually ―be of higher quality‖ to be successful in the primary (p. 14).
Certainly, there is a willingness by both sexes to vote for a qualified female
candidate. However, some scholars have demonstrated that, for some voters, this stated
willingness to support women candidates may reflect social desirability more than a
willingness to vote for women candidates.
According to a Northern Illinois University press release, in 2006 a team of
political scientists at NIU gave a baseline group of respondents a list of four statements
and asked them how many made them ―angry or upset‖ (NIU Office of Public Affairs,
2007). Then, a fifth statement, ―a woman serving as president‖ was added to the list and
given to the test group (NIU Office of Public Affairs 2007). With this addition, the
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number of angry or upset responses jumped to 26 percent. Perhaps most troubling,
researchers didn‘t find education or gender had any effect on the outcome.
Fox and Smith (1998) also find evidence of voter bias in their study of college
students in California and Wyoming. They find that students consistently tend to favor
hypothetical male candidates in Wyoming by a margin of 9.5% to 12.4% and that they
also give individual male candidates higher thermometer ratings. Neither of these
findings occurred among the California students, which points to the possibility of
regional or cultural based bias. This should not be surprising given the findings that
women tend to be more successful in certain political contexts (Hogan 2001a; Darcy et
al. 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rule 1990; Squire 1992).
In addition, Fox and Smith (1998) found that students give socially desirable
responses when asked ―If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote
for her if she were qualified for the job?‖ (p. 409). The authors speculate that bias may
not appear in some studies because voters are not aware of their own biases, or because
candidates respond differently ―when asked about women candidates in the abstract (e.g.,
a qualified woman) than when asked about them in concrete detail (e.g., Carol White,
who believes….)‖ (p. 409).
Anzia and Berry (2009) agree that the selection process may be different for male
and female candidates. The authors argue that women must be ―the most talented,
hardest working…. most qualified, politically ambitious females to emerge as
candidates‖ as a function of voter bias, sex discrimination, and underestimating campaign
qualifications (Anzia and Berry, 2009, p. 1). To test for this possibility, the authors
examine the performance rates of female officeholders. They find that congresswomen
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sponsor legislation at higher rates, garner more co-sponsors and acquire more federal
spending for their districts as compared to congressmen (Anzia and Berry, 2009).
Voter bias is not the only electoral hurdle that women may face. Women may
also receive differential treatment from the media. Studies indicate that women tend to
receive less coverage and more unflattering coverage of their campaign when compared
to male candidates. Kahn (1994) conducts a content analysis of newspaper coverage in
48 states over a six-year period in the 1980s. She finds that women receive less total
coverage, less issue coverage and more unflattering coverage about their chances of
victory (Kahn, 1994). In particular, the author finds that the news media is more likely to
discuss the lack of financial resources for female candidates of all types when compared
to male candidates (Kahn 1996).
The media has also been charged with providing disparate coverage that
reinforces unflattering or traditional sexual stereotypes. Kahn (1996) finds that the media
tends to ascribe more feminine traits to female candidates and more masculine traits to
male candidates despite the fact that women often try to emphasize more masculine traits
in their campaign communications. In addition, Kahn (1996) argues that the media tends
to spend less time focusing on ―feminine‖ issues (i.e. education, health care, poverty,
women‘s rights, etc.) in their coverage (Kahn, 1996, p. 94). Instead, viewers and readers
are offered more personal coverage of women candidates. Everything from clothing and
hairstyle choices to personality traits are more likely to be discussed for women than men
(Bystrom et al. 2004).
Since many individuals have never met their representative and are even less
familiar with their challenger, they are more likely to base their candidate presumptions
on the information they receive from the print and broadcast media (Kahn, 1994).
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Consequently, if a candidate receives unfavorable coverage or not enough coverage to
appear viable, voters may be unwilling to cast a ballot for them.
Media personalities may also express their dislike of particular female politicians
in a more direct and straightforward way. This type of disdain is less concealed and
easier for the average viewer to detect. For example, when Hillary Clinton ran for
president in 2008, she faced many negative and gender-specific comments from reporters
in the news media. Chris Matthews, an MSNBC host, who attributed her success to her
husband‘s infidelity, referred to Clinton as a ―she-devil‖ (Seelye and Bosman, 2008).
Glenn Beck called Clinton, ―a stereotypical bitch‖ while MSNBC host Tucker Carlson,
said, ―[T]here's just something about [Hillary Clinton] that feels castrating, overbearing,
and scary.‖ Carlson is also quoted as saying, ―When she comes on television, I
involuntarily cross my legs.‖ (Seelye and Bosman 2008; ―NOW‘s Media Hall of Shame,‖
2008, p. 1). But, criticism of Hillary Clinton wasn‘t limited to cable and radio. Other
journalists went after more personal characteristics. For instance, an entire Washington
Post article was devoted to the subject of her cleavage baring attire (Givhan 2007).
One could argue that these examples point to the presence of sexism in modern
day political campaigns and serve as another example of why women may not pursue
office as frequently as men. With repeated exposure to such high-profile remarks and
with little backlash against them, women of all ages may feel discouraged from running
or may feel a general sense of being unwelcome in the world of politics. Although
women may be more successful in their bids for less visible offices, clearly the possibility
of voter hostility and prejudice are still factors each woman must consider.
Discouragement is not only possible at the mass level but may also be a problem
among political, economic, and party elites. The idea that women have faced challenges
13

on the road to entering politics is not new. In 1955, French sociologist, Maurice
Duverger proposed the ―male conspiracy‖ argument (Duverger 1955). This was a theory
that tried to explain women‘s non-participation in political affairs. It argued that women
were being excluded from power by elites who were focused on preserving their own
hegemony (Darcy et al. 1994). Since then, a number of authors have found that women
face a tougher time getting the nomination of the party or are discouraged from running
(Werner 1968; Rule 1981; Fox and Lawless 2004; Carroll 1994). Others have argued
that women are more likely to be put up as ―sacrificial lambs,‖ running in races where
their chances of success are dismal (Seligman 1961; Carroll 1994). Scholars have even
argued that women may face a tougher time acquiring the financial support necessary to
run a successful campaign (Werne 1968; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999).
There could be a number of reasons for these responses. Sanbonmatsu (2005,
2006) has found that some party leaders are skeptical about the ability of women to get
elected. This skepticism may not always be erroneously placed given the historically
high reelection rates of incumbents, and the likelihood that women will not be running
from that advantaged position (Welch et al. 1985). As a result, parties and other donors
may shy away from encouraging women either verbally or financially to run for office.
In addition, men are more likely to hold coveted leadership positions in legislatures
where inter-candidate transfers are allowed between leaders and candidates, and women
may be overlooked (Thompson et al. 1998).
Besides the theories above, Fox and Lawless (2004a, 2004b, 2010) argue that
women simply have less political ambition. They believe this dearth of ambition is a
function of two primary factors. First, they find that women receive less encouragement
to run from political elites like party leaders, elected officials and political activists. This
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is problematic because candidates are twice as likely to consider a bid for office if they
have been recruited by influential elites. Second, they find that women believe they are
less qualified to run. This belief is especially damaging because women are more likely
than men to base their decision to run off of these personal appraisals. These findings are
based on responses from the Citizen Political Ambition Study, a national survey of
individuals whose occupational employment matches that of most officeholders.
Sanbonmatsu (2006) also finds support for Fox and Lawless‘ (2004b) argument in
several interviews with state representatives, senators, and party leaders. The idea that
women lack political ambition, or at least feel less qualified, is echoed most directly by
Senator Jennifer Veiga from CO:
Men are much more willing to jump into it than women. You need to
push women a lot harder to do it, and for whatever reason, they feel like
they‘re not as qualified or they‘re not as ready. I don‘t know who‘s
sending them that message necessarily, but it certainly seems to be one
that‘s fairly universal from the folks I‘ve talked to (Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p.
126).
Elder (2004) also finds gender differences in ambition among college and high
school students in New York. She surveys four different age cohorts (i.e., junior high
students, high school students, college students and a sample of registered voters). She
finds that only female junior high students are more likely to have considered running for
office, to claim they would like to be president someday, to believe a political career
would be desirable and to be politically interested (Elder 2004).
But, women do not just trail behind men on measures of ambition; they also suffer
from a general lack of confidence. Elder (2004) finds that, ―college and high school
women were significantly less likely then their male counterparts to think that they would
win if they put together a good campaign‖ (p. 40). The author also finds that high school
women, college women, and adult women are less likely to respond positively when
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asked whether they are ―knowledgeable enough to be good politicians‖ (p. 40). These
findings are especially troubling because they point to gendered beliefs and stereotypes
persisting even among younger cohorts.
Finally, social scientists recognize that politicians are often strategic about when
they run for office (Black 1972; Brace 1984; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Rohde 1979;
Stone et al. 2004). Women may be especially strategic about whether and when to run
for office (Fulton et al. 2006; Palmer and Simon 2001). If women feel less confident in
their qualifications, their ability to get elected, and their ability to compete financially,
then they may attempt to offset these perceived disadvantages by opting into a race they
feel they have a better chance of winning (Fox and Lawless 2004a; Fox and Lawless
2004b; Elder 2004; Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006). In other words,
women may follow a strategy whereby they wait to run until they can compete in an open
seat election, in races where the incumbent is vulnerable or weak, and/or when partisan
tides are running in their favor (Fulton et al. 2006; Palmer and Simon 2001). Palmer and
Simon (2001) find evidence that this is exactly what happened in 1992 when women
gained seats in record numbers. Their success was prompted by the unusually high
number of open seats, which were a result of the recent redistricting process and the
banking scandal in the United State House of Representatives. Although this strategic
behavior could mean more women will be successful when they do run, it comes at the
cost of women contesting fewer races overall, and thereby hurting their total legislative
representation.
Women may even wait to run until they can compete against a female incumbent
(Palmer and Simon 2005). The authors argue that a successful female incumbent
provides a ‗strategic signal‘ to other female candidates that, ―the woman was able to
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neutralize the stereotypes or make them work to her advantage‖ (Palmer and Simon,
2005, p. 47). This leads to increased competition for female incumbents, as they
experience more contested races, especially in the primary. This heightened competition
is likely to offset the electoral advantages that often come with incumbency.
As a result, in spite of the parity that exists between male and female candidates
in terms of electoral outcomes, female incumbents face a more rigorous electoral
environment and incur higher ‗costs‘ in achieving reelection. Male and female
incumbents may have the same success rates, but women have to work harder to
retain their seats (Palmer and Simon, 2005, p. 58).
Besides weighing when to run and where their entry might be most successful,
women also have to think about how they will raise the money they need to compete
effectively. No one can deny that money plays a critical role in one‘s ability to campaign
successfully and to achieve electoral success, thus, it is possible that the campaign
finance process may also play a role in women‘s under-representation. I explore this
possibility below.
The Role of Campaign Finance in Women’s Under-Representation
One of the greatest concerns for candidates, whether male or female, is money.
Moncrief et al. (1996) conduct a survey of veteran state legislators in an effort to
ascertain how legislatures have evolved. They find that approximately 79% of all
respondents believe fundraising takes ―more time and effort‖ then in the past (p. 63).
Today, that statistic would probably be even higher given the increasing sophistication of
campaigns, the media-centric nature of campaigning and the restrictions on campaign
financing at the state level. What this statistic does not say, and cannot say given that
most legislators prior to 1979 were male, is whether women are affected
disproportionately.

17

A number of studies set out to answer this question. The majority of these studies
found that women are generally not disadvantaged and any findings of funding disparities
were attributed to differences in candidate attributes rather than any overt discrimination
(Burrell 1985, 1990, 1994; Gaddie and Bullock 1995, 1997; Uhlander and Schlozman
1986; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Darcy et al. 1984; Darcy et al. 1994; Thompson et al.
1998; Werner 1997; Seltzer et al. 1997; Fox 2000). The most comprehensive state-level
assessment to date comes from several working papers by Hogan (2008, 2007, 2001a,
2001b). In these papers, the author analyzes campaign finance data for state legislative
candidates in 20 states across two election cycles. He finds that men and women spend
similar amounts of money in pursuit of a state legislative seat and they receive a similar
electoral payoff for each additional dollar of spending. However, women are slightly
more successful than men in obtaining general election votes.
Given the importance of money in successful campaigns and the lack of gender
based funding disparities, it is puzzling that women have not been more successful in
gaining seats in the legislature. Frankly, it is my opinion that our field has been too quick
to discount the role of fundraising and that there are many reasons to believe differences
can be found at the sub-donor or sub-national level. For instance, it is certainly possible
that many of the barriers already discussed (media bias, elite bias, lack of confidence,
disproportionate household and childcare responsibilities, etc.) will be manifested in
elements of the campaign finance process. As such, women may have to invest more of
their own money into their campaign or may receive smaller donations from donors who
lack confidence in the electoral ability of women. In addition, if women lack legislative
influence they may struggle to raise money from access-oriented donors. Each of these
outcomes could impede the campaign finance process for women but it is quite possible
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that none of these elements would be detected by researchers who focus solely on total
campaign receipts.
There are a number of theoretical reasons to believe that women might struggle
in the campaign financing process. First, recent interviews demonstrate that women do
not just lack confidence in campaigning; rather, they also lack confidence in raising
money for campaigns (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Sanbonmatsu et
al. 2009). Although, arguably, no one enjoys asking for money when campaigning,
women may be more concerned about their ability to compete financially with men or
may have different attitudes about the fundraising process. Jenkins (2007) demonstrates
through state legislative surveys that, ―women are more concerned then men about their
ability to raise funds‖ (p. 236). These feelings are well captured in the survey output of
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2009), who reports that 56% of women believe it is harder for them
to raise money while only 9% of men believe women have a tougher time. Jenkins
(2007) also finds support for this viewpoint in her survey data of major party state
legislative candidates. She finds, ―while women may raise as much money as men, they
must work harder to do so by asking more sources and using a wider variety of
techniques and services‖ (p. 236). Women may also struggle in the fundraising process
because they raise money in lesser increments either because they do not feel comfortable
asking for large sums of money or because they are not aggressive enough in seeking
contributions (LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006). LeMieux (2009) contends that
women, ―often feel it is egotistical to ask for money for their own campaign‖ (para 16).
This could be an issue given Grenzke‘s (1989) finding that PACs are more likely to make
donations to either their personal friends or to those who are aggressive in asking for
money.
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Other theories contend that some women may face bigger hurdles in the
fundraising process because they are not as integrated into political and fundraising
networks or because the gatekeepers of these networks are largely male (Conway 2001;
Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). This belief was shared by a number of interviewees from
Sanbonmatsu‘s (2006) work. One interview subject even seemed to mirror the above
argument, ―I think fund-raising is a major, major barrier, and I think a lot of women just
haven‘t had the life, business, or professional experience that can give them the
credibility and stature and the aggressiveness to successfully fund-raise‖ (Sanbonmatsu,
2006, p. 125).
It is certainly possible that women are not alone in these apprehensions. Donors
may also share them and may, as a result, be less likely to make an investment in female
candidates. In other words, just as women may be strategic about when to run (Fulton et
al. 2006; Paul and Simon 200; Darcy et al. 1994) so too may donors be strategic about
whom they allocate funds to. Just like candidates, donors are likely to consider the
candidate‘s probability of success when making a donation. After weighing the costs and
benefits associated with contributing to various candidates, they are likely to make a
donation to the person who demonstrates the best return on their investment. For
instance, many donors want to gain access to influential members of the legislature.
Therefore, they are more likely to contribute to candidates who are party leaders, who
have more legislative experience, and who are members of the majority party (Evans
1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005). On the other hand, the
driving force behind donations from more policy centric ideological groups may be the
previous voting record of the candidate and their party affiliation (Evans 1988; Wright
1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In addition, it is possible that gender
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also enters the strategic calculations of various donors. Donors may use gender,
especially in open seat races, as a proxy for a candidate‘s ideology or likely voting
behavior (Thomas and Wilcox 1998; Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton 2005;
Thomas 1994). In addition, if donors have preconceived stereotypes about gender, they
may reference these inadvertently in their decision making calculus.
In the case of party support, some state and local parties are accused of being
unwilling to recruit women or of being skeptical about their ability to win. For instance,
one party leader in Ohio states, ―In some counties the local party leaders don‘t believe a
woman can carry their district, which hurts the recruiting effort‖ (Moncrief et al. 2001,
pp. 103). This type of negative mind-set could seep into contribution decisions and put
women at a disadvantage. In addition, donors may be dissuaded from contributing to a
candidate based on unflattering or sexist media coverage or on personal stereotypes that
women are not as qualified for office or that a male candidate would simply do a better
job.
There are also reasons to believe that corporate contributors might be less
supportive of women candidates. These groups tend to follow an access-oriented
approach, giving money to influential members of the legislature, those in the majority
party, or to incumbents who appear to have electoral security (Evans 1988; Wright 1985;
Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005). Since women are less likely to run as
incumbents, to hold these leadership positions, and to have established friendships or
connections with lobbyists, they may be overlooked by interest groups wishing to gain
access. In addition, as I explain later, the philosophy and membership of corporate
groups is unlikely to be as sensitive to women.

21

Knowing that these attitudes exist, a number of organizations have been
predicated on the notion that women have a difficult time raising large sums of money
early in their campaign. Groups such as EMILY‘s List (Early Money is Like Yeast),
WISH List (Women in the Senate and House), and the Alabama Solution have been
created to help overcome this perceived obstacle by giving women special training and
acting as a source of fundraising support. Unfortunately, the simple existence of these
groups may help stoke the perception that women are weaker candidates or less
politically and financially connected. Thus, these groups‘ good intentions could actually
cause more harm then good.
Besides the potential to face setbacks in raising money from certain donors, this
problem may only be compounded if women also need more donations to get the same
electoral benefit. For example, the amount of money required for women to be
successful may vary depending on the gender composition of the electoral match-up
(male vs. male, female vs. female, male vs. female). Research in this area has produced
inconsistent findings (Herrick 1996; Burrell 1985; Hogan 2001b). At the congressional
level, Herrick (1996) finds that among challengers, ―the value of campaign spending and
party strength is greater for men then women‖ (p. 68). In an earlier study, Burrell (1985)
finds the exact opposite. Female challengers receive more ‗bang for their buck‘. At the
state legislative level, Hogan (2001b) finds, ―that women incumbents receive a smaller
portion of the vote for each dollar expended‖ (p. 11) but that overall spending patterns
tend to ―purchase‖ the same amount of votes regardless of gender. Hogan (2001b) also
finds that male incumbents tend to spend more per eligible voter when they face a
challenge from a female candidate. Finally, Palmer and Simon (2005), find that female
incumbents endure a more competitive environment when they run, in part, because they
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increase the number of women who compete against them from both their own party and
from the opposite party. Thus, if women face more electoral competition and if they get
less mileage out of the money they do raise, then they may not feel the potential for
winning justifies the time and resources involved in getting there.
Finally, if women are more responsible for household and childcare duties this
may affect their ability to put enough time into campaigning and fundraising. In writing
about his experiences running for the Vermont state legislature, Ralph Wright states, ―the
bad news is that if you want to be truly competitive, you will have to work harder and be
more organized than you‘ve probably ever been in your life‖ (Wright, 2005, p. 3). This
may be a tall task for women who feel torn between the demands of their political
ambitions and the demands of being a mother and wife.
In summary, the compilation of these potential fundraising pitfalls may lead
women to invest more of their own money into their campaign or to endure smaller
donations at the hands of wary donors. It is also possible that women may receive fewer
repeat contributions due, in part, to beliefs that women are less politically and financially
connected and that they have different attitudes about the fundraising process (Jenkins
2007; LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001). In addition, women may also struggle to raise
money from corporations and certain types of party donors. Although all of these aspects
may make the fundraising process more difficult for women, it is quite possible that none
of these pitfalls would be detected by researchers who merely explore total campaign
receipts or who limit their research to the congressional level where women tend to be
more experienced fundraisers and more politically connected. Thus, this project attempts
to dig deeper and to explore how each of these facets affect the fundraising ability and
outcomes of both male and female state legislative candidates.
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Outline of the Dissertation
Besides worrying about elite support, when candidates (whether male or female)
decide to run for office they must consider how difficult it will be to raise the funds
necessary to compete successfully. The goal of this project is to determine whether or
not women are disadvantaged in the campaign fundraising process and whether men
receive preferential treatment from political donors. Is campaign financing a reasonable
explanation for women‘s under-representation? Is it reasonable to assume that women‘s
campaign receipts will be on par with men‘s so long as incumbency, majority party
status, and leadership status are taken into account? Is the nature of raising money
different for men and women? If so, how might this difference have consequences for
the candidacy decisions of women that the current scholarly literature has overlooked?
To answer these questions, the chapters to come examine the differences between
male and female state legislative candidates in terms of total candidate contributions and
contributions from various financiers (the party, interest groups, etc.) by the average
house district population. A variety of candidate, district and state-level control variables
are also included in the analysis. These variables measure a wide variety of factors from
candidate gender and past electoral competition to state legislative professionalism and
campaign finance stringency. The data is collected on open seat, contested and
uncontested races in 24 states across two election cycles (1998 and 2000) for all major
party candidates.
Chapter 2 examines the theories behind contribution patters by various donors
ranging from the political parties to business donors, as well as what role gender plays in
giving. In addition, I examine the theoretical underpinnings for total campaign
contributions and campaign self-finance. Chapter 3 explains my model for testing the
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possibility of gender bias in the campaign finance process. I describe the data utilized in
my study and provide a description and explanation of each of the dependent and
independent variables operationalized in my model. Chapter 4 examines the total amount
of donations received by male and female state legislative candidates in 1998 and 2000.
Chapter 5 explores what factors influence the contribution behavior of party donors and
what role, if any; gender plays in the donor decision-making process. Chapter 6 focuses
on contributions from a wide variety of interest groups. In particular, I concentrate on the
donor behavior of businesses, labor unions and ideological interest groups. In my final
analysis chapter, Chapter 7, I examine two under-studied aspects of the campaign finance
process, campaign self-finance and contribution size. Finally, Chapter 8 provides an
overview of the findings from the analysis in the previous chapters before concluding
with some insight into possible areas for future and continuing research.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTOR AND CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR
If, as discussed in the last chapter, perception affects women‘s attitudes about
fundraising, and raising money is an essential component of running for office, then it is
certainly possible that donors may perceive these attitudes or share them. Women may
worry that they won‘t get the financial support they need and donors may be more
reticent to give it under the assumption that women are not as safe of an investment
(Sanbonmatsu 2005; Fox 1997). In other words, the same self-defeatist attitudes that
plague some women may also affect how donors, political activists and other groups
approach and contemplate the campaigns of male and female state legislative candidates.
If these perceptions are true, then it is important to understand objectively and
empirically where the biases exist among financiers and how this affects the amount of
money that women collect from various donors, and ultimately whether they decide to
run. Unfortunately, research on gender and campaign finance tends to focus on aggregate
campaign expenditures and receipts without paying as much attention to the motivations
and behavior of particular groups of donors.
Although looking at total candidate contributions is important, it reveals very little
about whether gender differences exist. In addition, previous scholarly literature largely
rules out any funding disparities in this area (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al.
1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al. 1994; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Burrell 1985;
Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Welch et al. 1985). To get a better sense of the campaign
funding process, one needs to look beyond the aggregate sum each candidate collects to
the individual funding sources and sub-categories of contributions. In addition, one
needs to examine the size of donations made to both male and female candidates. In
other words, do women have to raise more of their money in small increments from a
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large number of donors? This is an aspect of the fundraising process that has received
very little attention but could affect the nature of campaign finance.
Below, I explore the theoretical underpinnings of donor behavior. I begin with an
examination of total campaign receipts and continue with a look at political parties,
interest group donors (businesses, labor unions, and ideological interest groups), and
campaign self-finance. I conclude with an examination of what factors influence the size
of these donations.
Total Campaign Contributions
As previously discussed, many studies do not find significant monetary
differences between male and female total candidate fundraising or spending. It is
possible that this may be a function of examining all donor sub-groups together instead of
disaggregating them. As noted, I hypothesize that women will be advantaged by
particular donors while others will be less generous in their contribution behavior. As a
result of looking at contributions in this manner, it is possible that I may find evidence of
bias in the fundraising process where others have failed to do so before.
I expect to find that female candidates are largely on par with their male
opponents given the previous findings on gender and total campaign receipts (Newman,
1994, Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan 2006 and Darcy et al. 1994, Wilhite and
Theilmann, 1986; Burrell, 1985 and Uhlaner and Schlozman, 1986). As previously
discussed, areas where women may face a disadvantage (business contributions, selffinance, contribution size) will be countered by areas where women might be advantaged
or at least break even with their male counterparts (ideological group donations, labor
union contributions, etc.). Thus, if I find differences in donor behavior, I expect them to
be located at a more particularistic donor specific level as opposed to in the aggregate.
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I intend to begin my analysis by testing a model that examines total contributions.
Previous studies have not always included many controls when examining total campaign
receipts (i.e. Thompson and Moncrief 1998) and many studies have not examined this
question at the state-level. Thus, it is important to start here so that I can see whether
gender differences might be more prominent at this level among similarly situated
candidates and so that I can gain a better understanding of the factors that influence total
campaign contribution size. In this manner, the reader can become familiar with my
model as each of the variables discussed will have some application to the various donor
sub-groups in the chapters that follow the examination of total campaign receipts.
Donations from the Party
Previous research has demonstrated that political parties often follow different
strategies when deciding how to allocate candidate donations. Thompson et al. (1994)
finds that the majority party tends to follow a ―protectionist strategy‖ where support is
given primarily to vulnerable incumbents in competitive races in the hope that the party
can maintain their majority. On the other hand, the party out of power tends to follow an
―additive strategy‖ where donations are given to competitive challengers in the hope of
making in-roads to party control (see also Herrnson 1989). Less is known about what
role, if any, gender plays in the decision-making calculus of parties. Do parties tend to
contribute more heavily to women‘s campaigns or do they concentrate their resources
more directly on male candidacies?
Until recently, the field has mostly limited its examination of parties and gender
to exploring whether there are advantages or disadvantages in recruitment patterns.
Interestingly, there is a lack of consensus among scholars in this area on whether strong
parties advantage or disadvantage female candidates. What scholars can agree on is the
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important role parties‘ play in the recruitment process. In their survey of state legislative
candidates, Moncrief et al. (2001) find that just under 75% of respondents spoke with
local party officials about their candidacy while half also spoke with state party officials
and other political officeholders. Since women are less likely to be self-starters, these
recruitment contacts can be essential in persuading women to run, so long as the
conversation is encouraging.
Certainly, the historical relationship between women and the party has been icy.
When women entered the political house they initially thought they would be
accepted as full and equal partners by party men. As in a marriage, their duties
and roles would be different, but their contribution would be important enough for
the men to solicit their advice and pay attention to their concerns. It took several
years for party women to realize that they were naïve. The experience of women
in the parties, as in marriages, varied considerably; a lot depended on the
proclivities of individual party men. Working in the parties was like a traditional
marriage and, for most women, not a very good one. Men were still head of the
household and made all the important decisions, but, as in a bad marriage, women
did not run the home; they were largely servants (Freeman, 2000, p. 229).
Traditionally the operative message from party leaders was ‗no woman need
apply‘ for a party nomination. In the 1980‘s, while female candidates were still
rare, women‘s campaigns were highlighted by the parties, and ‗a woman could
win this‘ became an occasional theme (Burrell, 1994, p. 99).
But, has this relationship thawed since the 1980s? Do parties believe women can win
when they run or do they harbor old stereotypes that women are simply not as viable?
The answer depends on whom you ask. In examining the average party
contribution and coordinated expenditure to congressional candidates between 1980 and
1990, Burrell (1994) finds that neither party has financially disadvantaged female
candidates and states, ―In the 1990s, women candidates have become mainstreamed in
the parties, and are treated like any other candidates‖ (Burrell, 1994, p. 99). Darcy et al.
(1994) agree that women are not just sacrificial lambs, as some have contended, and they
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argue, along with Moncrief et al. (2001), that women are as likely, perhaps more likely,
to receive encouragement and support from party leaders.
Despite these positive assessments, some authors argue that women are not as
welcome in the Republican Party. Shiner and Thrush (2009) report that the Republican
Party has become far less supportive of women who have moderate policy positions on
issues like abortion and health care. Representative Debbie Wasserman of Florida is
quoted in the article as saying, ―This is a party that doesn‘t respect women, a party that
doesn‘t believe women are equal to men. I don‘t think they attract women to their party,
I think they repulse women‖ (Shiner and Thrush, 2009, p. 2). This may indeed be the
case as fewer Republican women are willing to challenge Democratic incumbents while
the reverse remains untrue (Shiner and Thrush 2009).
Like Shiner and Thrush (2009), Fox and Lawless (2010) also find evidence that
recruitment bias is especially pronounced in the Republican Party. However, the authors
also find that party leaders, elected officials and political activists from both parties are
less likely to recruit women and less likely to concentrate their efforts on getting them to
run over time. This is especially troubling given that the women under examination are
as politically interested and professionally qualified as the men.
However, partisan discouragement is not necessarily confined to one party or
another. Niven (1998) also conducts a four-state survey with county party leaders and
potential female legislative candidates. The author finds that 64% of female respondents
believe party leaders have discouraged them or someone they knew from running. Just
over 40% of these respondents believe male party leaders supported men first in true
good ol‘ boy fashion. The authors also find that while ―only 24% of male party chairs
indicate that their top candidate for a future state legislative race is a woman, 47% of
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female party chairs indicate that their top candidate is a woman‖ (Niven 1998, p. 72). In
a survey of state legislative winners, losers, and dropouts in Florida, Niven (2004) also
finds more evidence of bias,
Men are disproportionately more likely to dropout of races their party was
unlikely to win while women are disproportionately more likely to dropout of
races their party was unlikely to lose. A survey of declared candidates offers a
clear explanation for this anomaly. Men receive encouragement from political
elites to run in favorable districts and discouragement from political elites to run
in unfavorable districts. Women receive the opposite messages. Moreover,
women report being more apt to value the input they receive from political elites
(Niven, 2004, p. 12-13).
Along with Niven (1998 and 2004), Sanbonmatsu (2006) argues that women may
face skepticism at the hands of party leaders. Although some party leaders may believe
women can be more successful in some conditions (gaining crossover voters, positive
voter stereotypes about trustworthiness, added excitement and attention that comes from
a woman running), others believe women can be disadvantaged under other conditions
(some voters may be unwilling to support women, women running in rural areas). In
Sanbonmatsu‘s (2006) interviews, the author finds that party leaders believe women can
be successful but they also feel their chances of success depend on where they are
running, among other things. Sanbonmatsu (2006) reports that ―[n]one of the party
leaders I interviewed thought twice about whether men could win election in all districts
in their state—a question often asked about women candidates‖ (p. 119).
This is not meant to imply that parties are resistant to the influx of female
candidates at all levels of government or in all states. Since research demonstrates that
women are often more successful when institutional, district and state-level conditions
are favorable for their election it is not unreasonable to think that party leaders are more
inclined to their candidacies when the conditions or the timing is right (Darcy et al. 1994;
Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rule 1990; Squire 1992; Hogan 2001a). For instance, the presence
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of female legislative or party leaders can make a major difference in whether women are
recruited or overlooked (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Often, the impetus is from women but it
does not have to be. Ralph Wright, the former speaker of the Vermont House of
Representatives, made a concerted effort to recruit women as a means to increasing
Democratic representation in the House. In the course of 14 years, 19 additional women
were elected, accounting almost entirely for the Democratic gains (Wright 2005).
Unfortunately, the desire of maintaining a ―good old boys‘‖ network may be
especially pronounced at the local level. Several authors find that local party leaders can
be especially unwelcoming to female candidates (Moncrief et al. 2001; Sanbonmatsu
2006; Darcy et al. 1994).
At the local level, I suspect it is a less accessible process for women. I think in
some of these small counties, it is a creaky, older structure, and so it is less
accessible. These folks may be entrenched and used to doing business the old
way, which didn‘t include women. And again, not necessarily in an antagonistic
way, but in a sort of last generation view of what women‘s roles were or could be
(Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p. 135).
Thus, it is possible that recruitment efforts, organizational support and financial
donations may not be as forthcoming from the local party when compared to the state
party.
Legislative campaign committees are another source of funds for candidates.
These groups are typically headed by party leaders and charged with recruitment, raising
and distributing campaign money, targeting legislative districts, and providing media or
other technical assistance (Moncrief et al. 2001; Rosenthal 1995b). Typically, funds and
support are directed to challengers and open seat contestants who may have more
difficulty securing funds or to candidates embroiled in competitive elections. These
organizations may be more open to helping women than some local parties but their
degree of support may be a function of the number of female leaders and members in the
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legislature. Thus, the more women in office, the more likely legislators will know viable
female candidates personally and the more likely they will have formed a favorable
impression about female officeholders and their electability. This should translate into a
greater effort to help women candidates through the legislative campaign committee,
especially if other women believe their help could translate into more political power for
their voting bloc or caucus if female representation goes up.
These are important distinctions to keep in mind when analyzing party
contributions. In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the
party and female candidates, I examine whether differences exist in the amount of
contributions that are made by each candidate‘s respective party. I examine the average
party contribution made to male and female candidates across all 24 states by candidate
status. I also break party contributions up into two distinct groups, those from the party
committee and those from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party
donors. My general expectations regarding the relative effects of gender on party
contributions when other factors are controlled are as follows. On the one hand, I might
find that once a woman has moved from the recruitment stage to actually declaring their
candidacy that the party will support them financially, especially since they will have had
ample opportunity to dissuade those who appear unelectable from running in the first
place. On the other hand, I might find that women face a tougher battle in gaining
contributions from the party leadership or from individual party donors because of the
negative stereotypes expressed above or because they are not as invested in getting
women into office and wish to protect their own hegemony.
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Donations from Business and Labor Groups
One prominent and highly studied source of candidate funds are corporations and
labor unions. In order to understand the allocation decisions of interest groups or their
affiliated PACs, it is necessary to first appreciate why these organizations make
campaign contributions. Gopoian et al. (1984) argues that there are four primary
concerns that interest groups have when making decisions about donating money:
―parochial issue concerns, broad ideological concerns, access, and power‖ (p. 260-263).
In the first group, parochial issues concerns, PACs are expected to focus their
contributions on those candidates who support their particularized viewpoints. These
groups are sometimes referred to as special-interest groups in the literature because they
have a very narrow agenda. Thus, candidates who serve on or chair committees of
interest to the interest group or who exhibit a supportive voting record on the interest
groups‘ issues, particularly crucial votes, will be more likely to receive campaign
donations (Gopian et al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Gordon
2001; Grier and Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988).
The theory behind the second group, broad ideological concerns, argues that
interest groups are not solely focused on particularized policies, and as a result, are
looking to support candidates who have the same basic ideological agenda as the interest
group in question (Gopoian et al. 1984). Here, PACs may contribute most of their
support and funds to members of a particular party whose values they share (Brunell
2005; Rudolph 1999; Evans 1988).
The third group, access, is focused on the degree to which PACs are able to gain
access to political officeholders. The reasons for wanting access are primarily two-fold.
The first goal may involve an offensive strategy whereby interest groups establish
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relationships with officeholders so they will have an opportunity to persuade, provide
information, lobby, or give advice to legislators on policy matters (Austen-Smith 1995;
Hall and Wayman 1990; Chin et al. 2000; Herndon 1982). Interest groups want face time
with legislators so they will think of them favorably or at least listen to their position
when the time is right. The second goal may involve a defensive strategy whereby
interest groups establish relationships for the purpose of keeping channels of
communication open so they can prevent officeholders from taking action that would be
detrimental to the cause of the group (Gopoian et al. 1984; Grenzke 1989; Hall and
Wayman 1990). Following this strategy, PACs will tend to donate to candidates,
particularly incumbents or political leaders, who look unbeatable as a way of preventing
hard feelings or as a way to stifle opposition during the next legislative session (Cassie
and Thompson 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990).
The final group, power, follows the opposite strategy from access. Here, interest
groups are focused on donating to those in tight electoral contests whose electoral future
is uncertain (Wright 1985). Following this perspective, if a PAC contributes to
officeholders in electoral jeopardy and they subsequently win, then that interest group
will not only have gained access to the member but also may have acquired some level of
control or influence. ―The PAC that can claim to have been a decisive coalition partner
in a close election is in a position not only to gain access, but to exercise claims upon the
candidate‖ (Gopoian et al., 1984, p. 263).
For reasons of parsimony, these four theories are frequently reduced to two; one
being an ideological or election based approach and the other being a strategic or access
oriented approach. An ideological strategy typically involves interest groups focusing
their donations on members of the political party most closely aligned with the group‘s
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ideology and those candidates who share and vote according to the viewpoints or issue
positions of the interest group (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985;
Brunell 2005). In addition, interest groups that follow an ideological strategy are more
likely to support challengers and candidates in tight electoral contests (Evans 1988;
Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). On the other hand, interest
groups following an access-oriented approach tend to give money to incumbents, political
leaders, committee chairs and members of key committees, those who support the interest
group‘s agenda on key votes, members of the majority party, and those who appear to be
running well ahead of their opponent (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock,
1985; Brunell 2005). Clearly, candidate characteristics, voting record, and electoral
considerations play a large role in who gets money and who does not.
The question is what role gender might play, as a candidate characteristic, in
determining whether or not candidates receive donations from each of these types of
interest groups. On the one hand, most scholars find that PACs tend to make
contribution decisions based on the characteristics of the candidates or the electoral
contest itself. These characteristics include majority party status, political party
affiliation, ideology, voting record, leadership position, committee chairmanship,
incumbency status, previous electoral margin, etc (Gopoian 1984; Clawson et al. 1986;
Wright 1985; Herndon 1982; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Grier and
Munger 1993; Grenzke 1989; Evans 1988; Deitz 2007). Since women are
underrepresented at all levels of government, they are less likely to run from the
advantageous position of an incumbent or to have been in office long enough to have
earned prestigious leadership positions and committee assignments. In addition, they are
less likely to have a voting record or a record of service that would make donors more
36

comfortable with providing large donations. Thus, women might face somewhat of a
disadvantage in fundraising against male officeholders, especially from donors who are
pursuing an access-oriented strategy. However, once these characteristics are controlled
for and like groups are compared to like (incumbents with incumbents and challengers
with challengers) the funding differences could very well vanish.
There are also more reasons to believe that women could be disadvantaged. If, as
stated earlier, women are less likely to have established strong financial and political
networks and if women feel less confident about asking for money, then they may be
overlooked by some interest groups. In open-ended interviews with officials representing
a wide variety of industries, Grenzke (1989) finds that PACs are more likely to make
donations to either their personal friends or to candidates who aggressively ask for
money. He notes, ―PACs, like other political groups, tend to give to friends and to people
who ask for help, even when more ‗rational‘ criteria would suggest diverting their
contributions to House members who are more powerful, more supportive, and running in
more competitive districts‖ (pp. 260).
In addition, the philosophy and membership of corporate groups is unlikely to be
as sensitive to women as that of labor unions. Labor unions are more inclusive of people
from various ethnic and racial backgrounds and socio-economic status. They are also
supportive of the rights of working women. A quick glance at the AFL-CIO (American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) website, and ―human, civil
and women‘s rights‖ stands out as one of the key issue platforms of the organization.
The following quote also illustrates how the organization‘s platform could bleed into the
political arena.
Today, the union movement is in the forefront of efforts to ensure that the gains of
the past are maintained and to fight for those still denied opportunity and equality.
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From its struggles to ensure U.S. workplaces are free of discrimination to its
battles to ensure that the hard-earned right to vote is secure for all, the union
movement continues to fight for the poor and the oppressed (AFL-CIO, 2009,
para 3).
Hence, if the focus is on ensuring equality, then this group, and others like them, might
be more likely to support female candidates in an effort to create a more representative
and diverse governing structure.
Given these differences, I expect when various other conditions at the state,
district and candidate levels are controlled for that women, on average, will have a
disadvantage relative to men in funds received from access-oriented groups such as
business interests or corporations. However, among election-oriented (or ideologicallyoriented) groups such as labor unions, women, on average, may be advantaged relative to
similarly situated men. In a survey of state legislators in 2002, Thomas and Wilcox
(2005) find just this, as women are 12% more likely to report labor unions as a source of
strong electoral and financial support while men are 17% more likely to report businesses
as a source of strong electoral and financial support. Among specific single-issue groups,
I would expect that the relative advantages would vary depending on whether the
organizations are supportive of conservative or liberal leaning groups.
It is also important to note that my examination of interest group donations
includes contributions from individual donors affiliated or associated with these
organizations. Fellowes and Wolf (2004) argue that including individual donations in
with PAC donations provides a better picture of the total fundraising effort. In addition,
individual interest group donors tend to follow the same basic strategies as the
organizations they are affiliated with when deciding whom to contribute to. Most of
these donors can be safely categorized into one of two groups: ―investors‖ or
―ideologues‖ (Francia et al. 2003). Based on my previous discussion, I anticipate that
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business donors are more likely to act like investors while labor union and ideological
interest group donors are more likely to be ideologues.
Investors are donors that have a financial stake in the outcome of an election and
will make a donation in an attempt to further or protect their corporate interests (Francia
et al. 2003). Often, this group of donors will make contribution decisions based on how a
particular candidate treated their business in the past. This group of contributors is more
likely to give to incumbents and to legislators who serve on committees of special interest
to business or that indirectly reflect business concerns, such as health care, trade, and tax
policy (Francia et al. 2003).
Unlike investors, ideologues are less likely to contribute primarily for financial
gain or industry advantage. Instead, they are more likely to focus on either a particular
policy or a series of policies and invest in candidates who share their viewpoint and
philosophy (Francia et al. 2003). However, the argument could certainly be made that
ideology and policy advantage are more intertwined for this group of donors and that
getting a similarly minded candidate elected may very well be in their financial or
political interest. Ideologues may also focus their contributions on a particular party if
that party tends to lean more favorably in the direction of the donor on that issue. Thus,
contributions may be given to either advantage a particular candidate or in an attempt to
shift the partisan/ideological direction of the legislative body more broadly (Francia et al.
2003). For this reason, ideologues are more likely to funnel money to close races than
investors are.
Donations from Ideological Groups
Unlike business donors, ideological interest group donors are most apt to follow
an electoral or ideological strategy. When making a donation, these groups will tend to
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focus on candidates who share their policy positions and beliefs, or are closely aligned
with their ideological viewpoint (McGhee and La Raja 2008; Evans 1988; Wright 1985;
Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In some cases, the interest group may funnel
the majority of their donations to a particular political party because they are more
sympathetic to their cause (e.g. gay and lesbian rights to Democrats or pro-life to
Republicans).
There are a variety of channels or mechanisms that ideological groups can use to
influence legislators and lawmakers. Research on this topic addresses lobbying and
litigation efforts, candidate endorsements, interest group rating systems, and etc.
However, less attention seems to be given to the act of providing campaign contributions.
When talking about PAC donations, the focus is often on contributions made by
corporations, labor unions, trade industries and leadership committees. When thinking
about the potential for gender differences in single-issue interest group PAC allocation,
this research often focuses exclusively on women‘s groups like EMILY‘s List, WISH
List, the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women‘s Political
Caucus (NWPC). However, there are other types of groups that may also exhibit a bias
in favor of, or perhaps against women candidates. But, these other issue areas remain
woefully under-examined.
Research on female-centric organizations demonstrates that they are very valuable
to female candidates both financially and politically. These organizations help recruit,
train and fund women (Rozell 2000; Fox and Lawless 2010). Women--especially
Democratic women--often reap the rewards through earlier funding, which translates into
more campaign receipts throughout the campaign, and higher general election vote
percentages on Election Day (Tankersley 2005; Francia 2001). Financial contributions to
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these groups tend to come from women who are politically active, affluent, and more
ideologically polarized than non-donors (Day and Hadley 2002). In addition, these
groups may also play a role in getting women to become more active in the political
process through requests for donations, voter registration drives, or other political events
(Fox and Lawless 2010). This could, in turn, encourage women to become more
politically engaged, which may lead to more women ultimately running for office or
making the political connections necessary to consider a bid.
Unfortunately, little is known about what role women‘s groups play at the state
legislative level or who the donors are. Even less is known about the role of other singleissue groups that focus on policy issues, whether controversial or non-controversial, or
partisan or non-partisan. Thus, the question remains, do these groups respond differently
to male and female candidates and, if so, why?
The National Institute on Money in State Politics collects data on a wide variety
of ideological or single-issue interest groups. Each state varies as to how many of these
groups are in action. Some groups represent especially conservative viewpoints, such as
those focused on pro-life, Christian conservative and anti-labor viewpoints. Other groups
represent especially liberal viewpoints, such as those focused on gay/lesbian rights and
issues, minority/ethnic groups, women‘s issues, pro-choice issues, pro-environment
issues, anti-gun issues, human rights issues, and etc. Other interests are more general and
could be seen as either supporting liberal or conservative viewpoints depending on the
policy focus, these include: health and welfare, tax issues, term limits and elderly/social
security issues.
Given that more of the aforementioned groups appear to exercise a liberal agenda
and focus on issues with which women are often identified, I anticipate that female
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candidates will receive a larger share of their funding from these types of groups than
their male counterparts. Since historically women have been identified with and
supportive of women‘s rights and social welfare policies I would anticipate that liberal
leaning interest groups would be very interested in getting women who share their
viewpoints into office (Poggione 2004; Thomas and Wilcox 2005; la Cour Dabelko and
Herrnson 1997). In addition, some of these groups, particularly those focused on
women‘s interests, may receive pressure from their membership base to support female
candidates or may fear looking unsupportive of the very sex they are advocating for if
they do not give token contributions to female legislators. In order to test for this, I
include two dependant variables -- one that includes contributions to candidates from leftleaning interest groups and another that contains contributions from right-leaning interest
groups.
Campaign Self-Finance
To round out my examination of funding sources, I look at another under-studied
revenue supply, the candidate. Examining campaign self-finance is important because
donors who have to contribute more to their own campaign may face disadvantages in
building grass-roots support and may find it harder to acquire revenue from other sources
(Steen, 2000).
The self-financing of campaigns has drawn increasing media attention since the
early 1990‘s. A number of candidates (H. Ross Perot, Mitt Romney, Steve Forbes,
Michael Bloomberg, John Kerry, and Hillary Clinton) pour millions of their own dollars
(either successfully or unsuccessfully) into their electoral contests (Cook 2008). Steen
(2000) reports that ―[i]n the 1998 election cycle, candidates for the U.S. House and
Senate loaned and contributed more then $50 million in campaign funds (10% of all
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receipts) to their own campaigns, and 77 candidates self-financed more then $100,000‖
(p. 1). At the state legislative level, a survey of just over 350 state legislative candidates
reveals that the second largest source of campaign funds comes from a candidate‘s own
revenue sources or personal loans (Faucheux and Herrnson 1999). This amount is twice
the percentage candidates report receiving from interest groups and four percent more
than the amount they receive from parties (Faucheux and Herrnson 1999). It is possible
that campaign self-finance plays such an important role because of state contribution
limits on both individuals and corporations.
Clearly then, campaign self-finance is an important source of funds for legislative
candidates, yet, very few studies, to my knowledge, examine this phenomenon at the
federal or state level, despite its potential explanatory power. Two exceptions are Steen‘s
(2000, 2006) works, which have taken the most comprehensive look at this topic to date.
She examines electoral contests between 1992 and 1998 for the U.S. House of
Representatives. In particular, she examines the role of candidate self-financing in ―the
quality of the candidates involved, the level of competition, the outcome of the vote, and
the incentive and experiences that elections provide for representatives‖ (Steen, 2000, p.
7). Steen finds a number of things. First, she finds that self-financers are often
politically inexperienced and lack name recognition and the support of political networks.
Second, the presence of a self-financed candidate can reduce political opposition. Third,
self-financing can increase a candidate‘s chances of electoral success but raising funds
the ―old fashioned way‖ is far more effective because campaign donations equal more
voter support and signal other donors about the strength of the candidate‘s campaign.
Fourth, most self-financing is loan based, which allows candidates to recoup their losses
by either writing off the loan as a loss or repayment of the loan after winning - with
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money from PACs hoping to gain access after the fact. Finally, the few self-financed
candidates who win their races typically transition to traditional sources of funding when
they run again (Steen 2000; Cook 2008).
Although these findings shed much light on the process of candidate self-finance,
they do not account for what role, if any, gender plays. Nor, do they address the role of
self-finance at the state legislative level. As a result, we still do not know whether it is
reasonable to assume that women self-finance their campaigns to a greater extent than
their male counterparts? To my knowledge, no study has answered this question.
However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that this might be the case.
First, as argued previously, women may feel less confident in their ability to raise
funds or may simply believe the process will be more difficult for them.
The bottom line is that women are not skilled fund-raisers. As a psychologist, I
think that the Southern culture conditions women to be polite (‗Never make
others uncomfortable‘) but does not teach them to be assertive in asking for
what they need. Southern women are far more at home giving dinner parties
then calling friends and associates to ask for checks (Whiting, 1998, para. 6).
These beliefs are not exclusive to the South. Faucheux and Herrnson‘s (1999) survey of
state legislative candidates bears this out. They find that female respondents are 50%
more likely to believe they will have a harder time building the resources necessary to be
competitive. Given these expectations, women who decide to run may believe they will
need to invest more of their own money into their campaign.
Second, if women are not as integrated into political and fundraising networks,
then they may have to offset this shortcoming with more of their own start-up money.
This may be especially true for female challengers who lack the characteristics that
interest groups look for when they are trying to gain access to influential members of the
legislature or to incumbents (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985;
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Brunell 2005). Women running as challengers and open-seat contestants may also need
more money to pull off a victory either because they are running from the disadvantaged
position of a challenger or because the race is especially competitive. In addition,
running from these positions often means that candidates have less name recognition and
this could make it more difficult for women to secure contributions from PACs, parties,
and individuals at a time when women need larger sums of money to get their message
out (Johnson 2008). Once they demonstrate that they can be competitive and gain more
name recognition, getting funding should be less of a factor.
I examine whether these assumptions are accurate by including a dependent
variable that measures the average amount men and women have personally contributed
to their own campaign across each state in the analysis. I expect to find that women put
more of their own money into their campaign when compared to men.
Examining the Size of Campaign Donations
Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted in this area. Most of the
speculation about contribution size revolves around the amount that individuals
contribute, particularly to presidential candidates. The Federal Election Commission
(FEC) tracks the size of donations received from individuals in Presidential campaigns
and with the rise in internet donations this area has received more attention recently.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in the most recent presidential election
Barack Obama acquired 54% of his contributions from donors contributing $200 or less
while 32% of his contributions came from donors contributing $2,300 or more. In
addition, 13,120 individuals (9%) contributed the maximum allowable amount in both the
primary and general ($4,600 in total). On the other hand, John McCain received 34% of
his contributions from donors contributing $200 or less while 49% of his contributions
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came from donors contributing $2,300 or more. In addition, 6,654 individuals (16%)
contributed the maximum allowable amount. These findings point to interesting
differences between the two campaigns in their donor base and possibly in their
campaign strategy.
Brown et al. (1995) and Francia et al. (2003) find that significant presidential and
congressional donors (those giving over $200) tend to be more politically involved than
the average citizen, they are more likely to have strong partisan beliefs, and they are more
likely to be well educated, wealthy, white and male. In addition, Francia et al. (2003)
find that donors tend to be older, more frequent church attendees, more involved in
voluntary organizations and more likely to belong to the legal, business, medical,
education, media or government profession. Other scholars find that political interest,
political knowledge, and even geographic location/population density can play a role in
contribution decisions and likelihood of solicitation (Grant and Rudolph 2002; Wiltse
2005; Lowry 2007). They also find that the ―economic base‖ for each party is different
(p. 43). Democratic donors tend to be better educated while Republican donors tend to
have larger incomes (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Both groups of authors also
note the importance of personal relationships in building donors and in acquiring
donations.
How does this research compare to other studies at the congressional or state
level? I am aware of two congressional studies on this topic. The first is Burrell‘s (1994)
research, which examines both the average PAC contribution and the average total
amount raised in contributions of $500 or more for federal candidates from 1980-1990.
Only in 1988 did women surpass men in raising money on these dimensions. However,
once controls are introduced, gender is not a statistically significant predictor of
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campaign size. The second is Baker‘s (2006) examination of U.S. Senate elections
between 1998 and 2004. In her study, she concludes that women tend to receive smaller
donations from individual donors.
Do women receive smaller donations when compared to their male counterparts?
To test for this relationship, I include several dependant variables that group donors into
categories according to their level of giving: small (contributions up to $200), medium
($201-1,000), and large ($1,001-5,000). I suggest that women receive more small
donations than do men. I base this belief on two theoretical arguments. First, as
discussed earlier, women may be less likely to receive donations, particularly of a sizable
nature, from access-oriented groups. Since corporations tend to have more sizeable
financial resources I would expect this to result in smaller contributions on average for
women. In addition, I expect women to be more successful in attracting individual
contributions from other female donors, which should, on average, be smaller then those
coming from corporations, parties or labor unions (Francia et al. 2004; Brown et al. 1995;
Baker 2006; Mooney 2009). Second, given the theories that women are less politically
and financially connected, have different attitudes about the fundraising process, and may
face skepticism from elites about their ability to get elected, one could conclude that
women will receive smaller donations than their male counterparts (Jenkins 2007;
LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001).
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING THE FUNDING LANDSCAPE OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
This dissertation focuses on open seat, contested and uncontested elections to 24
state legislatures in 1998 and 2000 among major party candidates (independent and third
party candidates are excluded). Unlike the majority of earlier research studies, the focus
is neither on the congressional level nor is the focus on only one or a small number of
states at the sub-national level. Examining campaign finance activity at the state
legislative level is important for a number of reasons. First, the state legislature is a
major entry point for many officeholders. Often state legislators go on to have careers as
state senators, governors, congressmen, even lobbyists. Some candidates may not have
first-hand campaign experience prior to running for state office, and these elections
should inform how they view, organize, fundraise and run for subsequent offices. More
importantly, state legislative candidates will form connections with donors and other
political and party elites prior to running for federal office. This heightened political
experience should render many of the theories about female confidence, ambition,
recruitment, and political and financial networking void at the federal level. Thus, the
state legislative setting should be the most promising avenue for detecting gender
discrimination, if it exists.
Second, the devolution revolution has given more power and responsibility to
state legislatures, interest groups have taken on a more prominent role in some state
legislatures, and most states have become more professionalized (Petracca 1992; Squire
and Hamm 2005). All of these factors should affect the campaign finance environment
and may matter for how donors react to candidate gender and for the entry decisions of
both male and female candidates. As state electoral contests become more expensive and
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as donors concentrate more funds at the state legislative level, the need to understand
donor behavior becomes even more paramount.
Third, studying campaign finance in a wide variety of states at the state legislative
level is important because it allows researchers to examine a large number of district and
institutional factors across many different ―laboratories‖ as opposed to just the two
institutions found at the federal level (Jewell 1982). This enhances generalizability and
allows for a more rigorous test of theory. In turn, this could shed new light on the study
of campaign finance at the congressional level or, at the very least, should enhance our
confidence in findings at the state legislative level or open up the area to further research.
Finally, state legislative elections, especially open seat elections, tend to take
place in a low information environment. Unlike high profile presidential or
congressional elections, state legislative voters may not be as knowledgeable about the
candidate‘s beliefs, background or issue positions. As such, voters may be more reliant
on information shortcuts like party affiliation and incumbency status (McDermott 1998).
In addition, the state electoral environment may increase the use of gender as a cue for
voters and possibly even donors (McDermott 1998). Here, voters and donors may use
gender as a way of deducing a candidate‘s ideology and policy beliefs. If so, examining
the state legislative environment may be especially appropriate given that this electoral
level may present a promising avenue for uncovering gender effects on donor behavior.
This dissertation takes advantage of this variation by examining approximately
half of the states in the U.S. I use this broad sample of 24 states to examine the
contribution patterns of candidates to their own campaigns and of various donors to
candidates. In addition, I look at total campaign receipts and the size of campaign
donations. I now provide an overview of the model I use to test these relationships.
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Modeling the Contribution Patterns of Donors to Male and Female Candidates
In my analysis, I use a variety of dependent and independent variables to help
account for the state legislative fundraising landscape. In this section I explain each of
these variables in turn, how they are measured, and what my theoretical expectations for
them are.
Dependent Variables
I have a number of dependent variables which are designed to capture the funding
landscape for both male and female state legislative candidates. The first set of variables
represents the amount of money contributed in terms of total campaign receipts and total
receipts by several categories of donors (political parties, corporations, labor unions,
etc.). The second set of variables, accounts for the variance in giving across each state in
the analysis. Here, total campaign receipts and total receipts by donor class are divided
by the average house district population in a given state and year. This results in a total
for each candidate per potential voter (all voters over the age of 18) in the voting age
population. Since candidates from more populous states will tend to spend more money
to get their message out and to campaign effectively, it is important to account for this
variation (Hogan and Hamm 1998; Sorauf 1992; Wright 2005). Such a technique works
to standardize the contributions to facilitate cross-state comparisons. My last set of
dependent variables looks at the percentage of contributions received from self-financing
and small contributors. Such a comparison is useful because it allows one to examine the
relative amount received in relation to the total. For instance, it may be more meaningful
to find that women raise two percent more of their total contributions from small donors
as opposed to saying they raised $1,000 more in small donations.
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Independent Variables
In addition to the dependent variables in this analysis, I include a number of
independent variables in order to control for a host of factors that could account for a
candidate‘s contribution amount and size. I begin by examining the operational and
conceptual definitions of the candidate-level factors.
Candidate-Level Factors
Gender
As discussed in my last chapter, there are a number of reasons to believe that
gender will play a role in the contribution decisions of various donors. However, I
hypothesize that gender will not play much of a role in total campaign receipts given the
variety of scholars who do not find a statistically significant difference between male and
female candidates on this dimension. Yet, I anticipate that women will receive more in
contributions from the party, from labor unions, and from liberal leaning ideological
interest groups. Female candidates, on average, may be more aligned with the
philosophy and policy beliefs of these organizations and these groups are more likely to
contribute to candidates in tough electoral contests, which may be better suited to the
type of races women find themselves in. I also expect that women will receive more in
small donations (contributions under $200) and will contribute more to their own
campaign. This outcome may occur because donors may contribute less to women if
they are unsure of their ability to win and if they do not have an established relationship
with the candidate. This may lead women to make up the shortfall by contributing more
to their own campaign. Finally, I expect women will receive fewer contributions from
businesses and corporations. Generally, these groups follow an access oriented strategy
and women are less likely to have acquired the characteristics that would make them
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more attractive to this type of donor. This information is represented for each candidate
in the analysis and is measured with a dichotomous indicator where 1 identifies a female
candidate and 0 is attributed to male candidates. This variable represents an alternative,
more parsimonious, measure of gender that does not account for the dynamic of the race.
Gender of the Opponent
As just discussed, donors may be influenced by the gender of a particular
candidate. However, donors may also be influenced by the gender of the opposing
candidate. Generally, studies have not accounted for this but it may be that donors base
their donation decisions on whether the competition is a man or a woman. Given the lack
of research on this dimension, it is difficult to speculate which type of races might be
most advantageous and it is possible that the effects may cancel out. On the one hand,
women might be most disadvantaged when they face a male opponent, as women are
most likely to be disadvantaged by stereotypes in this electoral environment. On the
other hand, Fulton (2008) found that challengers tend to spend more when they face a
female incumbent as opposed to a male opponent. Thus, it is possible that female
incumbents will be particularly disadvantaged regardless of their opponent. These
variables take the form of dichotomous indicators that represent the gender context of a
particular race. One variable identifies whether or not a woman was running against
another woman, another variable identifies whether a woman was running against a man,
another variable accounts for whether a man was running against a woman, and the final
variable is made up of races in which a man ran against another man. When the
opponent‘s gender is controlled for in the multivariate analysis, the cases in which men
run against men are used as the comparison category.
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Candidate Status
When looking at all contested candidates together, I include two dummy variables
that measure the status of the candidate. It is important to account for candidate status
because incumbents and open seat candidates tend to be better financed or to have larger
war chests when compared to candidates running as challengers against well established
opponents (Hogan, 2007; Burrell, 1994; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Krasno et al., 1994).
In addition, certain donors may be more receptive to these candidates either because they
have qualities that are missing in challengers, such as name recognition, or because they
hope to influence a tight electoral contest one way or the other. Thus, I expect
incumbents and open seat candidates to have higher campaign receipts both in total
contributions and in contributions from all types of other donors (party, business, etc.)
than challengers. In addition, I expect that incumbents will put less of their own money
into their own campaign given their higher probability of being electorally secure and the
likelihood they will raise more from various donors. Finally, I expect incumbents will
receive more in large donations because of their skill in campaigning, their array of
political and financial connections, their name recognition, and their experience in the
legislature. To measure this, I include one variable that identifies whether or not a
candidate is an incumbent and another variable that identifies whether a candidate is
running in an open seat race. The comparison category includes challengers.
Chamber Party Leadership
Legislative leaders, whether male or female, are valuable candidates that are
courted by all types of contributors, especially access-oriented donors. These donors are
looking to gain access to the gatekeepers of the legislative decision-making process
because they have influence over the success of legislation and are most likely to be in a
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position to persuade the rank and file to support, or at least not actively voice their
dissension, for legislation that favors the interests of that particular group (Moncrief et al.
2001). Cassie and Thompson (1998) and Clucas (1992) also uncover evidence in support
of this relationship.
For the reasons above, I expect to find that legislative leaders receive more
donations and larger donations from access-oriented groups like businesses. This should
also be the case because these leaders are likely to have established personal relationships
with donors that provide contributors with an incentive to help them remain in office
(Grenzke 1989). In addition, these candidates should receive more money from
individual corporate and labor union donors because they are more likely to have name
recognition, to be covered in the media and to be on the priority list for the organizations
they work for. I also expect to find that legislative leaders invest less of their own funds
into their campaign because they should have larger war chests and established
fundraising sources from prior elections (Francia et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier 1996).
As a result of these fundraising advantages, party leaders frequently find themselves in an
influential position to allocate funds to other candidates through legislative leadership
committees or through party or candidate campaign committees (Larson 2004; Mocrief et
al. 2001). This should only enhance their ability to collect larger donations in general
and donations from the party in particular. Finally, party leaders may receive more from
labor unions as these groups desire an ideological connection and will often consider
party affiliation and prior voting history as a surrogate for ideology. Party leaders should
be very loyal to the party and, as such, labor unions may use this as a cue in determining
proximity on issue positions of importance to the group. Thus, given the hypothesized
fundraising advantages across the board, I would expect party leaders to receive more in
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total campaign receipts. This variable is dichotomous and coded so an incumbent
candidate receives a 1 if they are a party leader and 0 if they are a rank and file member
of the legislature.
Committee Chairs
In much the same way as legislative leaders, male and female legislators who
chair standing committees should receive more contributions over-all and larger
contributions than officeholders who simply serve on the committees. This should be
especially true for legislators who chair prestigious committees or committees that
determine the fate of bills that are of great import to a variety of economic and special
interests (Endersby and Munger, 1992; Romer and Synder 1994; Grenzke 1989).
I expect that committee chairs receive more contributions from businesses, whose
primary mission is to seek access to influential legislators. However, I also expect
legislators to receive funds from labor unions who tend to follow an ideological strategy,
especially if these members chair committees that have jurisdiction or import over their
interests. Knowledgeable individual donors may also contribute more campaign funds to
these candidates either through the businesses and labor unions they work for or because
they care about a particular policy issue that the committee chair presides over. For much
the same reason as legislative leaders, I expect committee chairs to receive larger
donations than those in the basic rank and file and that they will have to put less of their
own money into their campaign. This variable is dichotomous with standing committee
chairs receiving a value of 1 and rank and file committee members receiving a value of 0.
Years of Service
In the last decade, political scientists have argued that a connection exists between
the amount of time a congressman has been in office and the amount of money they
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receive from donors (Grier and Munger, 1993; Rudolph, 1999). I speculate that there are
several reasons for this connection. First, the longer a member has been in office the
more familiar they should become with the legislative and campaign process and the
more skilled they should be in working with members of their constituency and in
making and passing legislation (Garand and Burke 2006; Wright 2005). They should be
more equipped to use their expertise and connections to help contributors meet their
policy goals. In addition, these individuals have an established voting record and should
have more sway over the policymaking process, which should help them gain
contributions from like-minded donors. Second, they are more likely to have earned their
way onto more prestigious committees or into a leadership post. Finally, these
individuals are more likely to know what types of fundraising appeals work and with
which constituencies and should also have established relationships with donors and
groups that will make it easier to ask for contributions and to receive them (Brown et al.
1995; Grenzke 1989; Francia et al. 2003). In fact, this is exactly what Grenzke (1989)
finds in her work. She states that candidates will accrue more in campaign donations if
they have developed the type of long-standing relationships that come with seniority, or if
they take an aggressive stance in pursuit of campaign dollars.
For these reasons, I expect access-oriented groups to be more likely to contribute,
and to provide larger donations when they do. I also expect candidates with more years
of service to receive more in total campaign contributions. On the one hand, I expect
seniority to lead to less campaign self-finance. On the other hand, I do not anticipate that
this variable will matter much for either labor unions or parties. Only if these candidates
appear vulnerable should party contributions become a significant source of revenue for
officeholders. Finally, I expect seniority will have a positive effect on the size of
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contributions received by candidates. This variable is continuous and simply represents
the number of years a member has served from the time they were first elected until the
last year of their current session (1998 or 2000).
Political Party Affiliation
Contributors often divide along partisan lines with business groups favoring
Republican legislators and labor unions favoring Democrats (e.g. Cassie and Thompson,
1998; Herndon 1982). I expect to find the same basic pattern in this analysis. However, I
also anticipate that this variable will matter more for groups favoring an ideological
strategy. Labor unions and ideological groups are more likely to pay attention to party
affiliation because they care about whether a candidate will share their policy positions
and beliefs (McGhee and La Raja 2008; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock
1985; Brunell 2005). Since party is one of the simplest cues for making assumptions
about ideology, donors are expected to hone in on this candidate characteristic when
making contribution decisions. I also expect Republicans to obtain heftier contributions
from the party and corporate donors given that Republican organizations are often
perceived to have a large fundraising base at their disposal and conservative donors are
frequently associated with higher personal incomes (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al.
2003). Given these expectations, I anticipate Democrats will raise more from small
donors. Finally, in terms of campaign self-finance, I am unsure which direction this
relationship will take. On the one hand, Republicans may invest less of their own money
given that they should do well in collecting contributions from a majority of the donors
examined here. However, Republicans, as a group, may have better personal financial
situations and may be able to finance their campaigns to a greater extent as a result. This
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variable is dichotomous and coded 1 if the candidate is a Democrat and 0 if the candidate
is a Republican.
Majority Party Status
Donors who wish to gain access to influential members in the chamber will be
more likely to make donations and donations of a larger size to officeholders from the
majority party (Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph 1999; Thompson et al. 1993; Cassie and
Thompson 1998; Grenzke 1989). Thus, I would expect majority party members to
receive more in total campaign receipts and more from businesses. In addition, majority
party members may receive more from the party as the majority party may be more
established and organized and may have a larger pool of funds to draw from than the
party out of power. However, groups that follow more of an ideological strategy (labor
unions), should be less likely to pay attention to majority party status and more likely to
focus on party affiliation and prior voting history (Rudolph 1999). Nevertheless,
majority party members may still receive more from labor unions because, as Cox and
McCubbins (1993) explain, majority party members tend to have the upper hand in
policymaking and procedural matters. In addition, majority party members tend to have a
seat distribution advantage on the most prestigious committee assignments. Finally,
majority party members are more likely to be successful when using their leadership
powers to get their agenda realized because they have gate keeping powers that allow
them more control over the procedures under which bills are or are not considered (Cox
and McCubbins, 1993). Given that majority party members are valuable to a wide
variety of donors, I would expect them to receive fewer small donations and to contribute
more to their own campaigns. In the dataset, this variable is coded 1 for all candidates
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who are from the majority party and 0 for all candidates who are from the minority
party.3
District-Level Factors
Past Electoral Competition
Political parties and labor unions are likely to concentrate on the previous
electoral margin of the candidate. If a candidate is supportive of a group‘s agenda but
appears to be in danger of losing their seat or is in a very competitive race, they should
receive higher levels of support in their bid for office (Thompson et al. 1993; Evans
1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). Alternatively, if a
challenger sounds like a good fit for an organization, then that party or interest group
should support this individual, especially if the opposition looks vulnerable (Thompson et
al. 1993; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005).
As to the other aspects of the campaign finance process, I am unsure which
direction these relationships will take. Candidates running in a historically competitive
district may need to invest more of their own money into their campaign. Further, they
may receive more in small donations and less in total contributions because donors may
not feel as assured that their investment will reap a reward. In addition, a competitive
race will tend to be more expensive and may require more of an investment by the
candidate. It may also be true that, candidates may invest less of their own money and
may get more from larger donors and total campaign contributions because some donors
may invest heavily in candidates facing tight electoral contests. This may mean that

3

Note that prior to 2000, state legislative incumbents in Washington shared chamber control.
Therefore, incumbents of neither party are coded as being in the majority.
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candidates will not need to invest as much of their own money if they can secure large
donations from other donors.
This variable measures past competition within a district in the previous election.
It is calculated by taking the winner‘s percentage of the two-party vote in the last election
and then subtracting it from 100. Thus, if a candidate in the previous election faced no
opposition (they won with 100% of the two-party vote) then their competitiveness score
will be zero. Alternatively, if the race is competitive and the candidate wins only 55% of
the vote, then the competitiveness measure would be 45. In other words, higher values
mean that the incumbent is more vulnerable. Higher values also indicate that a district is
particularly competitive.
Number of Candidates in the Previous Primary Election
Just as the previous degree of general electoral competition matters, so too does
the amount of competition in the previous primary. Although some candidates may be
unchallenged in the general election, it is quite possible they faced a challenging road in
the primary to get there. For instance, Palmer and Simon (2005) find that the electoral
context is different for male and female incumbents. They argue that women face stiffer
electoral competition and that they tend to be more of a magnet for challengers,
especially female, from within and outside of their party (p. 39). This heightened level of
competition may cause women to change their fundraising strategy and may affect how
much effort they put into building a war chest, collecting money early in the campaign
season, and etc.
As with past electoral competition, I anticipate that candidates will raise more in
receipts from groups that monitor electoral competition (e.g. political parties and labor
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unions). This variable details the number of candidates that ran in the legislator‘s
primary in the most previous primary election.
Amount Raised by the Opposition
I anticipate this variable will have a positive and statistically significant effect on
total campaign receipts, on total business receipts, on total labor receipts, on total party
receipts, and on self-finance because I assume the fundraising process has a reactive
element. Although this relationship may be more pronounced in terms of campaign
spending, it is certainly true that candidates‘ fundraising efforts take into consideration
their opponent or potential opponent. For example, candidates raise war chests in the
hopes this will dissuade potential challengers from running against them. In addition,
candidates may invest more in fundraising if their opponent is running a highly
professionalized and public campaign. Savvy candidates should be able to pick up on
cues, like the degree of media exposure, to help them determine whether they need to
invest more time into raising money to stay competitive. This variable is present in the
dataset for contested races. It measures the total campaign receipts and total receipts per
eligible voter for the opposing candidate. Thus, for an incumbent, this variable represents
the amount of money raised by the challenger and vice versa.
State-Level Factors
Legislative Professionalism
The degree of professionalism within state legislatures varies widely across all 50
states. Professional state legislatures tend to have longer sessions, higher member
salaries and greater levels of staff support (Moncrief et al. 2001). In addition,
officeholders in these chambers are far less likely to hold a job outside of their role as a
state legislator. Incumbents from professional legislatures are also more likely to
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maintain their office or to aspire to a higher office (Berry et al. 2000 and Carey et al.
2000). Since professional legislatures are often the source of innovative policies, accessoriented groups are likely to work harder to make a connection with incumbent state
legislators. In addition, incumbents from these legislatures are more likely to be
reelected, and this should increase the likelihood that access oriented groups (e.g.
businesses) will invest in their candidacies (Berry et al. 2000).
Although incumbents are more likely to be elected, gaining a seat in a
professional legislature can have its difficulties given the desirability of the office. Both
incumbents and challengers are likely to have some prior office holding experience, and
campaigns tend to be more expensive given that these types of legislatures are often
found in populates states (Moncrief et al. 2001). Once a candidate has gained office in
this type of legislature, they can expect future elections to be more frequently contested,
although the level of competition should not be as high as, ―legislators in professional
states have a clear advantage over challengers in terms of fundraising and generally
receive a higher vote percentage‖ (Hogan, 2004, p. 1298-1299). In addition, professional
legislatures often have high levels of party contestation, as well as active parties and
legislative campaign committees. Thus, parties, businesses and labor unions should
contribute more heavily, leading to higher overall total campaign receipts and fewer
small contributions. In addition, candidates may rely more heavily on self-finance given
the expensive nature of these campaigns and the high start-up costs.
To measure legislative professionalism, I use the standard measure by Squire
(2000), which factors in legislative session length, legislator salaries and staff resources.
The scale ranges from 0 to 1 with greater values indicating higher levels of
professionalism. For the purposes of descriptive analysis, I also use Kurtz‘s (1990)
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categorization of professionalism which puts state legislatures into categories using
legislative resources and time spent serving the legislature. Below, Table 3.1 illustrates
where the states in my analysis fall on each of Kurtz‘s categories from least professional
(citizen) to most professional.
Table 3.1: Level of Legislative Professionalism Categorized by States in the Analysis
States
GA, ID, IN, ME, NM, RI, UT
AK, CO, FL, IA, KY, MN, MO, OR,
TN, TX, WA
Professional CA, IL, MI, OH, PA, WI
Citizen
Hybrid

Campaign Finance Laws
Each state in the U.S. has campaign finance laws that range from allowing nearly
unlimited contributions to setting strict limits on the size of contributions that can be
made by various organizations or individuals (Alexander, 1991; Gross and Goidel, 2003;
Jones, 1984; Malbin and Gais, 1998; Michaelson, 2001; Thompson and Moncrief, 1998;
Schultz, 2002 and Witko, 2005). The stringency of these laws should have a definitive
effect on the contribution strategies employed by interest groups. Since parties and
individuals are less regulated, campaign finance laws should have only an indirect effect
on their contributions. Although, Baker (2006) points out that limits on individual
donations tend to disproportionately disadvantage women.
Since incumbents tend to be advantaged in the fundraising process, I expect
campaign finance reform to have more of a negative impact on their ability to raise
money (Hogan et al. 2009; Burrell 1994). Alternatively, stringent laws should offer some
benefit to challengers, as they should level the playing field and rectify some of the
contemporary fundraising imbalances (Hogan et al. 2009). When taken as a whole, I
expect that stricter campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that a candidate
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receives from every type of donor in the analysis and that it will increase small donations
and increase the need for campaign self-finance.
To measure campaign finance law stringency, I use a method which classifies
state laws into three categories (coded 0, 1 and 2). The first category encompasses each
state that allows unlimited contributions from corporations, labor unions and other PACs.
The second category encompasses each state that sets a limit on corporate and union
contributions or prohibits them completely but allows unlimited contributions through
PACs. Finally, the third category encompasses each state where PAC contributions are
limited to some degree and corporate and labor contributions are either prohibited or
limited. In 1998, just over half of the states in the analysis had the most stringent
contribution limits while five states had some limits in place and five states allowed
unlimited contributions. The only change to take effect between 1998 and 2000 was in
Missouri, which moved from allowing unlimited contributions to having some limits in
place. Below, Table 3.2 illustrates which states fall into each of these categories.
Table 3.2: Campaign Finance Law Stringency Categorized by States in the Analysis

0 (More Lax)
1
2 (More strict)

States
CA, IL, MO (1998), NM, OR, UT
IA, IN, MO (2000), PA, TX
AK, CO, FL, GA, ID, KY, ME, MI,
MN, OH, RI, TN, WA, WI

Interest Group Strength
Given the variation in interest group populations across the states (see Gray and
Lowery 1996 and Thomas and Hrebenar 2004), I expect to find that the strength of these
interest groups has an effect on the contribution strategies of donors. If interest groups
are strong and active, they are more likely to be at the forefront in researching candidate
history, making contributions to candidates, organizing fundraisers and creating issue
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advertising. If the state‘s interest group population is dense, then interest groups and
lobbyists are more likely to join forces to convince officeholders of their position and to
find innovative ways to grab the attention of candidates and officeholders.
Where interest groups are more inactive and weak, candidates should receive less
in total campaign contributions and contributions should be smaller from businesses and
labor unions. This lack of support may require candidates to reach deeper into their own
personal bank accounts to fund their campaign and may result in candidates receiving
more small contributions. On the other hand, when interest groups are strong and active,
party organizations may contribute less. I use Thomas and Hrebenar‘s (2004) measure of
interest group strength, which categorizes states on a four point scale from
complementary/subordinate (0) to dominate (3). Higher values on this dimension
indicate the presence of stronger interest groups. Table 3.3 below illustrates where each
of the states in my analysis fall on these dimensions.
Table 3.3: Interest Group Strength Categorized by States in the Analysis

0 (Lowest)
1
2

3 (Highest)

States
MI, MN
CO, IN, ME, PA, RI, WI
AK, CA, GA, IA, ID, IL,
KY, MO, NM, OR, TN,
TX, UT, WA
FL

Presence of Term Limits
Beginning in the 1990s, state legislative term limits became a hot topic as voters
grew increasingly comfortable with the idea of limiting the term length of state
legislators. Voters supported term limits for a wide variety of reasons, which Stein et al.
(2002) overview in their article. They state that term limits were favored by those who
were unhappy with the political process, by women and minorities who believed the
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process might create a gain in descriptive representation, by Republicans who were more
frequently the party out of power, and by voters who were of the opposite party from
their representative (Stein et al. 2002).
The first term limits took effect in California and Maine in 1996, one year before
the beginning of the first electoral cycle under examination here (NCSL, 2010). As such,
I have included a control for them in my analysis which accounts for whether or not term
limits were in effect for each state during the 1998 and 2000 elections. Table 3.4 below
illustrates which states had term limits during this time.
Table 3.4: Term Limits in Effect Categorized by States in the Analysis

Not In Effect

In Effect

States
AK, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, IN, KY,
MN, MO, NM, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX,
UT, WA, WI
CA, CO, FL, ME, MI, OH, OR

It may take some time after the inception of term limits for donors to regulate
their contribution strategy and figure out what works best for them. On the one hand,
some groups may contribute more heavily when term limits are in place as they may hope
that term limited members will use their last years in office to introduce legislation that is
favorable to the group‘s position. In addition, term limits will create more open seat
contests which may lead to increased donations by groups that normally contribute to
tight electoral contests or that are trying to get their preferred candidate elected. Term
limits may also limit the financial advantages that come with being a party leader or
committee chair for those whom are about to be termed out of office (Apollonio and
Raja, 2006), thus reducing over-all donations. Also, some donors may make an effort to
establish connections elsewhere by redirecting their donations or reducing their donations
to members they know will be out of office soon. In this manner, they can work to build
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a relationship and gain access to the next group of legislators. Thus, it is unclear whether
term limits will have a positive or negative effect on total campaign receipts, on the
receipts of various types of other donors, on campaign size and on self-finance. This
variable takes the form of a dichotomous indicator where a value of 1 means that term
limits are in effect within a given state and a 0 means that they are not.
Chamber Competition
Another factor that may affect the total amount raised by a candidate, as well as
the total amount raised from various donors, is the percentage of seats held by the
majority party in the state legislature. If a candidate is a member of a party that has a
commanding hold on the legislature, they may receive more money because their party is
behind the wheel and thus most likely to dictate the legislative agenda and what types of
policies are passed. However, if the partisan balance in the legislature is close to evenly
split, contributions may be directed more to challengers and open seat candidates as these
races offer the best opportunities for donors to influence the partisan balance in their
favor.
When the partisan balance in the chamber is close, I expect candidates to receive
more from the party, from businesses and from labor unions because each of these donors
has an investment in seeing one or the other party in control of the chamber. However,
the relationship between this variable and campaign self-finance and contribution size is
less clear. If donors are not sure which party will take control, they may hedge their bets
and donate smaller amounts to candidates from both parties, which may lead the
candidate to invest more in their own campaign to make up for the shortfall in donor
contributions. The obverse reading would be that some donors may invest more heavily
because they hope it will lead to their favored candidate winning and this may help to
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offset the costs involved so that a candidate will not have to contribute as much to their
campaign. This variable calculates the percentage of seats in the chamber held by the
minority party. I expect that higher values on this variable will translate into larger
campaign finance totals, especially for challengers and open seat contestants.
Presidential Election Year
One variable that may affect the amount raised is whether candidates are running
in a presidential election year. Generally, turnout is higher and voter interest and
attention is heightened during years in which a presidential election is held. This may
have a positive affect on total campaign fundraising levels, on donations received from
various types of donors, and may increase the amount received in small donations.
Conversely, donors may receive more pressure in an election year to contribute to races
at the federal or presidential level or they may choose to direct their resources more to
these campaigns because they feel having ties to these members is more valuable or they
are simply more invested in the outcomes of these elections. If the latter is true, this may
dampen contributions from the party, businesses, and labor unions and may result in
candidates having to invest more in their own campaigns. To account for this I have
included a dichotomous indicator where the 1997-1998 election cycle is coded 1 and the
1999-2000 election cycle is coded 0.
Having now explained the measurement and theoretical expectations concerning
each of the variables in my analysis, I include a table below that summaries the
hypothesized direction for each of these variables. Below, in Table 3.5, a positive
relationship is denoted with a plus sign and a negative relationship with a minus. When
there are theoretical reasons to believe the variable could take either direction I include
both symbols. Finally, when I do not have a hypothesized relationship for a variable,
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either because the literature is largely silent on the topic or I do not believe it will play
much of a role, I indicate this with a zero.
Table 3.5: Hypothesized Variable Directions for my Full Model
Variable

Total
Campaign
Receipts
Gender
0
Incumbent
+
Open Seat
+
Party Leader +
Committee
+
Leader
Years of
+
Service
Party
Affiliation
Majority
+
Party Status
Previous
+/Electoral
Competition
Number of
+/Primary
Opponents
Legislative
+
Professional
ism
Campaign
Finance
Laws
Interest
+
Group
Strength
Term Limits +/Chamber
+/Competition
Presidential +
Election
Year
Opposition
+
Candidate
Spending

Party
Donations

Business
Donations

SelfFinance

Small
Donations

+
+
+
+

Labor
Union
Donations
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
0

+
0
-

+
0
-

0

+

0

-

-

-

-

+

+/-

-

+

+

+

-

-

+

0

+

+/-

+/-

+

0

+

+/-

+/-

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

+

-

+

+

-

-

0
+

+/+

+/+

+/+/-

+/+/-

+/-

+/-

+/-

+

+

+

+

+

+

-
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The Full Model
Campaign Receipts per Eligible Voter= a + b1 (woman vs. woman) + b2 (woman vs. man)
+ b3 (man vs. woman) + b4 (incumbent) + b5 (open seat) + b6 (party leader) + b7
(committee leader) + b8 (years of service) + b9 (party affiliation) + b10 (majority
party status) + b11 (previous electoral competition) + b12 (number of candidates in
the previous primary) + b13 (amount raised by the opposition) + b14
(legislative professionalism) + b15 (stringency of campaign finance laws) + b16
(interest group strength) + b17 (term limits in effect) + b18 (chamber competition)
+ b19 (presidential election year).
In addition to understanding my model, it is also important to have a sense of my
decision framework regarding the selection of the states and time periods in my sample,
as well as where I acquired my data. This next section explains each of these aspects in
turn.
Description of the Data and Selection Criteria
This study takes advantage of the opportunity for variation and the larger pool of
candidates at the state legislative level by examining just under half of the states in the
U.S. The states under examination include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen for a variety of reasons.
First, an effort was made to focus on states that have single-member districts.4 Singlemember and multi-member districts should be separated because of the various

4

As of 1998, the following states had multi-member districts in the lower houses: Arizona, Arkansas,
Idaho, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington and West Virginia. I included Idaho and Washington in my analysis because these states have
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differences between the two electoral types. Scholars argue that single-member districts
tend to disadvantage women and minority groups while multi-member districts tend to
increase the importance of money in campaign success and lead to more expensive
elections generally (Hogan and Hamm 1998; Darcy et al. 1994). In addition, comparing
incumbents directly with challengers is a more parsimonious task when general election
contests are limited to no more then two candidates, one from each party (excepting
Louisiana‘s nonpartisan blanket primary system). Second, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Jersey and Virginia were all excluded because they conduct off-year election contests.
Finally, the state sample was also selected as a function of data availability. Campaign
finance data was not assessable on the Follow the Money website for one or both of the
electoral cycles in Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, Nebraska and Oklahoma. Despite
not having a full 50 state sample, these states do provide variation on important factors
such as region, interest group impact, degree of professionalism, inter-party competition
levels and culture. Additionally, the states vary on another critical component—i.e.,
campaign finance laws.
Only lower state houses are examined in this analysis, as for the states in this
sample, elections are always held in a two-year rotation, which ensures that all members
of the legislature can be examined for both electoral periods. Looking at elections to the
state senate is more complicated given that some states hold elections every two years
while others hold elections every four years.

post systems where candidates run for legislative office in the same geographic area. For this analysis,
each of these posts is treated as a separate election.
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The electoral cycles 1998 and 2000 were selected partly as a function of data
availability for the independent variables in the analysis. However, more importantly
these elections were selected because enough time elapsed from the date of redistricting
to allow for competition in the districts to regularize and for candidates to have a clear
picture of their constituency. Additionally, by selecting elections at the end of the
redistricting cycle, I should be able to eliminate the possibility that my measure of
previous electoral margin is clouded by the proximity of redistricting. Finally, enough
time should have elapsed for candidates to base entry decisions, and for donors to base
fundraising decisions, on factors other then redistricting.
I chose to examine general elections exclusively for a couple of reasons. First,
primaries tend to be more low-key affairs with less media attention, name recognition,
and challenger quality. This is likely to have an affect on donor contribution patterns and
voter turnout. As a result, some interest groups, especially big contributors, may wait to
influence an election until the Democratic and Republican candidates have been
established. In addition, candidates tend to put more of their own money into these
campaigns, which limits the breadth and scope of the type and amount of donors for
examination. Focusing on general elections eliminates many of these problems and
allows for a more detailed examination of the contribution patterns to male and female
state legislative candidates.
The primary dataset used in this analysis was obtained and coded from the
Institute on Money in State Politics, a nonprofit organization that collects data in paper
and electronic form from state disclosure agencies (About Our Data, n.d., para 1).
Reports are obtained and uploaded by the Institute into a dataset, which contains all
candidates in the primary and general election at the state legislative level (About Our
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Data, n.d., para 1). The dataset contains data on the campaign contributions of each
Democratic and Republican candidate who ran in an open, contested or uncontested race
in the general election. This information can be obtained from the website
www.followthemoney.org. Each record in the dataset contains information on the
contributor/industry that made the donation, who the recipient of the donation was, the
amount that was given to the candidate and, in some cases, the date that the contribution
was made. The primary advantage of using this data is that each donation is categorized
into a number of economic sectors according to ―economic interest codes‖ (About Our
Data, n.d., para 2). The economic sectors retain the same identification from state to state
although some classifications may be excluded due to a lack of applicability in some
states. The website contains a designation for agriculture, candidate contributions,
communications and electronics, construction, defense, energy and natural resources,
finance, insurance and real estate, general business, health, ideology/single issue, labor,
lawyers and lobbyists, other/retiree/civil servants, party and transportation (About Our
Data, n.d., para 6). The data collection was made possible by two grants from the
National Science Foundation (SES-0215450 and SES-0215604), which were awarded to
the principal investigators: Dr. Robert Hogan of Louisiana State University and Dr. Keith
Hamm of Rice University.
In addition to the aforementioned dataset, I also obtained data on each incumbent
candidate‘s personal and professional attributes (such as their gender, term of service,
party affiliation, etc.) This data was obtained either directly from the Secretary of State
or the Clerk of the House or from the book State Legislative Leadership, Committees and
Staff for the years 1998 and 2000 published by the Council of State Governments. In the
case of candidates who were not successful in their bid for office, much of this
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information is simply not applicable (such as previous voting record, chamber leadership,
committee chairmanship, etc.) and is therefore not included. For the variables that are
applicable to non-incumbent candidates, such as gender and party affiliation, an effort
was made to collect this data for each candidate.
I was able to obtain information on the party affiliation of the non-incumbent
candidates from either election returns or the website www.followthemoney.org. Data on
the gender of both the incumbent and non-incumbent candidates was obtained from the
Center for American Women on Politics, an organization that lists the gender of all
female candidates for political office.
Besides individual level characteristics, data was collected on several district and
state level factors. Demographic district level data was obtained from the book
Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and Demographics by Barony et al. published in
1998. Data on the campaign finance laws in each state was obtained from Campaign
Finance Law, a publication by Feigenbaum and Palmer for both 1998 and 2000. If
questions arose concerning some particular aspect of the laws more information was
sought from the state oversight agencies. Election materials came from each state‘s
election division either via a personal request from an official working in that department
or through the department‘s website.
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CHAPTER 4: EXAMINING TOTAL CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS
This chapter and the remaining analysis chapters explore just how viable
campaign finance is as an explanation for women‘s under-representation. I make an
effort to answer the following questions: Are women‘s campaign receipts on par with
men‘s so long as incumbency, majority party status, leadership status, etc. are taken into
account? Is the nature of raising money different for men and women? Are women
advantaged by some types of donors but disadvantaged by others? My exploration of
these questions begins with an in-depth look at total campaign receipts. In general, I
expect to find differences between male and female state legislators across the various
types of donors but not necessarily in total campaign receipts. In some cases, I expect
these differences will advantage female candidates while in other cases they may put
women at a disadvantage.
Previous Research on Total Campaign Contributions
There has long been a perception that women have a hard time raising money and
competing with men financially. Candidates, party activists, and various types of donors
have all shared personal experiences and perceptions of the obstacles that women face in
the campaign fundraising process (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006;
Moncrief et al. 2001). Burrell (1994) argues that these beliefs are based on three basic
assumptions. The first is that, ―women are psychologically unsuited to asking for money
for themselves‖ (Burrell, 1994, p. 102). In other words, while women may not think
twice about raising money for charity, a political organization, or a child‘s fundraising
project, it is another thing when it involves raising money for something that benefits
them directly. Second, women may struggle to raise money because they are less
connected professionally, socially, and politically to the types of donors and networks
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necessary to raise money (Burrell, 1994). Third, assuming that number two is false and
women make their case to approximately the same number and type of donors, it is
possible that they do not get the same results for their time and effort. In other words,
donors may harbor stereotypes about female candidates and their ability to compete
successfully. These stereotypes may prevent donors from investing in women candidates
or to even discourage their candidacies.
Despite the electoral gains that women have made in some states and the
proliferation of women‘s political organizations to help with campaigning and
fundraising, if these stereotypes persist, they may derail the candidacies of some women
or make it less likely that women run in the first place. The goal of this dissertation is to
help reconcile perception with reality. Most of the scholarly literature in political science
since the 1980s concludes that when women run they win and that women can be
successful fundraisers (Newman, 1994; Burrell 1985, 1990, 1994; Gaddie and Bullock
1995, 1997; Uhlander and Schlozman 1986; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Darcy et al.
1984, 1994; Thompson et al. 1998; Werner 1997; Seltzer et al. 1997; Fox 2000). When
differences in campaign finance are found between male and female candidates they are
attributed to differences in status as men are more likely to be incumbents or to hold
leadership positions within the legislature. Thus, when female incumbents are compared
to male incumbent these differences disappear (Burrell, 1985).
However, given the difficulties inherent in examining campaign finance at the
state legislative level, many of these studies occur exclusively at the congressional level.
Obviously, this poses some challenges for extrapolation as congresswomen tend to be
more established candidates with a built-in network of donors and political contacts and
previous experience campaigning, fundraising, working with the media, appealing for
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votes, etc. Therefore, it may not be safe to assume that what holds true at the federal
level will also be the case at the sub-national level. In addition, congressional campaigns
can often be very expensive affairs. The Federal Election Commission reports that
congressional candidates who ran for office between 2007 and 2008 raised close to $1.5
billion and spent close to $1.4 billion during that time period. In addition, between Jan. 1
and Dec. 31 of last year, congressional campaign receipts were close to $600 million,
which represents almost an 18% increase since 2007 (Federal Election Commission,
2010). Although state legislative campaigns have become more expensive, especially in
professional states, many still fail to reach the financial excess of a race for the U.S.
House or Senate.
Many sub-national studies of campaign finance are conducted with a very limited
sample of states or have been single-state studies (Thompson and Moncrief, 1998)
making generalizations difficult. The most comprehensive state-level assessments come
from a couple of sources. The first is a book chapter by Thompson and Moncrief (1998)
which examines campaign contributions to male and female state legislative candidates
across 18 state legislatures. The authors examine the 1992 electoral session which has
been referred to as ―The Year of the Woman‖. The authors find that women actually
outperform men in their fundraising capabilities. However, the authors qualify this
conclusion by saying that women have a much more difficult time when competing for a
seat in a professional legislature. The author‘s also caution that their sample of states
does not contain many Southern states which may be problematic since these states tend
to be home to cultural factors that can disadvantage women in fundraising. Although this
study provides a rare multi-state assessment of campaign finance, it is rather limited in
terms of the number of controls for the district and state electoral environment. For
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instance, this study does not account for the strength of interest groups, the level of
previous competition in a district, or the stringency of campaign finance laws.
The second multi-state set of analyses of campaign finance are included in several
papers by Hogan (2008, 2007, 2001a, 2001b). These studies examine male and female
state legislators across 20 states and two electoral cycles. The author finds that male and
female candidates tend to spend the same amount of money in running for a seat in the
state legislature and that other factors (such as leadership status and opposition spending)
tend to affect total campaign spending. However, these studies are focused on campaign
spending and not campaign fundraising and therefore do not have quite the same research
objectives in mind. For instance, when looking at total spending exclusively, one does
not get a sense of the degree of effort that went into raising this sum of money nor do
they know how much of that money was contributed by the candidate themselves. In
other words, at the end of the day, a woman may raise and spend a sum of money that is
equal to that of a man; however, the woman may have had to collect more donations to
reach this total if they received smaller contributions. Thus, I argue it is fundamentally
important to our understanding of gender and campaign finance to examine campaign
fundraising more in-depth and across a large array of states. For now, my analysis is
limited to an examination of total campaign contributions. My primary research question
is concerned with whether male and female state legislative candidates raise similar
amounts of money across the large array of state in the analysis.
I begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of total male and female
campaign receipts before performing a more detailed analysis that controls for other
mitigating factors that might account for any differences I find below.
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Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Campaign Receipts
An initial way to determine whether differences exist between male and female
legislators is to examine the mean and median on total campaign receipts across each
state. I include both the mean and median because the median is less sensitive to outliers,
such as instances when a small number of candidates raised a sum far higher or lower
then average. For instance, legislative leaders may raise tens to even hundreds of
thousands more than a challenger running for the first time. Table 4.1 displays the mean
and median total contributions received for both contested and uncontested races for men
and women across the 24 states. The table is sorted according to the mean contribution
received by the male candidates.
Table 4.1: Total Campaign Receipts by Gender and State
State
Rhode Island
Maine
Idaho
Utah
Colorado
Kentucky
Minnesota
New Mexico
Missouri
Wisconsin
Iowa
Georgia
Alaska
Tennessee
Michigan
Indiana
Washington
Pennsylvania
Oregon
Ohio
Florida
Texas

Men
Women
Mean
Median
Number
Mean
Median
Number
4,769
1,800
186
1,596
1,076
65
5,394
4,324
387
4,990
3,864
130
9,121
7,217
146
12,821
10,960
59
12,013
10,577
203
13,951
10,479
63
19,588
17,675
147
21,776
19,031
76
21,577
13,197
243
24,736
16,033
35
22,864
21,094
371
23,268
23,039
138
24,503
17,173
147
23,261
19,278
65
26,510
21,240
382
28,141
23,261
121
31,687
21,696
248
31,889
24,391
64
34,157
24,169
252
31,191
24,141
71
34,697
25,202
391
27,009
18,645
98
38,794
34,505
88
46,515
35,837
38
43,549
30,152
224
47,805
38,236
45
43,916
26,096
312
37,562
19,362
123
51,527
31,773
265
53,668
28,305
52
56,180
50,685
233
62,206
50,275
107
68,891
36,913
517
57,147
29,704
111
83,550
61,545
142
93,315
89,455
68
83,931
47,743
272
59,691
39,350
93
108,032
98,663
248
117,325
103,754
104
123,768
89,441
321
116,689
84,136
71
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Table 4.1 Continued
State
Illinois
California
Total

Men
Women
Mean
Median
Number
Mean
Median
Number
212,225
112,542
254
105,818
84,359
96
465,875
285,734
224
470,501
326,862
85
66,630
23,928
6,203
63,848
24,888
1,978

In looking at the table, it is apparent that there is a great deal of variation across
the states in terms of total campaign receipts. In California men and women raise above
$450,000 on average while in Rhode Island the average total is below $5,000 for both
men and women. In addition, there tends to be great variation in the distance between the
average contribution for men and women in a number of the states. For instance, the
largest difference is in Illinois where men receive over $106,000 more in total campaign
receipts on average than women do. The second largest contribution difference is in
another professional state, Ohio, where men out-raise women, on average, by just over
$24,000. On the other hand, in some states the differences are incredibly slight with
women receiving $404 more on average in Minnesota and $202 in Wisconsin. In
examining the average total across all of the states in the analysis it is interesting to see
that when compared to men, women have a slightly higher median contribution but a
slightly lower mean contribution. Finally, in looking at each state individually, one finds
that women out-raise men on the median total contribution across 12 of the states in the
analysis while men outperform women in the other half. This suggests that women are
capable fundraisers who can compete with men or even exceed the total coffers of their
male opponents in some cases.
The next table, Table 4.2, provides a different perspective on campaign receipts
by examining total receipts divided by the house district population. This figure provides
an estimate of the total amount received by each candidate per potential voter in the
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voting age population. Controlling for population is important because campaigns tend
to be more expensive in populous districts and accounting for this variation may facilitate
comparisons.
Table 4.2: Total Campaign Receipts per Eligible Voter by Gender and State
State
Oregon
California
Tennessee
Idaho
Alaska
New Mexico
Missouri
Kentucky
Florida
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Colorado
Iowa
Washington
Utah
Maine
Texas
Indiana
Ohio
Michigan
Rhode Island
Pennsylvania
Georgia
Illinois
Total

Male Median Female Median Difference
1.43
2.13
-0.70
0.93
1.10
-0.17
0.72
0.88
-0.16
0.28
0.44
-0.16
3.21
3.34
-0.13
0.92
1.03
-0.11
0.84
0.94
-0.10
0.45
0.54
-0.09
0.97
1.05
-0.08
0.54
0.62
-0.08
0.81
0.86
-0.05
0.38
0.42
-0.04
1.12
1.13
-0.01
0.58
0.58
0.00
0.55
0.52
0.03
0.67
0.61
0.06
0.92
0.86
0.06
0.72
0.63
0.09
0.57
0.47
0.10
0.39
0.29
0.10
0.24
0.13
0.11
0.81
0.64
0.17
0.78
0.56
0.22
1.48
1.12
0.36
0.71
0.70
0.01

In this table, it is again apparent that there is a fair amount of variation between
each of the states under consideration. In Colorado, Idaho, Michigan and Rhode Island
male and female candidates raise, less then 45 cents per eligible voter while in Alaska,
Iowa, Illinois and Oregon both male and female candidates raised over $1.10 per eligible
voter in the district. One interesting change from the previous table is Alaska. Once
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population is accounted for, this state has the highest median contribution for both men
and women. In looking at the difference between the male and female median total
contribution per eligible voter, one sees that women out-raise men in 13 states and men
exceed the totals raised by women in 10 states. Women do exceedingly well in
fundraising in Oregon where the difference is 70 cents in their favor while men have the
greatest advantage in Illinois where their total exceeds a woman‘s by just over 35 cents
per eligible voter. Again, on the whole, women can compete with men. However, they
are more successful in their endeavors in some states versus others.
Discussion
Finally, as we saw in chapter one, just as there is variation across the states in the
number of women running and winning, so too is there variation in the amount of money
women and men raise. Although, men raise $2,782 more than women on average,
women‘s median contribution is $960 higher than men‘s. However, when examining the
median total contribution per eligible voter, men out-raise women by about one cent per
eligible voter.
Given the great variation across the states in the number of women running and in
the amount of money being raised, it is imperative that these differences be explored
more fully. Although gender may play a role in this variation, there are many other
factors that should also account for these differences. Thus, I control for the various
candidate, district and state-level factors that play a role in the contribution decisions of
donors. Below, I describe my hypotheses and measurements for each of the variables in
my model.
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Variables and Hypotheses
In this chapter I examine total contributions received by male and female state
legislators accounting for the voting age population in each state. The total contribution
encompasses every recorded contribution per candidate on the Follow the Money
website. It includes donations from 19 economic sectors such as agriculture, energy and
natural resources, government agencies, health, lawyers and lobbyists, party, and
transportation. The contributions represent donations from a variety of sources including
labor unions, corporations, individuals and parties. I examine total campaign receipts per
eligible voter because fundraising is so strongly affected by the number of potential
voters that need to be contacted. Each candidate‘s total contributions per eligible voter
are used for all 24 states in my analysis across both electoral periods (1997-1998 and
1999-2000). There are a number of demographic, district and state-level factors that I
anticipate may have an effect on total campaign receipts. Below, I discuss each of these
variables in turn and explain their hypothesized relationships to the dependent variable.
Candidate-Level Factors
First, given the previously mentioned array of findings that have not demonstrated
a statistically significant difference between men and women in total contributions, I
hypothesize that differences between the two types of candidates will be slight. I expect
that gender differences may be exhibited more clearly when looking at particular types of
donors versus the total array of donations. Second, I expect incumbents and open seat
candidates will have higher total campaign receipts than challengers because these
candidates will tend to be better financed or will have larger war chests when compared
to candidates running as challengers against well established opponents (Hogan, 2007;
Burrell, 1994; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Krasno et al., 1994). Third, I expect
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Republicans to receive slightly higher total campaign receipts overall given that
Republican organizations are often perceived to have a large fundraising base at their
disposal and conservative donors are frequently associated with higher personal incomes
(Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Fourth, I expect majority party members, party
leaders, committee leaders, and more senior members will receive more in total campaign
receipts. Because these members tend to have more gate keeping and policy making
authority, I anticipate donors want to gain access to them. In addition, members with
these characteristics may be more skilled at fundraising and are more likely to have
established connections with various types of donors (Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph
1999; Thompson et al. 1993; Cassie and Thompson 1998; Grenzke 1989; Sorauf, 1992;
Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Moncrief et al.
2001; Cassie and Thompson 1998; Clucas 1992; Larson 2004; Grier and Munger 1993).
District-Level Factors
Besides candidate-level factors, there are also features unique to a district that can
affect fundraising. The three factors that I pay particular attention to in this analysis
include the level of competition in the last general election, the degree of opposition
faced by a candidate in their primary in the last election, and the amount raised by the
opposition. First, previous electoral competition should have a positive or negative effect
on total campaign contributions. In instances where the election result hangs in the
balance, both access and election oriented contributors are likely to make donations.
Recent history of a contested primary is also likely to result in larger total campaign
receipts for similar reasons. The level of spending by the opponent is an even more
proximate indicator of the competitiveness of the district and should be positively
associated with campaign receipts.
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State-Level Factors
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned candidate-level and district-level
factors, there are a number of system-level factors that are known to impact the amount
of money raised by candidates. First, I anticipate that candidates will raise more when
running for a seat in a professional legislature as these races tend to be more expensive
(Moncrief et al. 2001). In addition, parties and interest groups should be more active here
given the level of contestation and the desirability of acquiring ties with members who
make this their career. Second, I expect that campaign finance laws will dampen the total
amount that candidates receive because these laws make it more difficult for donors to
provide large sums of money to candidates (Hogan et al. 2009; Burrell 1994). Third,
I expect to find that the strength of interest groups has a positive impact on total
campaign receipts because businesses and labor unions should be better organized and
more active when interest groups are strong and this should translate into more
contributing. Fourth, as discussed earlier, term limits may have a positive or negative
impact on total campaign receipts. If groups wish to buy access then they may not
contribute to members who are in their last term (Appollonio and Raja 2006). On the
other hand, donors may contribute more to these members in a last ditch effort to reach
them before they depart. In addition, term limits will create more open seat contest
opportunities and this may translate into higher donations as donors try to establish a
relationship or influence a contested election one way or the other. Fifth, like term limits,
I am unsure whether chamber competition will have a positive or negative effect on total
campaign receipts. On the one hand, if a candidate is a member of a party that has a
commanding hold on the legislature, they may receive more money because their party is
behind the wheel and thus, most likely to dictate the legislative agenda and what types of
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policies are passed. On the other hand, if the partisan balance in the legislature is close to
evenly split, contributions may be directed more to challengers and open seat candidates
as these races offer the best opportunities for donors to influence the partisan balance in
their favor. Finally, I expect candidates will raise more in a presidential election year as
voter attention and interest tends to be heightened during this time and this may lead
donors to contribute more then normal.
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Campaign
Receipts
This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the amount of total
campaign dollars that candidates receive per eligible voter in the district. I first perform
several OLS regression analyses that examine the model for all candidates and then
conduct separate analyses for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates. Given
that several scholars find that fundraising differences are a function of differences in
candidate status, it is important to test whether gender will have any explanatory power
once these factors are controlled for (Burrell, 1985). Below, Table 4.3 presents the
coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of
the candidate, as well as the gender of the candidate and their opponent.
Table 4.3: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Candidates
in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
-0.84***

All Candidates
-0.85***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader

-0.03
-0.005
-0.02
0.75***
0.77***
5.08***

0.01
---0.75***
0.77***
5.08***
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Table 4.3 Continued
Variable
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

All Candidates
0.11
0.04***
-0.16***
0.23***
0.01***
0.05
0.01
-0.19***
0.19***
-0.12*
0.02***
-0.16***
0.22***

All Candidates
0.11
0.04***
-0.16***
0.23***
0.01***
0.05
0.01
-0.19***
0.19***
-0.12*
0.02***
-0.16***
0.22***

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.24

6,067
0.24

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In the first model, I examine all candidates who ran in a contested race by the
gender of the candidate and their opponent while in the second model I examine the
effect of gender without controlling for the gender of the opponent. These models
explain about 24 percent of the variance and most of the variables are statically
significant. Interestingly, in neither model, is gender significant. Among candidate level
factors, incumbents and open seat candidates raise more than challengers, party leaders
raise a staggering $5.08 more per eligible voter, while Republicans, members with more
seniority, and majority party members raise more per eligible voter. All of these factors
point to the power of incumbency and the difficulty in running as a challenger,
particularly against a candidate with some type of chamber leadership role. This analysis
also tends to support earlier findings that Republicans are well-financed candidates
(Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Aldrich 1995).
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Turning to the district level factors, when the previous election was more
competitive candidates tend to raise one cent more per eligible voter (more precisely – for
every one-unit increase in the competition variable that ranges from 0 (no competition) to
50 (high competition), total contributions increased by one cent per eligible voter). Past
primary competition does not appear to affect campaign contributions.
In terms of the state-level factors, legislative professionalism does not seem to
have an impact on total campaign receipts. However, the coefficients for each of the
other state-level factors are rather large. Strict campaign finance laws (as opposed to
more lax ones) reduce the total amount that candidates raise by 19 cents per eligible
voter, the presence of strong interest groups increases the amount of money raised by 19
cents (for every one-point increase on the 0 to 3 point scale), and when term limits are in
effect candidates raise 12 cents less per voter. In addition, candidates tend to raise less in
a presidential election year but they raise more when their opposition raises more money.
In analysis not shown, I estimate these models using state dummy variables in
place of the state-level factors. It is important to estimate the model using dummy
variables as these can control, to some degree, for state-level effects that are not
measured here, such as the culture of the state, the socio-economic status of the voters, or
the public attitudes of citizens.5
Having now examined the results when all of the contested candidates are
grouped together, I will shift gears and repeat the analysis from table 11 separately for
incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates in contested races. As before, I also
5

When using state dummy variables in place of state-level factors, I found there was no change in the
significance or direction of any of the measures of gender when all contested candidates were grouped
together. When contested incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates are examined separately I
found one primary difference. For contested open seat candidates, I found that the woman vs. man measure
became an insignificant predictor of total campaign receipts while the man vs. woman measure became a
significant predictor. Finally, when looking at uncontested open seat candidates, I found that gender
became an insignificant predictor of total campaign receipts when state dummy variables were used.
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divide the analysis for each class of candidate so that one model examines the gender of
the candidate exclusively and the other model also takes into account the gender of the
opponent. The results are shown on the next page in Table 4.4 below.
Starting with incumbents, the models explain about 25 percent of the variance
and, again, many of the coefficients are significant. Here, one can see that women and
men raise different levels of money when facing a male challenger. In comparison to
male incumbents, female incumbents raise 28 cents less per voter when facing a male
opponent. This finding could demonstrate that donors respond to these types of races
differently and tend to curtail their donations when a woman faces a man or they could
signal that women struggle more to raise money when their opponent is a man. In
looking only at the gender of the candidate, I find that female incumbents raise 21 cents
less per voter than male incumbents. This statistically significant relationship provides
some evidence that female incumbents are not financially advantaged and may have to
work harder to stay competitive against their male opponents.
As expected, in terms of candidate characteristics, incumbents are advantaged
when they are party leaders, when they are more senior and when they are members of
the majority party. This is not surprising since these values tend to be highly prized by
donors wishing to gain access to powerful, more experienced members of the legislature.
Incumbents tend to be advantaged when legislatures are professionalized, when
interest groups are strong and when the partisan balance in the chamber is close.
Incumbents are more likely to have the characteristics and access that interest groups
value and it is likely that donors will be more likely to fork over dollars when it is going
to a candidate in a highly professionalized chamber, as these legislatures tend to be policy
innovators.
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Table 4.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates in
Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
-0.76+

Incumbents Challengers Challengers Open Seats
-0.80*
-0.15
-0.15
-0.33

Open Seats
-0.35

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.14
-0.28*
-0.12
--4.84****
-0.09
0.05***
-0.16
0.39***
0.004
-0.04
1.61***
-0.32***
0.36***
0.05
0.03***
-0.20*
0.57***

-0.21+
-----4.84****
-0.09
0.05***
-0.15
0.39***
0.004
-0.04
1.61***
-0.32***
0.35***
0.05
0.03***
-0.20*
0.56***

-0.05
0.17**
0.002
------0.13**
0.07
0.01***
0.05
-0.88***
-0.03
0.07*
-0.16**
0.01**
-0.08+
0.11***

N
2,283
2,283
2,283
2
Adjusted R
0.25
0.25
0.14
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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0.14**
---------0.13**
0.07
0.01***
0.05
-0.88***
-0.03
0.07*
-0.16**
0.01**
-0.08+
0.11***

-0.10
0.16+
-0.12
------0.39***
0.40***
0.003
0.21***
-0.16
-0.15***
0.10*
-0.13+
0.02***
-0.17*
0.55***

0.18*
---------0.38***
0.40***
0.003
0.21***
-0.16
-0.15***
0.09*
-0.14+
0.02***
-0.17*
0.55***

2,283
0.14

1,499
0.39

1,499
0.39

In addition, incumbents should have a more extensive network of donors that they can
use to offset an expensive election. Thus, they should be especially advantaged when
running for a seat in a professional legislature as these campaigns tend to be very
expensive affairs (Thompson et al. 1998). As before, candidates tend to be disadvantaged
in a presidential election year and by strict campaign finance laws. Incumbents are hit
the hardest (when compared to challengers and open seat contestants) on this dimension.
This is not surprising since these laws were put into place in an attempt to level the
playing field and reduce the incumbency advantage (Hogan et al. 2009). Finally,
incumbents tend to raise over 55 cents more per eligible voter when their opponent is a
competitive fundraiser. Incumbents are far more reactive than challengers on this
variable which supports the earlier findings of Krasno et al. (1994).
In looking exclusively at challengers, I see that these models explain about 14
percent of the variance. Here, female challengers raise 17 cents more per eligible voter
than male challengers when competing against a male incumbent. In addition, in analysis
not shown, female challengers also raise 16 more than male challengers when they each
face opponents of the opposite sex. Both of these relationships are statistically
significant. In looking exclusively at the gender of the candidate, I also find that women
raise 14 cents more per eligible voter when compared to male challengers. This shows
that female challengers are able to raise money successfully and can collect more than
similarly situated men. However, at the same time, female challengers may need to raise
more money than men to produce the same electoral outcome.
As with incumbents, challengers raise more when they are Republicans and when
the previous election was more competitive. However, unlike incumbents, being a
member of the majority party does not play a statistically significant role. Finally, in
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looking at state-level factors, challengers lose 88 cents per voter when running for a seat
in a professional legislature. Again, since these races tend to be very high-profile,
expensive affairs, it means the challenger faces an even steeper uphill battle for office.
Challengers are still benefited by strong interest groups but not nearly as much as
incumbents are. Challengers also tend to be disadvantaged in presidential election years
and when term limits are in place. Perhaps this is the case because donors are more likely
to give to term limited incumbents in a last ditch attempt to get them to sponsor favorable
legislation before they leave office. Or, the most viable candidates may compete in open
seat races versus as challengers. Lastly, challengers‘ fundraising is far less sensitive to
incumbent funding than incumbent fundraising is to challenger fundraising. This
suggests that there may not be much a challenger can do to raise more funds against a
well-funded incumbent when compared to other subsets of candidates.
Finally, in looking at open seat races, I see that these models explain a fair
amount of the variance at 39 percent. Again, female open seat contestants raise more
than similarly situated men. Women in contested open seat races raise approximately 18
cents more per eligible voters than their male counterparts. In addition, there are
differences based on the gender of the opponents. First, female open seat candidates raise
16 cents more than male candidates when both face male opponents. However, female
open seat candidates raise 28 cents more than male open seat candidates when each face
an opponent of the opposite sex. Again, each of these relationships is statistically
significant and shows that female open seat candidates can out-raise men. However,
again, I do not know if women need more money to get the same electoral benefit or if
women psychologically feel their best defense is a good offense.
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In terms of the other variables in the analysis, Republican open seat contestants
raise more than Democrats, while being a member of the majority party increases one‘s
level of funding. These cues may be valuable to donors who do not have incumbency to
rely on and may lead to more or larger donations. In addition, a previously competitive
primary tends to lead to higher campaign totals, especially for open seat candidates.
Finally, when examining state-level factors, I find that the direction and significance of
these variables is similar to that for the other types of candidates. Generally, the financial
benefits and disadvantages are somewhere between those of incumbents and challengers.
Now, that I have examined the contested races I turn to an analysis of the
uncontested races. It is important to study uncontested races as well because of the need
to understand whether donors treat these races differently or whether they contribute to
uncontested candidates based on different factors. In these races, the candidate‘s only
challenge will come from the primary, if at all. Thus, candidates may become focused
on building a war chest to stave off the possibility of future challenges versus on raising
money for the purpose of beating their opponent. As a result, donors may react to this
motivation differently.
Below, in Table 4.5, I present the results for two models. The first model looks at
the factors that influence contribution levels to uncontested incumbents. The second
model examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat candidates
who ran unopposed.
Table 4.5: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Candidates
Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.37

Open Seats
-0.57

Gender

-0.19*

0.45*
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Table 4.5 Continued
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.37

Open Seats
-0.57

Party Leader
Committee Leader
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Years Served
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year

3.17***
0.09
-0.07
-0.02
0.02***
0.002
0.03
1.22**
-0.25***
0.14*
0.14
0.005
-0.10

--0.23
-0.21
-0.01*
-0.12
1.73+
0.24*
0.25+
-0.50*
0.01
0.15

N
1,907
202
2
Adjusted R
0.15
0.08
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance
In examining uncontested incumbents, I find that the model explains 15 percent of
the variance. As with contested incumbents, uncontested female incumbents raise less
than men. Perhaps women are not as adept as men in building war chests or women may
not feel it is as important to focus on fundraising when they do not have an immediate
challenge. Again, as with contested incumbents, party leadership and seniority are
important factors in garnering more donations although these qualifications do not yield
as much of a financial advantage to uncontested candidates. Unlike before, not as many
of the state-level coefficients are significant. However, candidates here still raise more
when running for a seat in a professional legislature and when interest groups are strong.
In addition, they tend to raise 25 cents less when strict campaign finance laws are present.
As previously discussed, these findings tend to fit with other findings in the literature and
with earlier findings here.
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Finally, in examining uncontested open seat races, it is interesting to note that
women tend to raise 45 cents more per eligible voter than men in the same situation.
Perhaps donors are more receptive to women in this environment because women who
run here are likely to be the most strategic or may have such strong qualifications that
they remain unchallenged at this level. In addition, candidates tend to raise more when
the previous election was competitive, when legislative professionalism is higher, when
campaign finance laws are more prohibitive, and when interest groups are strong. The
only statistically significant relationship that hinders uncontested open seat candidate‘s
total campaign receipts is the imposition of term limits.
Discussion
Having just performed an analysis of total campaign receipts per eligible voter I
can now answer a number of my research questions. Despite previous findings that
gender does not have a statistically significant impact on the total amount raised, I find
otherwise here. When breaking the analysis down by type of candidate and by contested
versus uncontested races, I can see that gender does play a role in the fundraising process.
Female incumbents tend to raise less than male incumbents in both contested and
uncontested races. On the other hand, female open seat candidates tend to raise more
than men in both contested and uncontested races. Female challengers also tend to
outperform male challengers in the fundraising process. These results are encouraging to
those who are supportive of women candidates because they demonstrate that women
make an effort to be successful fundraisers in environments in which they are not
advantaged by name recognition, the incumbency advantage, etc. Since women are more
likely to run as open seat candidates or challengers, and since it does not appear that
women raise less in these environments, one might conclude that women can be
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successful on Election Day. However, once these women are in office, they may have a
harder time remaining competitive fundraisers and this may hurt their ability to remain in
office long-term.
Besides my key independent variable of interest, I find many other variables have
a statistically significant impact on the total amount raised. In terms of contested races,
candidates tend to raise the most per eligible voter when they are party leaders, have
longer service records, are Republicans, are members of the majority party and when
their opponent raised more. Given the importance of some of these access-oriented
characteristics, it may not be surprising that female incumbents raise less than male
incumbents since they are not as likely to have these characteristics. In addition,
contested candidates were generally disadvantaged by the presence of term limits, in
presidential election years, and when strict campaign finance laws were in place, while
being advantaged by strong interest groups. In terms of uncontested races, again, I find
that party leadership and years of service have a positive impact on total campaign
receipts, as does the presence of strong interest groups. However, I notice that many of
the state-level coefficients have less of a significant impact on the total amount raised.
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CHAPTER 5: EXAMINING PARTY DONATIONS
Chapter 4 examined the total amount of donations received by male and female
state legislators. Such a perspective provides an initial comprehensive outlook, but it
may mask important differences between men and women within specific categories of
contributions. In this chapter, I explore what factors influence the contribution behavior
of party donors and what role, if any gender plays in the contribution decision-making
process.
Previous Research on Party Contributions
Generally, research on gender in relation to party contributions has been rather
limited in scope. In the case of party scholarship, much of the literature has focused on
the role of parties in recruiting women to run for office. Far less attention has been paid
to how parties treat women during the campaign process. Although there are limits to
what is known about how these sub-groups structure their contributions, it is possible to
draw some conclusions about their behavior based on other findings in the literature.
One common finding is that women need encouragement to run (Fox and Lawless, 2000).
Party leaders, elected officials, political organizations, and family members make up
much of this recruitment base (Fox and Lawless 2004a, 2004b, 2010; Moncrief et al.
2001; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). Parties play an especially critical role in recruiting
women. Sanbonmatsu et al. (2009) find, ―Women are more likely than men to say that
party support was very important to their decision to run. Women are also more likely to
cite their party, rather than an organization, as the most influential source of
encouragement for their candidacies‖ (p. 3).
Historically, women faced difficulty gaining the party‘s nomination and
encouragement (Freeman, 2000; Burrell, 1994; Werner, 1968; Rule, 1981). However,
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many scholars argue that not much has changed and that parties still have not warmed up
to women (Shiner and Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu,
2006). There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. First, women may be
excluded or discouraged because men are more likely to be in charge and may not want
to see women infiltrating their organizations (Darcy et al., 1994). Second, party leaders
may avoid recruiting women because they believe female candidates will have a harder
time getting elected (Sanbonmatsu, 2005, 2006). This belief could be based on the notion
that women lack political ambition, that women lack confidence in their qualifications
and fundraising ability, or that women lack financial and political connections (Fox and
Lawless 2010; Werner 1968; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Elder 2004; Jenkins 2007;
LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). Others argue that women
are simply less likely to be running as an incumbent or to have the sort of leadership
characteristics that make them more attractive candidates (Welch et al., 1985; Thompson
et al., 1998).
If women are discouraged in the recruitment stage it stands to reason that they
might also face discouragement when fundraising. Unfortunately, this issue is underexamined at the state-level or much of the data are based on interviews, and there have
been few efforts to engage in a close and thorough examination of campaign finance
records. Interestingly, there is a disconnect between qualitative and quantitative studies.
Beginning with quantitative studies at the congressional level, I find little evidence of
discrimination. Burrell (1994) reports that women are not financially disadvantaged by
parties and are at least as likely to receive support. Wilhite (1988) finds that women were
financially advantaged by party contributions in 1982 but that the Republican Party was
more generous in their support of women during the 1980-1982 time period. Finally,
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Thomas and Wilcox (2005) examine the 2002 general election and find differences
between male and female candidates in terms of party and candidate status. The authors
conclude that male and female challengers tend to receive about the same amount of
money from both of their respective parties. However, female incumbents receive much
more than men from the Republican Party while female open seat contestants receive less
than men from the Republican Party.
In looking at interview data at the county and congressional level, scholars find
that parties are less supportive of women candidates. In these studies candidates and
party leaders state that women are discouraged by the party and that this is especially
prevalent within the Republican Party (Shiner and Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010;
Niven, 1998). In order to sort out these discrepancies and gain a better understanding of
the relationship between the party and female candidates, I intend to examine whether
any differences exist in the amount of contributions that are made by each candidate‘s
respective party.
The goal of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of how the parties treat
women and to discover whether any discrimination exists in the fundraising process.
I begin with a brief statement of my hypotheses as they relate to various types of party
donors. Then, I conduct a descriptive exploration of male and female campaign receipts
before moving on to a brief overview of my model. Here, I detail my hypotheses as they
relate to partisan donors. Finally, I perform a more detailed multivariate analysis that
controls for other factors that might account for any differences.
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Party Contributions
Based on previous research, I think female candidates will be advantaged by some
elements of the party and disadvantaged by others. Previous research indicates that there
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are different components of political parties and these components have varying goals
and perform separate actions. Scholars often break the party up into three components:
party in the electorate, party in government and party organization (Hershey 2006;
Weisberg 2000; Key 1964). When referring to the party in the electorate scholars tend to
think in terms of individuals who identify with one particular party or another and those
who consider themselves to be independent. When thinking of the party in government
the focus is on political officeholders at all levels of government. Finally, the party
organization consists of the national committee, state and local party committees, as well
as a myriad of other groups like the Young Republicans and Democrats (Bianco and
Cannon, 2009). Some of these components are likely to be more supportive of women
candidates than others. For example, women tend to be very active members within the
party organization and have had a more lengthy history in this capacity as compared to
female officeholders (Freeman, 2000).
Here, I distinguish between these various elements by separating the party
committee from leaderships PACs, candidate committees and party officials, candidates
and former members. I separate these entities into two categories because it is possible
that these two types of donors will follow a different strategy when contributing to
candidates. On the one hand, I expect women will face more of an uphill battle raising
money from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and party officials, candidates and
former members. Given the underrepresentation of women in the legislature and in key
leadership positions, I would not expect women to have the personal relationships and
established networks in place that would make it easier for them to garner money from
these sources. In addition, members of the party leadership, as well as party officials,
candidates and former party members may be resistant to what some may consider an
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intrusion of women into what has traditionally been largely an all boys club. These
members may have ingrained stereotypes about a woman‘s ability to win and may not
perceive that they will get a good return on their investment.
On the other hand, the party committee may be more receptive to female
candidates. Although Sanbonmatsu (2006) has demonstrated that local parties are more
hostile to women, there are reasons to believe that many state parties would be open to
funding female candidates. First, the party‘s prime objective should be to maintain or to
gain seats regardless of the candidate‘s characteristics. Second, once a woman has
moved from the recruitment stage to actually declaring their candidacy, it may be that the
party will support them financially, especially since they will have had ample opportunity
to dissuade those who appear unelectable from running in the first place. Third,
Matthews‘ (1984) finds that women often participate in service to the party prior to
running for office. As such, women are likely to develop relationships with this
organization and this should help overshadow any negative assessments and stereotypes
that the organization might have and open the doors to more contributions.
On the whole, when donations from all of these parts of parties are considered in
combination (when party committee funding is combined with funding from candidate
committees, leadership PACs, and individual party donors), I expect women to come out
slightly ahead given that party committee donations tend to make up a higher percentage
of contributions to candidates generally.
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Party Receipts
Before discussing contribution differences for men and women, it is important to
first detail the gender breakdown by party. In my analysis, the men are nearly evenly
split by party (48% Democrats and 51% Republicans). Women, however, are much more
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likely to be Democrats than Republicans (58% to 42%). In addition, women constitute
28% of all Democratic candidates and 21% of all Republican candidates.
An initial way to determine whether differences exist between male and female
legislative candidates is to examine the mean contribution on party campaign receipts
across each state by the party affiliation of the candidate. However, there are a number of
ways that party contributions can be examined. On the website Follow the Money, party
contributions include donations from candidate committees, joint candidate committees,
leadership PACs, party committees, party officials, candidates and former members, as
well as small and unitemized contributions from the party. From these classifications, I
created three categories that I feel best classify the various components of party
contributions. The first category looks exclusively at party committees, which are the
result of collective decisions made by the organization. This category makes up 9% of
the contributions men receive on average and 11% of the total that women receive on
average. The second category includes donations from candidate committees, leadership
PACs, and Democratic and Republican officials, candidates, and former members and are
therefore the result of individual decisions of specific party officials. This category
makes up 3% of the contributions men receive on average and 4% of the total that women
receive on average. Finally, the third category combines contributions from these two
categories into one measure for the most comprehensive examination of party
contributions.
My measures are designed to capture each of these party components. The party
committee measure largely represents the notion of party organization, since the
committee will be charged with performing a number of traditional organizational
functions like recruiting candidates for office, generating support among voters for their
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roster of candidates, and providing a source of revenue in the election, etc. On the other
hand, candidate committees, leadership PACs and party officials, candidates and former
members, best represent party in government and party in the electorate. These donors
will either be private citizens that are strongly affiliated with a political party or
officeholders. It is important to account for each of these categories because there are
theoretical reasons to believe donors will have different motivations based on whether
they are political officeholders, devoted party members, or the party organization itself.
For instance, the party organization may be focused on maintaining or increasing their
numbers above all else while political officeholders may be resistant to electing women
because they have a history of working primarily with men and wish to maintain the
status quo. The question is whether these motivations actually translate into contribution
differences. To answer this question I begin with a descriptive analysis of party
committee receipts. Below, in Table 5.1 I examine the total amount of contributions
received from the party committee across each type of race in the analysis (contested and
uncontested races) by gender, state and party affiliation.
Table 5.1: Mean Party Committee Receipts by Party Affiliation, Gender and State
State
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota

Democrats
Republicans
Male Mean Female Mean Male Mean Female Mean
3,134
5,074
4,836
4,824
95,015
191,843
16,874
28,222
1,509
2,391
1,805
2,296
6,292
13,856
11,125
28,783
1,067
799
2,154
1,908
3,328
4,450
9,686
11,748
757
1,541
962
843
49,212
19,265
46,348
31,429
11,232
17,692
7,769
13,011
1,864
4,683
952
1,160
406
538
571
662
2,434
1,475
12,127
6,985
1,335
1,982
2,104
2,699
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Table 5.1 Continued
State

Democrats
Republicans
Male Mean Female Mean Male Mean Female Mean
Missouri
3,083
1,892
1,809
1,861
New Mexico
3,013
5,309
3,353
4,620
Ohio
10,718
13,344
38,565
11,663
Oregon
8,697
12,856
9,685
16,338
Pennsylvania
9,258
3,147
14,308
19,223
Rhode Island
49
52
247
181
Tennessee
4,781
3,856
6,400
13,914
Texas
16,482
8,350
17,023
26,649
Utah
349
588
1,307
1,507
Washington
12,908
11,739
9,213
9,606
Wisconsin
878
1,236
1,465
1,888
Total
9,858
14,417
9,644
10,529
Table 5.1 shows there is a great deal of variation across the states, between men
and women and between Democrats and Republicans. In Idaho, Maine, Rhode Island,
and Utah the average party committee contribution never exceeds $2,000 from either
party to either gender while in California, Illinois and Ohio the average party committee
contribution never dips below $10,000. Such differences are due in large measure to the
large differences in average district populations that exist across states. In comparing
Democrats to Republicans, it is clear that the Democratic Party committee in California
and Indiana funds candidates of both genders more generously than the Republican Party
committee while the Republican Party committee in Florida, Iowa, Michigan and
Pennsylvania funds candidates of both genders more generously than the Democratic
Party committee. On a state by state basis, the Republican Party committee invests more
than the Democratic Party committee in both male and female candidates in 13 of the 24
states under consideration. Finally, when comparing male Democrats to female
Democrats, women‘s average contributions exceed those of men in 16 states. There is a
great deal of variance here with women raising just $3 more on average in Rhode Island
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and $96,828 more on average in California. On the other hand, male Democrats
exceeded the average contribution to female Democrats by just over $260 in Georgia and
almost $30,000 in Illinois. In comparing male Republicans to female Republicans,
women raise more from the party committee in 17 states with their mean advantage
ranging from $52 more in Missouri up to $17,658 more in Florida.
Now that I have examined the mean contribution differences from the party
committee, I also take a moment to display the over all median difference as a point of
comparison. Below in Figure 5.1, I provide the median contribution for party committee
campaign receipts according to the party and gender of the candidates.
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Figure 5.1: Median Party Committee Receipts by Party and Gender
Here, one can see that the over all median contributions are much lower than the
mean contributions, which demonstrates that some states contribute far more to some
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candidates than is generally true for others. This could be a function of the
competitiveness of the district, the composition difference in the chamber, or the strength
of the party relative to other types of donors. As with the mean contributions, it is again
clear that female candidates tend to raise more from the party committee when compared
to men. Female Republicans raise $260 more than male Republicans while female
Democrats raise $298 more than male Democrats. However, it is also clear, that
Republicans receive more from the party committee when compared to Democrats. The
median contribution for both male and female Republicans exceeds that of their
opponents by over $245.
Having examined the contribution differences by party committee, I now turn to
an analysis of the differences between male and female Democrats and Republicans on
another measure of party donations. Table 5.2 examines the total amount of
contributions received from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and party officials,
candidates and former members across each type of race in the analysis (contested and
uncontested races) by gender, state, and party affiliation.
Table 5.2: Mean Party Receipts from Leadership PACs, Candidate Committees and
Party Officials, Candidates and Former Members by Party Affiliation, Gender and
State
State
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine

Democrats
Republicans
Male Mean Female Mean Male Mean Female Mean
290
148
277
103
99,845
34,840
70,646
69,792
200
273
337
284
182
304
933
1,288
1,134
1,069
1,354
837
319
352
535
693
428
746
591
823
10,501
8,627
15,423
12,238
2,316
2,272
4,466
4,520
34
150
50
50
290
277
238
255
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Table 5.2 Continued
State

Democrats
Republicans
Male Mean Female Mean Male Mean Female Mean
Michigan
2,073
1,635
3,418
2,797
Minnesota
226
259
150
173
Missouri
1,489
1,748
1,092
1,391
New Mexico
618
491
2,617
3,603
Ohio
1,651
2,820
3,672
1,938
Oregon
3,016
5,213
6,749
9,638
Pennsylvania
3,491
2,342
2,620
3,744
Rhode Island
61
56
47
47
Tennessee
341
292
968
1,037
Texas
1,844
1,204
1,758
3,261
Utah
745
580
291
310
Washington
258
751
139
1,223
Wisconsin
583
1,173
1,415
1,253
Total
4,837
3,005
4,742
4,992
One thing that is evident from Table 5.2 is that the mean contribution received by
male and female Democratic and Republican candidates is smaller in all but five states
than the mean contributions of party committees. The exceptions to this are in California,
Georgia, Michigan, Rhode Island and Utah. Also, when examining Tables 5.1 and 5.2,
party donors tend to be the least generous in Rhode Island and the most generous in
Illinois and California. When comparing the number of states where women raise more
than men regardless of party affiliation, the rate is almost twice as high when the donor is
the party committee. Women raise more than men, regardless of party affiliation, in 12
states when the donor is the party committee but they raise more in just seven states when
the donations are coming from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and individual
party donors. In only four states, (Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon) do female
Democrats and Republicans exceed the amount raised by male Democrats and
Republicans on both types of donations. In addition, when examining Table 5.2, one can
see that the overall mean from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual
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party donations is higher for male Democrats but not for male Republicans. Here,
Democratic men raise, on average, $1,832 more than Democratic women while
Republican men raise, on average, $250 less than Republican women. This provides
some evidence that Democratic women tend to be more successful at fundraising when
the donor is the party committee. In addition, both Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate that
the Republican Party tends to support male and female candidates at similar rates while
there is greater variance between donations from male and female Democrats.
When examining the overall differences from table 5.2, I see that on a state by
state basis, the Republican leadership PAC, candidate committee and individual donors,
invest more in both male and female candidates in nearly half the states in the analysis.
When comparing male Democrats to female Democrats, women‘s average contributions
exceed those of men in 11 states. The average mean advantage for women ranges from
$33 in Iowa to almost $2,200 dollars in Oregon while the average mean advantage for
men ranges from just $5 in Rhode Island to just over $65,000 in California. When
comparing male Republicans to female Republicans women maintain a mean advantage
in 14 states of anywhere from close to $17 in Maine to $2,889 in Oregon.
Although women are able to compete with men in raising money in many of the
states in the analysis, they do slightly less well when party is not factored in. In analysis
not shown, women raise $3,046 more, on average, from the party committee while men
raise $953 more on average from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual
party donors. But, what are the overall differences on this dimension with regard to the
median? Below in Figure 5.2, I illustrate the median contribution from these donors
according to the party and gender of the candidates.
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Figure 5.2: Median Leadership PAC, Candidate Committee, and Individual Party
Donor Receipts by Party and Gender
As with party committee donations, Republicans contribute more to both male
and female candidates when compared to the Democratic Party. In addition, women raise
more regardless of party affiliation. Leadership PACs, candidate committees and party
officials, candidates and former members, donate $100 more to Republican women while
Democratic women receive $90 more than Democratic men. This provides some
evidence that donors respond not only to the gender of candidates but also to the party of
candidates or some combination thereof.
Having examined separately the major sources of party contributions (party
committees, candidate committees, leadership PACs and individual party donors), it is
now time to see how contributions vary when these two donation sources are grouped
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together. It is important to account for population because states vary a great deal on this
dimension and campaigns are run very differently depending on population size. In a
small district, candidates may be able to reach voters on foot while in a populous district
a candidate may have to rely on expensive media time on local television stations or in
state newspapers (Wright 2005). Below, in Table 5.3, I examine total partisan
contributions according to the house district population. This figure provides an estimate
of the total amount received by each candidate from the party per potential voter in the
voting age population.
Table 5.3: Total Party Receipts per Eligible Voter by Party Affiliation, Gender and
State
State

Democrats
Male
Female
Mean
Mean
Alaska
0.07
0.29
California
0.02
0.09
Colorado
0.02
0.02
Florida
0.00
0.01
Georgia
0.04
0.02
Iowa
0.04
0.04
Idaho
0.03
0.08
Illinois
0.06
0.04
Indiana
0.02
0.02
Kentucky
0.00
0.02
Maine
0.05
0.02
Michigan
0.01
0.01
Minnesota
0.03
0.06
Missouri
0.05
0.06
New Mexico
0.01
0.05
Ohio
0.04
0.05
Oregon
0.05
0.06
Pennsylvania
0.03
0.05
Rhode Island
0.00
0.00
Tennessee
0.01
0.03
Texas
0.02
0.02
Utah
0.02
0.02
Washington
0.02
0.01
Wisconsin
0.01
0.01
Total
0.02
0.03

Republicans
Democratic Male Female
Difference Mean Mean
0.22
0.49
0.10
0.07
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.21
-0.02
0.06
0.05
0.00
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.03
-0.02
0.07
0.06
0.00
0.03
0.13
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.03
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.11
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.08
0.22
0.01
0.09
0.04
0.01
0.19
0.32
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.05
0.07
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.05
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Republican
Difference
-0.39
0.03
0.01
0.20
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.10
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.05
0.02
0.14
-0.05
0.13
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.02

This table illustrates that women from both parties generally raise more in total
party contributions per eligible voter. In four states Democratic men raise more than
women and in five states Republican men raise more than women. Across these states,
the fundraising advantage for women ranges from one cent more per eligible voter to 22
cents more for Democratic women in Alaska. It is also interesting to note that there are
rather large differences across the states in terms of how each party approaches
donations. For instance, in Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, and Washington both parties
contribute about the same amount of money per voter to men and to women. Thus, there
are not large differences between what each party gives and to the amount they contribute
to men and to women. On the other hand, in New Mexico and Oregon the Republican
Party provides at least four times as much in donations as the Democratic Party. In
addition, in some states party donors seems to concentrate their donations more heavily to
one particular gender or another. For instance, in Alaska Republican men get 39 cents
more per eligible voter then Republican women while Democratic women get 22 cents
more per eligible voter then Democratic men. Other stark contrasts occur in Florida and
Oregon where Republican women get between 13 and 22 cents more then Republican
men per eligible voter. This variation highlights the many facets of donor behavior and
the myriad ways in which differences can present themselves.
Discussion
As with total campaign receipts, I find much variation in the amount of money
that is raised across the states and by male and female candidates. Earlier, in my theory
chapter, I was unable to propose a hypothesis about party donors due to the discrepancies
within the scholarly literature. Following my descriptive analysis, I find that female
Democrats and Republicans tend to be slightly advantaged by all types of party donors.
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However, I also find that Republican women tend to raise more than Democratic women
from the party committee, leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party
donors. This finding is somewhat surprising since one might expect the Democratic
Party to be more open towards women based on earlier scholarly findings (Shiner and
Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Niven, 1998). However, it may simply signal that
the Republican Party is better organized and financed or that the party is looking to
expand their voter base by attracting more conservative women to the legislature. These
differences point to the importance of examining contributions in detail and also provide
us with a greater understanding of the fundraising landscape for each gender and for each
party.
When taking party out of the equation and looking solely at the mean differences
for men and women, one finds that women raise more from the party committee but less
from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. Interestingly,
these findings seem to reconcile differences in the literature. Previously, scholars found
few partisan differences in terms of over all contributions but interviewees have
described a great deal of bias by some party members, local party officials, etc. (Burrell
1994; Wilhite 1988; Shiner and Thrush 2009; Fox and Lawless 2010; Niven 1998). In
addition, it has been proposed that women may be held back by elites who wish to
preserve their own hegemony (Darcy et al. 1994; Duverger 1955). Here, I find evidence
that supports both ways of thinking. In terms of total contributions, women tend to raise
slightly more then men, but, they do not raise as much from individual party donors
(officials, candidates and former members) or from leadership PACs. In light of the
aforementioned arguments, these findings are quite logical.
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However, once again, there are many other variables that need to be accounted for
besides gender. There are a number of factors that should play an important role in
contribution decisions by party donors. I briefly lay out my hypotheses in relation to
these variables before I move on to a multivariate analysis.
Control Variables and Hypotheses
In this chapter I examine the total amount of contributions from the party
accounting for the voting age population in each state. Party contributions include
donations from the party committee, candidate committee, leadership PACs, and party
officials, candidates and former members.
Candidate-Level Factors
It is possible that some factors may play more of a role in determining the size of
a party donation than others. Unlike the previous chapter, where I was examining total
campaign receipts, here the theoretical expectations may be more defined for some
characteristics then others. For instance, seniority may be an important characteristic for
donors generally but it may not play a role here where party donors are more likely to pay
attention to characteristics like election competition (Thompson et al. 1994). Therefore, I
will only review my hypotheses as they pertain especially to donations from the party.
First, I expect women will acquire slightly more from party donors for the reasons
described above. Second, I expect party leaders will raise more from the party because
these members may serve as a conduit to fellow rank and file partisans (Larson 2004;
Hogan 2007). Third, I anticipate that candidates who are members of the majority party
will raise more since the majority party may be more established and organized and may
have a larger pool of funds to draw from then the party out of power. Finally, based on
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my descriptive analysis, I think that Republicans will generally receive more from party
donors then Democrats (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Aldrich 1995).
District-Level Factors
As with total contributions, I expect that candidates will be responsive to the
amount that there opponent is raising and will raise more from both the party in reaction
to the level of donations received by their opponent (Hogan 2007). In addition, I expect
that party donations will be more forthcoming when a candidate is running in a more
competitive district and when there were a large number of candidates in the previous
primary election. Thompson et al. (1994) finds that parties tend to follow either a
―protectionist strategy‖ or an ―additive strategy‖ when making decisions about funding.
In other words, variables like chamber competition and previous election competition
should matter a great deal to this sub-group of donors as they are more likely to focus
their funds on vulnerable incumbents in competitive races or to competitive challengers
in either the hopes of maintaining their majority or making in-roads to party control.
State-Level Factors
As with total campaign receipts, it is possible many of the hypothesized
relationships will hold true here as well. I expect various party donors to contribute more
when candidates are running for a seat on a professional legislature (Thompson et al.
1998). These campaigns tend to be more expensive and these legislatures tend to
produce innovate legislation, which should lead to more contributions by the party.
Second, I expect campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that is raised from party
donors, as with total campaign receipts, candidates, especially incumbents, find it harder
to fundraise when there are limits on what they can receive from certain donors (Hogan et
al. 2009). Third, I anticipate that party contributions will be reduced when interest
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groups are strong. Evidence suggests that strong interest groups tend to disadvantage
other types of donors, such as the party (Gray 2004). Fourth, parties may contribute more
in a presidential election year as a function of being better organized or races being more
responsive to partisan tides. However, it is also just as possible that the party will donate
less because they have to focus their attention on candidates running in more high-profile
races. As a result, they may be more strategic about who gets funds and how much they
receive. Fifth, I anticipate parties will be especially active when there is a close balance
between the parties in the chamber. If few seats separate the party in power from the
party out of power I anticipate that both parties will have a strong interest in trying to
maintain or build upon their seat distribution (Thompson et al. 1994; Herrnson 1989).
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Party Receipts
This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the total amount of
party campaign dollars that candidates receive per eligible voter in the district. In using
the model above, I perform several OLS regression analyses that estimate the model for
all candidates and then separately for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates.
Given that several scholars find that fundraising differences are a function of differences
in candidate status, it is important to test whether gender will have any explanatory power
once these factors are controlled for (Burrell, 1985). Below, Table 5.4 presents the
coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of
the candidate and their opponent. I did not construct models for the gender of the
candidate exclusively because I find only one instance of statistical significance and the
remaining coefficients mirror those for the models presented below. The difference
occurs among contested incumbents where I find that female incumbents raise five cents
less than male incumbents. The difference is only marginally significant at the .10 level.
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In the first model I examine all candidates that ran in a contested race by the
gender of the candidate and their opponent. This model explains about 16 percent of the
variance and the coefficients for many of the independent variables are significant.
However, none of the gender variables play a significant role. Instead, I find that
incumbents and open seat candidates raise significantly more money from the party than
challengers do. This is not too surprising given that party donors should focus their funds
on races where they believe they have the best chance of preserving gains or making
gains. In addition, as hypothesized, party leaders, majority party members, and
Republicans raise more per eligible voter. In terms of district variables, I find that
previous electoral competition has a significant impact on party contributions. Finally,
there are a number of statistically significant state level determinants. Given the
expensive nature of races for seats in professional chambers, it is not surprising to see
that this variable has such a strong substantive impact. In addition, since campaign
finance laws reduce the amount of money that candidates can raise from any particular
source, I am not surprised to find that parties also contribute 10 cents less per eligible
voter when stricter laws are in place. In addition, I find that the presence of a presidential
election year and term limits reduce party contributions while strong interest groups and
high levels of chamber competition and opponent fundraising increase donations.
Turning next to incumbents, I find that this model predicts approximately 27
percent of the variance. In analysis not shown, I find that female incumbents raise five
cents less than male incumbents.
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Table 5.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Party Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections
(Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
-0.24**

Incumbents
-0.12

Challengers Open Seats
-0.15
-0.05

Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

0.02
-0.01
-0.03
0.14***
0.24***
0.27**
-0.09*
-0.003
-0.07***
0.13***
0.004***
0.003
0.21**
-0.10***
0.03*
-0.08***
0.004***
-0.08***
0.13***

-0.02
-0.06+
-0.001
--0.21**
-0.11***
-0.001
0.02
0.12***
0.001
-0.02+
0.66***
-0.12***
0.05**
0.04
0.002
-0.05*
0.26***

-0.01
0.05
-0.03
------0.13***
0.07*
0.01***
0.01
-0.10
-0.06**
0.05**
-0.09**
0.01*
-0.05+
0.05***

0.03
-0.02
-0.15**
------0.20***
0.23***
0.001
0.02
0.33*
-0.06*
-0.05
-0.14**
0.003
-0.14**
0.35***

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.16

2,283
0.27

2,283
0.09

1,499
0.34

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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In addition, I find that when incumbents face a challenge from a male candidate, the
female incumbent will raise six cents less per eligible voter than the male incumbent,
although the coefficient is only marginally significant. In addition to gender, many of the
relationships found in the all contested model hold for incumbents as well. One relevant
departure is the change in which measure of electoral competition is significant. For
incumbents, party donors appear to pay more attention to the number of primary
opponents in the previous election and a competitive primary reduces the amount that an
incumbent raises by two cents per eligible voter. This could indicate that the party pays
attention to electoral competition but that they are also more likely to fund incumbents
that are secure.
In terms of differences in degree, one can see that professionalism has a larger
impact on party contributing to incumbents than it does on party contributing to
challengers or open seat candidates. Incumbents are likely to be the most skilled
campaigners and may be the most accomplished at capturing resources from all types of
donors, including the party. In addition, I find that incumbents are hit the hardest by
stricter campaign finance laws. When these laws are in place incumbents raise 12 cents
less per eligible voter versus just six cents less for challengers and open seat contestants.
Since incumbents are attractive candidates to many donors and are likely to receive larger
contributions, it is not surprising that campaign finance laws impact them to a greater
degree. As such, these differences should help level the playing field a bit for
challengers. Finally, I find that interest group strength is an important positive predictor
of party contributions for incumbents. Perhaps interest group donations signal to the
party who the most viable candidates are or parties donate more to incumbents when
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interest groups are strong as a way of trying to maintain their loyalty against the desires
of lobbyists.
Moving from incumbents to challengers, I again find that many of the
relationships are similar to that of the first two models although a few relationships stand
out for this group of candidates. First, challengers raise more from the party when the
pervious election was competitive. This demonstrates that parties may be following the
additive strategy by funding strong challengers in the hopes they will be able to overtake
potentially vulnerable incumbents. Second, although the relationship is not significant,
the direction of the relationship for legislative professionalism is reversed for challengers.
As expected, challengers are likely to find this environment the most competitive and, as
a result, the party may write off many challengers in favor of funding races that are more
definite.
In analyses not shown, when the analysis was re-done and the comparison
category was man vs. woman instead of man vs. man, I found that female challengers
raise eight cents more per eligible voter than male challengers when both face opponents
of the opposite sex. This seems to indicate that female challengers either make more of
an effort to raise money from the party when they have a male opponent or that the party
recognizes that women need funding to be successful when running against a male
incumbent. Either way, women seem to put more of an emphasis on raising money in
this scenario than men do when facing a female incumbent.
In addition, challengers tend to raise more when they are Republicans, when they
are members of the majority party, when the previous election was competitive, when
interest groups are strong, when the chamber is competitive and when their opponent is
raising more. On the other hand, challengers raise less when campaign finance laws are
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strict, when term limits are in place and when it is a presidential election year. Most of
these relationships conform to my earlier hypotheses.
Finally, in examining open seat races, I find that gender plays an important role
here. There are a number of statistically significant relationships when examining the
various gender by gender of opponent combinations. First, male open seat candidates
raise 15 cents less per eligible voter when their opponent is a woman versus a man.
Second, in analysis not shown, in comparison to female open seat candidates, male open
seat candidates raise 18 cents less per eligible voter when facing a female opponent.
Finally, in analysis not shown, when a male open seat candidate faces an opponent of the
opposite gender, he will raise 14 cents less per eligible voter than when a female open
seat candidate faces off against a man. These relationships all demonstrate that female
open seat candidates are well financed in the face of a male challenge and that men have
a more difficult time raising money from the party when they face a female opponent.
This could indicate that women are running strategically and that the strongest female
candidates run in open seat races and, therefore, get the most financial attention here. It
could also indicate that the party believes women are as, or more, capable of winning
these elections so long as they are financed at rates high enough to give them a financial
advantage against their opponent. In addition to these models, I also reestimate my
models using state dummy variables in place of state-level factors.6
Now, that I have examined the contested races I turn to an analysis of the
uncontested races. Although parties tend to focus their attention on competitive races
6

In terms of my primary independent variable of interest, I find that gender loses its significance across the
board in the contested incumbent model. This difference is not surprising given that both of these
relationships were only marginally significant before. In addition, I find that gender is no longer a
significant predictor of uncontested open seat elections. Instead, all of the variance is explained by the state
dummy variables. Since the effect is not consistent using different model specifications this suggests that
the influence of gender in not very strong.
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where the outcome is not a foregone conclusion, they may contribute to uncontested races
as a way of warding off potential challenges. Therefore, it is important to examine
whether the party bases their decision to contribute to uncontested candidates on the same
factors as contested candidates or whether they weigh some factors differently. Below, in
Table 5.5, I present the empirical results from two models. The first model looks at the
factors that influence contribution levels to uncontested incumbents. The second model
examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat candidates who ran
unopposed.
Table 5.5: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Party Fundraising by
Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized
Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.07

Open Seats
-0.01

Gender
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Years Served
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year

-0.01
0.37***
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.002
0.001*
0.003
0.14+
-0.04***
0.01
0.05*
-0.001
0.01

0.08**
--0.04
0.02
-0.001
-0.01
0.27+
-0.004
-0.02
-0.04
0.001
-0.02

N
Adjusted R2

1,907
0.07

202
0.04

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Beginning with uncontested incumbents, I find that gender does not play a
statistically significant role in funding decisions for these types of candidates. Instead,
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uncontested incumbents tend to receive more when they are party leaders, when they are
running for a seat on a professional legislature, when term limits are in place, and when
campaign finance laws are less stringent. In addition, party donors tend to pay attention
to the degree of competition in the previous election. Save for term limits, all of these
relationships match up rather closely with those of contested incumbents. The primary
difference is in the party leadership variable. Here, party leaders receive a whopping 37
cents more per eligible voter, which is more than twice as high as that for contested
incumbents. This could indicate that uncontested party leaders are valuable to the party
either because of their important role in policy decisions or their ability to redistribute
funds to others who do not enjoy their relative electoral security.
Finally, in examining open seat uncontested races, I find that gender and
legislative professionalism are the only statistically significant explanations of donor
behavior. Here, female candidates raise eight cents more per eligible voter form party
donors than male candidates do. Perhaps these candidates are very well qualified or
simply provide the best chance to diversify the legislature and policy viewpoints at the
same time.
In addition to the models I present here, I also estimate models separately for the
analysis for party committee donations and donations that came from leadership PACs,
candidate committees and individual party donors. I also conduct my analysis separately
for Democrats and Republicans. Finally, I examine whether gender plays a role in the
percentage of contributions received from various types of party donors.7
7

Generally, I find that the coefficient for gender is occasionally significant but that donors pay more
attention to the gender of the candidate and the opponent when making contribution decisions. In addition,
I find that gender plays a larger role in party committee donations when the dependent variable is based on
the amount of money per eligible voter while donations from leadership PACs, candidate committees and
individual donors factor more prominently for the percentage of contributions received. Finally, when
separating the analysis by party, I find that there is no real consistency between which party measure is
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Discussion
As with total campaign receipts, I find evidence in this chapter that gender plays a
significant role in the contribution decisions of party donors, however, these relationships
occur far less frequently here, especially when state dummy variables are used in place of
state-level factors. After controlling for a variety of other factors, I find that the
regression coefficients for gender are statistically significant for contested incumbents
and uncontested open seat candidates. Female incumbents raise five cents less per
eligible voter and female uncontested open seat candidates raise eight cents more per
eligible voter than similarly situated male candidates. Women also do rather well against
male and female opponents when running in contested open seat elections. As in the last
chapter, I find that female incumbents raise slightly less in some circumstances but
female open seat candidates raise more, regardless of contestation. These results
demonstrate that the party is not opposed to funding women in most types of races and
that they may even contribute more to their candidacies in certain electoral
circumstances. This provides some evidence that regardless of the parties‘ relationship
with women at the recruitment stage, those who make it past this phase will tend to
receive the financial support of the party.
In addition, these findings seem to indicate that the party does not focus all that
much on gender when making campaign contributions. Instead, they concentrate more
heavily on other types of characteristics. Perhaps this outcome is a result of women
being strategic about when and where they run in an attempt to maximize the chance that
their electoral outcome will be positive.

affected most by gender. This suggests that the party committee may pay more attention to the state
electoral environment than individual donors do and that gender is generally not a major factor in how
parties distribute campaign money, regardless of which type of party donor is examined.
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Besides my key independent variables of interest, I find that many other variables
have a statistically significant effect on the total amount raised from the party committee,
the candidate committee, leadership PACs and individual party donors. In terms of
contested races, candidates tended to raise the most per eligible voter when they are party
leaders, are Republicans (save for incumbents), are members of the majority party, when
the previous level of electoral competition is high, and when their opponent raised more.
Contested candidates are generally disadvantaged by the presence of term limits (save for
incumbents), in presidential election years, and when strict campaign finance laws are in
place, while being advantaged by strong interest groups, professional legislatures (save
for challengers). In terms of uncontested races, again, for incumbents, I find that party
leadership and previous electoral competition levels have a positive impact on total
campaign receipts, as does running for a seat on a professional legislature. However, I do
not find that my uncontested open seat model explains much of the variance in party
contribution behavior.
Generally, I find that these factors play a similar role in explaining party
donations as they did in explaining the total amount of campaign receipts raised.
However, seniority does not have the statistical weight here that it does for total
campaign receipts but previous electoral competition is more often a statistically
significant factor across the various types of races. This is not surprising given that
parties tend to focus more on gaining and maintaining seats in the legislature versus on
gaining access to particularly influential legislators.
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CHAPTER 6: EXAMINING CORPORATE, LABOR AND IDEOLOGICAL
INTEREST GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS
As I alluded to at the end of chapter five, donors have different reasons for
making contributions and they are likely to weigh certain factors more heavily than
others based on their goals. In chapter four, I examined the total amount of donations
received by male and female state legislators and in chapter five I examined contributions
from various types of party donors. In this chapter I turn my attention to examining
another major donor sub-group: interest groups. In particular, I examine donations from
corporations, labor unions, and ideological interest groups.
Previous Research on Interest Group Contributions
Like political parties, interest groups play an important and rather sizeable role in
the electoral fundraising landscape. These groups constitute a large percentage of total
candidate campaign receipts and are critical to a candidate demonstrating to other donors
that they are a viable contender (Hogan et al. 2009). Interest groups and political parties
are also very strategic in their allocation of resources. However, according to the
literature, they each follow different strategies when making contribution decisions. As
discussed previously, political parties are primarily concerned with their status in the
legislature. If donors are affiliated with the minority party in the legislature, their goal is
to improve their margins and increase their seat distribution within the legislature
(Thompson et al. 1994). On the other hand, if donors are affiliated with the majority
party their goal is to stay that way since being the party in power has many benefits
ranging from agenda control to policy creation (Thompson et al. 1994). Thus, these
donors should pay more attention to factors like chamber composition and previous
electoral competition levels. They may focus their attention on vulnerable incumbents or
highly qualified challengers.
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The strategy followed by interest groups depends on the type of interest group
under examination. First, most scholars believe corporations and businesses tend to
follow an access oriented or strategic approach. Here, donors are interested in gaining
access to influential members of the legislature so that they can provide information,
lobby, influence legislation, or work to limit the impact of detrimental policy on their
organization (Austen-Smith 1995; Hall and Wayman 1990; Chin et al. 2000; Herndon
1982; Gopoian et al., 1984; Grenzke, 1989). These groups generally give money to
incumbents, political leaders, committee chairs, majority party members, electorally
secure candidates, and members of key committees that support the interest group‘s
agenda (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005; Thompson
et al. 1994). Next, scholarly literature supports the view that labor unions tend to follow
an ideological strategy (Sorauf, 1992; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock
1995; Brunell 2005). This means donors are most interested in contributing to members
who share and vote according to their policy viewpoints or issue positions. As a result,
these organizations are more likely to pay attention to the party affiliation of a candidate
and to their voting record (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell
2005). Finally, much like labor unions, ideological interest groups tend to focus on
ideological issues. However, their agendas are usually even narrower and more
particularized than those of labor unions. As a result, donors are chiefly concerned with
supporting candidates who are in agreement or willing to support their policy agenda or
who are closely aligned with their ideological viewpoint (McGhee and La Raja 2008;
Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Gopoian et al.
1984). Thus, candidates who serve on or chair committees of interest to the interest
group or who exhibit a supportive voting record on the interest groups‘ issues,
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particularly crucial votes, will be more likely to receive campaign donations (Gopian et
al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Gordon 2001; Grier and
Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988).
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Interest Group Contributions
Now that I have overviewed the theories behind the contribution decisions of each
type of interest group and the factors that are most likely to lead to more donations, the
question is what role, if any, gender plays in this equation. Most scholars argue that
PACs tend to make contribution decisions based on the characteristics of the candidates
or the electoral contest itself. Gender is rarely cited as one of the possible characteristics.
Instead scholars point to majority party status, political party affiliation, party leadership,
incumbency, previous electoral margin, etc. (Gopoian 1984; Clawson et al. 1986; Wright
1985; Herndon 1982; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell; 2005; Grier and Munger
1993; Grenzke 1989; Evans 1988; Deitz 2007). Since I demonstrate that women are
underrepresented at all levels of government, they are less likely to run from the
advantageous position of an incumbent or to be in office long enough to have prestigious
leadership positions and committee assignments. In addition, they are less likely to have
a voting record or a record of service that would make donors more comfortable with
providing large donations. Thus, women might face somewhat of a disadvantage in
fundraising against male officeholders, especially from donors who are pursuing an
access-oriented strategy.
But there may be additional disadvantages that women face as a result of their
gender. For instance, some organizations base fundraising decisions on personal
relationships and may be more likely to give to friends or to those who aggressively ask
for donations (Grenzke 1989). If, as argued earlier, women are less likely to have
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established, strong, financial and political networks and if women feel less confident
about asking for money, then they may be overlooked by some interest groups (Whiting,
1998; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Jenkins 2007).
Labor unions, on the other hand, may be more open to donating to women given
the diversified membership of these organizations in terms of socio-economic status,
ethnic and minority status, and gender. Thus, they may take a more inclusive approach
that favors diversifying the legislature and contributing to women because, in some cases,
these candidates may better represent their ideological positions and beliefs. In addition,
previous research has shown that women vote in a more liberal direction, are more
supportive of social policies and more likely to be against tax cuts aimed at reducing
government spending (Thomas and Wilcox, 2005: Poggione 2004; Dodson et al.; 1991).
In addition, Thomas and Wilcox (2005) find in a survey of state legislators that
businesses, pro-gun groups and pro-life groups are all more likely to support male
candidates electorally and financially.
Unfortunately, gender has been relatively under-examined as an explanatory
factor for interest group contributions from either corporations or labor unions. Most
studies are conducted at the federal level and studies conducted at the sub-national level
usually include limited controls and, in some cases, gender is not even among the
variables tested (Thompson et al. 1994; Thompson et al. 1998; Jones and Borris 1985;
Thomas and Wilcox 1998; Burrell 1994). However, for the reasons given above I expect
that women will tend to be disadvantaged by corporate donors but I also think they will
have an edge in gaining donations from labor unions.
Like sub-national research on corporations and labor unions, research on gender
in relation to ideological interest group contributions has been rather limited in scope.
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Gender tends to play a prominent role in discussions of donor behavior only for groups
that exclusively support women or promote women‘s rights, such as EMILY‘s List.
Unfortunately, this means less attention has been paid to the contribution patterns of other
types of interest groups that do not have electing women at the heart of their agenda.
Research on women‘s political groups has shown that organizations are very valuable to
women both financially and politically and that they play a larger role in recruitment for
women than men (Rozell 2000; Fox and Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). These
organizations can help women establish early funds, while being a source of campaign
and fundraising support throughout the electoral process (Tankersley 2005; Fancia 2001).
Besides women‘s issues, Thomas and Wilcox (2005) find that female legislators
report receiving more fiscal, organizational and campaign support from women‘s groups,
pro-choice groups, environmental groups and labor unions in both 1995 and 2002 while
men report receiving more support from the Christian Coalition, tax relief organizations,
pro-life groups, businesses and gun owners. Other studies find that women are more
active in legislating for welfare policies, family and children‘s issues, women‘s rights,
etc. (Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton 2005; Thomas 1994). Thus, one might expect
donors to be more supportive of female candidates that promote their interests in the
legislature.
Given these findings, I anticipate that women will have an easier time raising
money from liberal ideological interest group donors but that men will raise more from
conservative groups. First, women‘s organizations should be especially attuned to the
necessity of supporting women financially and should be primarily focused on helping
women run and win. Second, women may be perceived by ideological interest groups as
being more closely aligned with more traditional feminine issues such as social welfare,
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education, etc. As a result, this perception may increase contributions from liberal groups
but decrease contributions from conservative groups Finally, given that women are more
likely to be moderates or to align with the Democratic Party, and given that many of the
groups in the analysis have a liberal agenda, one might expect donors to contribute more
heavily to women because they expect them to be closer to their policy beliefs and
positions.
I now turn my attention to exploring the accuracy of many of these claims. I
begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of male and female campaign receipts
from various groups. Then, I provide a quick overview of my model and detail my
hypotheses as they relate to the various controls in the analysis. Finally, I perform a more
detailed multivariate analysis that controls for other factors that might account for any
differences I find below. The analysis begins with business contributions, and then
proceeds to labor contributions. I finish with an examination of the role gender plays in
various economic sectors and its relationship to liberal and conservative ideological
interest group contributions.
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Interest Group Receipts
Businesses and Labor Unions
Before discussing the results of my descriptive analysis, below, I provide a brief
overview of what constitutes each category. Businesses donations encompass a wide
variety of economic sectors and include donations from: agriculture, communications and
electronics, construction, defense, energy and natural resources, general business (i.e.
retail sales, food and beverage, lodging and tourism, etc.), finance, insurance and real
estate, health, health professionals, resource extraction, and transportation. Although this
category encompasses a wide variety of business types, there are also commonalities
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across them. It is highly likely that each of these categories will be focused on generating
profits and that they will exhibit a conservative stance on economic and regulatory
matters (Hogan et al. 2009). This view should lead to similarities in their contribution
strategies and in the type of candidates that receive their donations. In addition, using a
broad category provides a far more complete and meaningful assessment of business
donors then would be the case if I simply examined the general business category alone.
It is also important to note that my measure includes donations from both
organizations and the individuals affiliated with these businesses. As discussed in Hogan
et al. (2009), there are a number of reasons why it may be prudent to examine interest
group donations in this manner. To begin, organizations often bundle individual
campaign contributions when making donations, making the two groups fairly
indistinguishable. Second, Fellowes and Wolf (2004) found that including individual
donations in with PAC donations provided a clearer indicator of, ―the interest effort in
affecting legislative voting‖ (Hogan et al. 2009, p. 9). Finally, state laws determine the
contribution limits of interest groups and focusing exclusively on PAC donations may
make it more difficult to capture this variance.
Conversely, categorizing labor donations is far more clear-cut. This category
encompasses all donations from the three unions (general trade, public sector, and
transportation) that are categorized as part of the labor sector on the campaign finance
website, Follow the Money.
Below, Table 6.1 displays the mean, median and percentage difference in
contributions from businesses and labor unions by gender. As one can see, business
contributions make up about a third of total campaign receipts and constitute a larger
percentage for male candidates than for female candidates.
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Table 6.1: Total Business and Labor Receipts by Gender
Contribution Type

Men

Women

Difference

Business Contributions
Mean
Median
Per Eligible Voter Mean
Per Eligible Voter Median
Percentage of Total Receipts

24,018
5,895
0.40
0.19
32%

18,527
5,421
0.31
0.15
28%

5,491
474
0.09
0.04
4%

Labor Contributions
Mean
Median
Per Eligible Voter Mean
Per Eligible Voter Median
Percentage of Total Receipts

5,537
500
0.09
0.01
8%

6,113
687
0.08
0.02
9%

-576
-187
0.01
-0.01
-1%

Not only do men receive a larger share of their total campaign receipts from corporations,
but they also acquire more money from these sources. Men receive about $5,491 more
on average from corporations, which amounts to about a nine cent advantage per eligible
voter in the district.
Turning to labor, one can see that female candidates have the mean and median
contribution advantage from these donors. Here, women raise $576 more on average
from labor unions and gain one cent more in median contributions per eligible voter in
the district. In addition, in looking at the percentage of the total amount raised labor
unions constituent approximately one percent more for women than men.
These findings largely conform to my expectations that when compared to men,
women raise more from labor unions but less from businesses. Despite the evidence that
women can raise more from labor unions, these results should not be taken to indicate
that women do not still face fundraising obstacles. Since businesses make up such a large
percentage of total receipts, a disadvantage here creates a large fundraising hurdle for
women; especially given how much more ground women have to make up to reach parity
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with men. Whether these differences persist once other controls are added into the model
remains to be seen.
Ideological Interest Groups
Now, that the descriptive differences between male and female candidates have
been examined for businesses and labor unions, it is time to turn to donations from
ideological interest groups. To be classified within this category, donations must come
from an interest group that has a singular, particularistic policy focus. The campaign
finance website, Follow the Money, has a pre-designated category that encompasses
these groups. For the purposes of this analysis, ideological groups that can be
categorized as liberal or conservative are examined. Across the states, there are more
registered liberal leaning groups (liberal policy organization, pro-choice, proenvironment, etc.) than conservative leaning groups (anti-gun control, anti-labor,
Christian conservative, etc.). I focus on groups that have an ideologically recognizable
agenda because I anticipate these groups will be more or less favorably disposed to one
gender or another. Since women are more likely to vote liberally and to support policies
that are liberal, I expect that liberal groups will donate to women at higher rates and that
men will receive more from conservative groups (Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton
2005; Thomas 1994).
I now focus on whether differences exist between male and female legislators by
examining the mean and median contribution, the per eligible voter mean and median
contribution and the percentage of total campaign receipts for ideological interest group
donations across each type of race in the analysis (contested and uncontested races) by
gender.
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Table 6.2: Total Liberal and Conservative Ideological Interest
Group Receipts by Gender
Contribution Type

Men

Women

Difference

Liberal Ideological Group
Mean
Median
Per Eligible Voter Mean
Per Eligible Voter Median
Percentage of Total Receipts

303
0
0.00
0.00
0%

853
0
0.01
0.00
1%

-550
0
-0.01
0.00
-1%

Conservative Ideological Group
Mean
Median
Per Eligible Voter Mean
Per Eligible Voter Median
Percentage of Total Receipts

371
0
0.01
0.00
0%

259
0
0.00
0.00
1%

112
0
0.01
0.00
-1%

On the whole, the results above in Table 6.2 support my earlier hypothesis that
liberal leaning ideological groups are more inclined to contribute to female candidates.
This is not surprising since many female candidates are affiliated with the Democratic
Party and may be perceived by donors as being more sympathetic to or more moderate on
issues of social policy (Poggione, 2004; Thomas and Wilcox 2005; la Cour Dabelko and
Herrnson 1997). Here, one can see that women raise about $550 more on average from
liberal groups, which amounts to approximately a one cent advantage per eligible voter in
the district. On the other hand, men raise $112 more on average from conservative
ideological groups, which amount to approximately a one-cent advantage per eligible
voter in the district. Finally, in looking at the percentage I can see that donations from
ideological interest groups make up about one cent more of the total amount of donations
raised for women versus men.
Although women appear to be advantaged by donations from liberal groups, the
differences are not dramatic and the amount of money being raised in this area is very
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minor and makes up an exceedingly small percentage of total campaign receipts. Later in
the chapter, I explore whether gender is a statistically significant predictor of donations
from both liberal and conservative ideological interest groups when a full model of
controls is run.
Discussion
This analysis demonstrates that interest groups respond to gender differently.
When groups focus on gaining access, women tend to be disadvantaged. When groups
focus more on ideological concerns women are more likely to come out ahead. Women
are able to raise more than men across the board from labor unions and liberal leaning
ideological interest groups. However, women are underfinanced by businesses relative to
male candidates and this category alone accounts for close to one-third of all donations
received in a campaign. Thus, while women may have an easier time appealing to some
groups for funds they may have to work hard to raise what they need from others,
especially if the places where they are advantaged make up a smaller percentage of total
campaign receipts. These differences, again, point to the importance of exploring
contributions more in-depth since simply combining all interest groups together would
mask the differences that are actually present in the fundraising landscape.
However, once again, there are many other factors that need to be accounted for
besides gender. I briefly lay out my hypotheses in relation to these variables below
before moving on to the multivariate analysis.
Control Variables and Hypotheses
In this chapter I examine the total amount of contributions from business, labor
and ideological interest groups accounting for the voting age population in each state.
Business contributions account for a wide variety of economic sectors (agriculture,
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health, transportation, etc.). Labor contributions encompass donations from public sector
unions, general trade unions and transportation unions. Ideological interest group
contributions encompass those from both conservative and liberal organizations. Given
the different goals and strategies of each of these interest groups, I anticipate that certain
factors will play more of a role for each donor group than others in determining the
amount raised by candidates Therefore, I only review my hypotheses as they pertain
especially to these particular factors.
Candidate-Level Factors
First, for the reasons already discussed I expect women will raise more from both
labor unions and liberal ideological interest groups and less from conservative ideological
interest groups and businesses. Second, I anticipate that incumbents will be advantaged
in donations from business groups because these candidates will be valuable to donors
looking to acquire access and these donors are more likely to contribute to individuals
that are electorally secure (Cassie and Thompson 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990;
Thompson et al. 1994). Third, I anticipate that party and committee leadership will be
especially important to businesses looking to gain access to influential members of the
legislature (Hogan 2007). However, I also think this factor will matter for labor unions
as these variables provide cues about a candidate‘s party affiliation and policy positions.
In addition, candidates who chair committees of interest to these groups should receive
more from them in the hopes they will advocate on their behalf or introduce policy that is
favorable to their interests (Gopian et al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and
Snyder 1994; Gordon 2001; Grier and Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988).
Fourth, party affiliation should also play a role. I would anticipate that Republicans will
tend to receive more from businesses while Democrats should be favored by labor
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unions. It is possible that this will be the case because Republicans tend to be more
fiscally conservative and more aligned with the regulatory views of business than
Democrats. Finally, I anticipate that majority party membership and years of service will
be important factors for businesses as these donors are hoping to gain access to members
in power who have more say over agenda setting and policy matters (Thompson et al.
1994; Rudolph 1999). In addition, majority party members may receive more from labor
unions, as these candidates should ultimately have more control over setting the agenda
and making policy (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
District-Level Factors
As with total and party contributions, I expect that candidates will be responsive
to the amount that their opponent is raising and will raise more from both businesses and
labor unions in reaction to the level of donations received by their opponent (Hogan
2007). In addition, I expect that labor contributions will be more forthcoming when a
candidate is running in a more competitive district and when there are a large number of
candidates in the previous primary election (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and
Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). I would not anticipate businesses to be as preoccupied with
these factors as their goal is to contribute to members who are more electorally secure so
that they will have a better chance of getting a return on their investment.
State-Level Factors
As with total and party campaign receipts, I expect many of the hypothesized
relationships will hold true here as well. I expect businesses and labor unions will donate
more when candidates are running for a seat on a professional legislature (Thompson et
al. 1998). These campaigns tend to be more expensive and gaining access to members
here may prove even more valuable since many of these members will be in the
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legislature full-time and innovate legislation is more likely to occur in these chambers.
Second, I expect campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that is raised from these
donors, since limits tend to particularly reduce the amount that corporations and labor
unions can contribute (Hogan et al. 2009). Third, I anticipate that both corporate and
labor union contributions will be higher when interest groups are strong. Fourth,
businesses and labor unions may contribute more in a presidential election year as a
function of being better organized or they may contribute less as these groups will have
more pressure on them to also fund other types of races and there may be less, over all, to
give to any one candidate. Fifth, chamber competition may play some type of a role here.
I do not anticipate that it will be as important with interest group donors as it is with party
donors. However, businesses may use this information to calculate which members to
contribute to in terms of coming away with the most access while labor unions may hope
to maintain or increase the number of individuals in the legislature who tend to support
their ideological views. Finally, it is possible that some groups will contribute more
heavily when term limits are in place as they may hope that term limited members will
use their last years in office to introduce legislation that is favorable to the group‘s
position. On the other hand, businesses may look to establish connections elsewhere and
contribute less to term limited members because they know that they will soon loose
access to them.
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Interest Group
Receipts
Business Donations
I perform several OLS regression analyses that examine the model for all
candidates and then separately for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates.
Table 6.3 presents the coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested
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races by the gender of the candidate, as well as the gender of the candidate and their
opponent.
Table 6.3: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
-0.44***

All Candidates
-0.44***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.04
-0.01
0.002
0.33***
0.20***
2.68***
0.12**
0.02***
-0.22***
0.08***
0.002***
0.02+
-0.05
-0.05***
0.17***
0.10***
0.01***
-0.01
0.02***

-0.02
---0.33***
0.20***
2.68***
0.12**
0.02***
-0.22***
0.08***
0.002***
0.02+
-0.05
-0.05***
0.17***
0.10***
0.01***
-0.01
0.02***

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.28

6,067
0.28

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance
Table 6.3 shows that the model explains about 28 percent of the variance. None
of the gender variables are significant in either model but all of the other candidate-level
factors are. As hypothesized, incumbents raise more from businesses when compared to
challengers. Since, businesses are concerned with gaining access and challengers often
face a difficult time against the incumbency advantage, it is not surprising that they raise
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less. Open seat candidates also raise about 20 cents more per eligible voter than
challengers do. In addition, it is clear that businesses direct much of their money to
people in positions of power within the legislature. Here, party leaders raise $2.68 more
per eligible voter, while committee leaders raise 12 cents more and majority party
members receive 8 cents more. Republicans also make more from businesses, which is
also expected given their likelihood to fit more closely with the conservative agenda of
many corporate interests. In terms of district-level factors, it is clear that both measures
of previous competition play a significant role in the donation strategy of businesses.
Also, as was the case with total and party donations, candidates are reactive to the
amount raised by their competition and tend to raise more as their opponent raises more.
Finally, turning to state-level factors, I can see that, as in earlier chapters, strong
campaign finance laws reduce the amount raised by contested candidates. In addition, I
can see that strong interest groups, term limits, and high levels of chamber competition
all lead to more corporate donations.
Having now examined what factors affect all contested candidates together, I
move on to examine each group, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates,
separately. Below, in Table 6.4 I present the results of each of these models for the
gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent separately.
Looking first at incumbents, I find that gender has a statically significant effect in
a couple of different ways. First, female incumbents raise approximately 10 cents less
per eligible voter when compared to male incumbents. In addition, I find that female
incumbents make about 13 cents less than male incumbents when both face off against a
male challenger. This finding provides some evidence that female incumbents are
disadvantaged by businesses when compared to male incumbents.
140

Table 6.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
-0.62***

Incumbents Challengers Challengers Open Seats
-0.64***
-0.02
-0.01
-0.31***

Open Seats
-0.31***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.10
-0.13*
-0.08
--2.57***
0.02
0.03***
-0.30***
0.16**
0.001
0.01
0.37+
-0.11***
0.32***
0.21***
0.01***
-0.04
0.10***

-0.10+
-----2.57***
0.02
0.03***
-0.30***
0.16**
0.001
0.01
0.37+
-0.11***
0.32***
0.21***
0.01***
-0.04
0.10***

--0.001
0.03*
0.02
------0.09***
0.0002
0.002***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.004
0.03***
0.02
0.001+
-0.003
0.01***

0.02
---------0.09***
0.001
0.002***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.004
0.03***
0.02
0.001+
-0.003
0.01***

-0.01
0.08**
0.05+
------0.28***
0.15***
0.00003
0.09***
-0.21**
-0.03**
0.14***
0.10***
0.01***
0.04+
0.05***

0.05*
---------0.28***
0.15***
0.00005
0.09***
-0.21**
-0.03**
0.14***
0.10***
0.01***
0.04+
0.05***

N
Adjusted R2

2,283
0.26

2,283
0.26

2,283
0.11

2,283
0.11

1,499
0.25

1,499
0.24

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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Although raising 10 to 13 cents less per eligible voter may not seem like much, it can
translate into quite a financial barrier, especially for women in more populated districts.
Given the desire of businesses to gain access to influential members of the legislature, it
is not surprising to see that incumbents raise more when they are party leaders, when they
have more seniority, and when they are members of the majority party. As before,
Republicans also raise more although electoral competition does not seem to impact the
financial decisions of donors in this model. However, it is clear that incumbents are able
to keep up with the gains of challengers and will raise about 10 cents more per eligible
voter from businesses when their opponent raises more. Finally, in examining the statelevel factors one can see that most play a highly significant role in the decisions of
business donors. Incumbents raise 21 cents more when term limits are in place and 32
cents more when comparing states where interest groups are weak to where they are
strong. This is not surprising since strong interest groups should lead to better financed
business donors and business donors may spend more on incumbents in an effort to gain
their loyalty and get them to use what time they have left to support their interests. In
addition, as with party and total campaign donations, campaign finance laws reduce the
advantages of incumbents to the greatest extent.
Turning next to challengers, I find that when used in the single-indicator equation,
gender is not statistically significant but in the model controlling for gendered context,
female challengers raise three cents more than male challengers when they run against a
male incumbent. This could indicate that women feel more pressure to focus on
fundraising when they face a male incumbent. Or, it could be an indication that women
who do decide to run against male incumbents are better fundraisers than similarly
situated male challengers. This could be an indication again of the strategic aspect of
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women running for office. As with incumbents, challengers raise more when they are
affiliated with the Republican Party although their advantage is not nearly as large as that
for incumbents or open seat candidates. Unlike with incumbents, I find that majority
party status does not play a statistically significant role in the contribution strategies of
businesses while previous electoral competition does. This is to be expected since a
highly competitive district could signal the presence of a weak incumbent. Since
business donors want to gain access to members of the legislature, they may hedge their
bets and contribute to both incumbents and challengers or they may donate more to
challengers so that they will have a connection to them if the challenger wins the
electoral contest. Another major departure from the incumbent models is that neither
term limits nor campaign finance laws have a statistically significant impact. It appears
that business donors are more likely to focus their money on incumbents and open seat
candidates when term limits are in effect. In addition, campaign finance laws should help
to level the playing field for challengers so it is not surprising that they are impacting
other types of candidates to a greater extent.
On the other hand, challengers are more likely to be affected when they run for a
seat on a professional legislature. These candidates receive lower levels of funding from
business donors when running in this environment. Since, business donors appear to be
directing more to incumbents in this scenario it is not surprising that this would have a
negative impact on challengers. Given the difficulty in gaining a seat in a professional
legislature and the expense of a campaign, one might expect a challenger to be at a
particular disadvantage and not a terribly attractive candidate to a business donor hoping
to gain access. Otherwise, interest group strength and chamber competition both make it
more likely challengers will raise slightly more from business donors. Finally, as with
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incumbents, challengers raise more when their opponent raises more, however the total
increase per eligible voter is one-tenth that of incumbents. This demonstrates that
challengers have a harder time matching the gains of their opponent when compared to
incumbents.
Finally, in looking at the last two models in Table 6.4 I can see that approximately
25 percent of the variance is explained for open seat candidates. In addition, gender is
again having a statistically significant affect, with female open seat candidates raising
approximately five cents more per eligible voter when compared to male open seat
candidates. In addition, gender plays a statistically significant role when the gender of
their opponent is factored in. First, female open seat candidates raise eight cents more
per eligible voter than male open seat candidates when both face a male opponent.
Second, when a male open seat candidate faces an opponent of the opposite sex they raise
five cents more per eligible voter than a male open seat candidate who faces a male
opponent. These relationships demonstrate that female open seat candidates are
competitive fundraisers but they also show, in part, that women tend to raise more when
they find themselves running against a male candidate. Perhaps women feel more
threatened by a male challenge and believe they must work harder to attract business
donors so that they can stay competitive. These races also provide evidence that both
men and women running in open seat races raise more from businesses when their
opponent is of the opposite sex.
In moving beyond gender, I see that Republicans and majority party members are
again raising more. However, for these races, it is the number of previous primary
opponents that is playing a role in contribution decisions. Businesses may use this
information as a cue to determine which party faced the biggest obstacle in the primary
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the last time out. This may aid them in deciding which candidate they should contribute
to now. In terms of state-level factors, all of the relationships conform to the findings
discussed earlier for challengers, although the coefficients are generally larger.
Understanding what factors influence business contributions in contested races is
only half the story. It is also necessary to compare the results already discussed to those
found in uncontested races. Thus, in Table 6.5 I present two models. The first model
looks at the factors that influence business contributions to uncontested incumbents. The
second model examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat
candidates who ran unopposed.
Table 6.5: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising
by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized
Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.10

Open Seats
-0.41*

Gender
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Years Served
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year

-0.12**
1.75***
0.05
-0.13**
0.02
0.01***
0.002
0.001
0.54*
-0.15***
0.16***
0.15*
0.002
-0.04

0.10+
---0.09+
0.01
-0.004*
0.003
0.77**
0.03
0.16***
-0.06
0.01*
0.07

N
Adjusted R2

1,907
0.16

202
0.18

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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Here, as with contested incumbents, one finds that uncontested female incumbents
raise less than their male counterparts. On average, women raise 12 cents less per
eligible voter. Perhaps female incumbents, face a greater challenge in getting the
attention of business donors when compared to male incumbents or perhaps women do
not feel as much pressure to raise more when they are running from the advantaged
position of an incumbent. In addition to the similarity with gender, female uncontested
candidates also raise more when they are party leaders, when they are Republicans, and
when they have been in office for a longer period of time. I also find that many of the
state-level factors maintain similar relationships for uncontested and contested
incumbents.
Finally, turning to the last model in the table, one sees that uncontested female
open seat candidates raise approximately 10 cents more per eligible voter than their male
opponents, although this coefficient is only marginally significant. While one might
expect businesses to be more supportive of male candidates in this situation, this does not
seem to be the case. Otherwise, candidates tend to raise more when the previous election
was competitive, when the legislature is more professional, when interest groups are
strong and when chamber competition is high. Also, in analysis not shown, I ran these
models using state dummy variables in place of state-level control variables.8
Labor Donations
Now that I have examined the factors that play a significant role in the amount of
money that candidates raise from business, it is time to turn to labor unions. Unlike
8

I found that in both my single-indicator equations and in the models controlling for gendered context,
gender became an insignificant predictor of business donations for contested challengers, and contested and
uncontested open seat races. Again, since the effect is not consistent using different model specifications
this suggests that the influence of gender is not very strong. It could also suggest that other factors
currently unaccounted for, such as the culture of the state or the socio-economic status of the voters might
be playing a role. However, the contested and uncontested incumbent relationships were not impacted by
the use of state dummy variables.

146

businesses, labor unions should be motivated more by ideological concerns than attempts
to gain access to influential members in the legislature. Thus, it is important to divide my
analysis so that each type of interest group is examined individually. As with my
analysis on business, I first examine all contested candidates before separating my
models out for each type of candidate (incumbent, challenger and open seat) that runs in a
contested election. Finally, I examine how labor unions treat incumbents and open seat
candidates in uncontested races. Below, in Table 6.6 I provide my findings for all
contested candidates.
Table 6.6: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
-0.06*

All Candidates
-0.06*

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.01
-0.08
0.01
0.07***
0.06***
0.48***
-0.02
0.003**
0.14***
0.01
0.001***
0.004
0.04
-0.05***
0.01
-0.01
0.001
-0.01+
0.02***

-0.01
---0.07***
0.06***
0.48***
-0.02
0.003**
0.14***
0.01
0.001***
0.004
0.04
-0.05***
0.01
-0.01
0.001
-0.01+
0.02***

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.16

6,067
0.16

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance
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As in Table 6.3, I do not find that gender has a statistically significant impact
when all contested candidates are grouped together. Moving on to other candidate
characteristics, I find that incumbents and open seat candidates receive more from labor
unions than challengers do. Although it makes sense that donors would contribute more
heavily to open seat candidates where races are likely to be more competitive, it is
surprising that more funds are not directed to challengers since this goes against many of
the arguments in the literature about the ideological strategy (Evans 1988; Wright 1985;
Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). However, it does conform to recent findings
that labor unions focus on incumbency status when making donations (Hogan et al.
2009). As anticipated, I find that party leadership and party affiliation play a very strong
role in the decision to contribute. This is to be expected since labor unions are more
likely to fund members who are closely aligned with their ideological preferences and
party serves as a cue to a candidate‘s ideological beliefs. The biggest departures from the
donation strategies of businesses are that labor unions focus far less attention on
committee leadership and majority party status. In addition, Democrats tend to benefit
from labor contributions as opposed to Republicans.
In terms of district-level influences, past district competition has a strong
influence on labor contributions, which fits with scholarly speculations that labor unions
tend to follow more of an electoral or ideological strategy. Finally, in looking at statelevel influences, I find that many of these variables played a larger role in determining
business contributions. However, as has generally been the case with other contributions,
candidates receive more in donations when their opponent raises more but they raise less
when it is a presidential election year and when campaign finance laws are strict.
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Now that I have examined what factors impact labor union contributions when all
contested candidates are grouped together, it is time to see if these relationships hold
once the candidates are separated. Below, in Table 6.7 I examine incumbents,
challengers and open seat candidates separately by the gender of the candidate and the
gender of the candidate and their opponent.
Looking first at incumbents, I see that none of the gender variables in the first
model are significant. However, I find that female incumbents tend to raise four cents
less per eligible voter than male incumbents, although it is only marginally significant.
This finding seems to follow a general pattern across contributors in which female
incumbents raise less than their opponents. It is unclear why this is the case but it is
possible that women may not feel as pressured to raise large sums of money once they
obtain incumbency.
Although labor unions are theoretically supposed to follow more of an ideological
strategy, I find evidence here that they also pay attention to more access oriented
characteristics when making donations. This is similar to what Hogan et al. (2009) found
in a recent study of business and labor donations. In particular, I find that party leaders
receive about 46 cents more, while Democrats receive 18 cents more and majority party
members gain four cents more per eligible voter. Seniority is also an important factor but
committee leadership actually reduces contributions from labor unions by four cents per
eligible voter. Perhaps this outcome is a function of committee leaders serving on a bevy
of committees that either do not pertain to the interests of labor unions or directly counter
them. Next, I find that neither measure of electoral competition serves a significant role.
However, several state-level factors are significant.
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Table 6.7: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
-0.01

Incumbents
-0.01

Challengers
-0.04*

Challengers
-0.04*

Open Seats
-0.01

Open Seats
-0.01

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.04
-0.03
0.00
--0.46***
-0.04+
0.003*
0.18***
0.04*
0.001
-0.01
0.19**
-0.08***
0.01
-0.002
0.001
-0.02
0.06***

-0.04+
-----0.46***
-0.04+
0.003*
0.18***
0.04*
0.001
-0.01
0.19**
-0.08***
0.01
-0.002
0.001
-0.02
0.06***

--0.003
0.01
0.01
-----0.09***
-0.005
0.001**
0.01**
-0.02
-0.01***
0.01*
-0.01+
0.001
-0.01
0.004***

0.004
--------0.09***
-0.004
0.001**
0.01**
-0.02
-0.01***
0.01*
-0.01+
0.001
-0.01
0.004***

--0.02
0.02
-0.01
-----0.16***
-0.01
0.0004
0.03***
-0.01
-0.05***
-0.0002
0.01
0.0002
-0.004
0.04***

0.01
--------0.16***
-0.01
0.0004
0.03***
-0.01
-0.05***
-0.0001
0.01
0.0002
-0.004
0.04***

2,283
0.14

1,499
0.30

1,499
0.30

N
2,283
2,283
2,283
2
Adjusted R
0.16
0.16
0.14
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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Again, incumbents can expect to raise more when running for a seat on a professional
legislature, when campaign finance laws are less stringent, and when their opponents are
raising more. These relationships comport well to findings from other donor groups as
well.
Turning next to challengers, I do not find any statistically significant relationships
for gender. However, I do find that party affiliation is an important factor and that labor
unions will tend to contribute nine cents more per eligible voter when a candidate is
affiliated with the Democratic Party.

In additions, candidates tend to raise more when

the previous primary and general election were highly contested. This provides evidence
to support the argument that labor unions tend to fund candidates in competitive electoral
situations. In addition, as I found repeatedly across my analysis chapters, strict campaign
finance laws have a chilling effect on donations while, on the other hand, candidates raise
more when their opponents raise more. In addition, I find that strong interest groups
benefit challengers and that term limits decrease their total contributions from labor
unions.
Finally, when examining contested open seat races, one can see that the models
closely resemble those for challengers but more of the variance is explained here. Again,
I do not find that gender has any bearing on labor union contributions. However, once
again, party affiliation, the number of primary opponents, campaign finance laws and
opponent fundraising all have an impact.
In addition to scrutinizing contested races, it is also important to examine whether
labor unions prioritize factors differently when candidates are running unopposed in the
general election. In Table 6.8 I focus on the factors that impact labor union donations
separately for incumbents and open seat candidates.
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Table 6.8: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by
Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized
Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.15***

Open Seats
0.02

Gender
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Years Served
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year

-0.02**
0.20***
0.02*
0.08***
-0.02*
0.0002
0.0001
0.0003
0.19***
-0.05***
-0.01
0.01
-0.002***
-0.01

-0.01
--0.08***
-0.03+
-0.001
-0.01
0.25**
-0.001
0.001
-0.03
-0.0003
-0.02

N
Adjusted R2

1,907
0.16

202
0.10

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance
Beginning with uncontested incumbents, I find that female candidates raise
approximately two cents less per eligible voter when compared to uncontested male
candidates. This finding mirrors that for contested incumbents. As with contested
incumbents, I find that labor unions pay attention to party leadership and party affiliation.
However, unlike contested incumbents, here committee leadership provides two cents
more per eligible voter. Since the outcome of the election is assured, labor unions may
invest more in these candidates because they hope a donation might lead them to be more
favorably disposed to their agenda or to at least be less openly hostile. Turning to statelevel factors, I find that labor unions contribute 19 cents more when the candidate is
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running for a seat in a professional legislature but that they will contribute about five
cents less when campaign finance laws are strict. These results mirror those discussed
earlier for business contributors. Finally, I find that chamber competition is also a
significant predictor of labor union behavior although the decrease in giving is very
small.
Turning finally to uncontested open seat races, we can see that only about 10
percent of the variance is explained here. This outcome is similar to what we saw for
party donations when gender and legislative professionalism were the only significant
predictors. Here, instead of gender, I find that party affiliation and majority party status
are significant factors and, ultimately, candidates can expect to raise eight cents more per
eligible voter when they are affiliated with the Democratic Party and three cents less
when they are members of the majority party. Although most of the variables are not
significant here, it is important to note that this result conforms to much of what the
literature argues, which is that party affiliation will be one of the most important
determinants of labor union contributions (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and
Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In addition, as with the business donor models, I also ran
these models using state dummy variables in place of state-level controls.9
Discussion
As with total campaign receipts, I find evidence in this chapter that gender plays a
role in the contribution decisions of businesses. But, as with party donations, I find that it
has a rather minor impact on labor union donations. After controlling for a variety of
other factors, gender plays a statistically significant role in business contributions for
contested and uncontested incumbents and contested and uncontested open seat

9

I did not find any changes in any of my models when the state dummy variables were used.
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candidates. In addition, gender plays a factor in the amount raised from labor unions for
contested and uncontested incumbents. In terms of donor strategy, I had anticipated that
businesses would discriminate more against women and that labor unions would be more
in favor of female candidates. However, once controls were introduced, I found that a
candidate‘s ability to garner funds had more to do with their candidate status. As in
previous chapters, I find that female incumbents tend to raise less, regardless of their
electoral status from businesses and labor unions and that female open seat candidates
tend to raise more from business donors.
As anticipated, businesses tend to follow an access oriented strategy when making
contributions. Here, party leadership, majority party status, and years of service were
often significant factors. In addition, businesses tend to concentrate more of their
contributions on Republican candidates. I also find that labor unions tend to contribute
based on a combination of access oriented and ideological characteristics. However, the
most frequently occurring candidate-level predictors of donations were tied to party,
which is a strong cue of ideology. Unlike businesses, labor unions focus a larger share of
their funds on Democrats.
Besides candidate level-factors, I found that campaign finance laws reduce the
amount of contributions received from businesses and labor unions and strong
fundraising from the opposition will increase the coffers of the competition in every
instance for both types of donors. However, strong interest groups, term limits, and
chamber competition are far more likely to have a positive, statistically significant impact
in my business models. This could indicate that businesses are more reactive to the state
campaign environment than are labor unions, at least according to the measures used in
my models.
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When comparing these findings to the party contribution models, I find a number
of similarities and differences. First, majority party status, party leadership, and party
affiliation are all important predictors of contributions from party donors. In addition,
parties tend to donate more to Republicans which is in line with business donors but
departs from the strategy of labor unions. Second, interest group strength plays more of a
factor for business donors than for either labor unions or parties, while opponent
fundraising and campaign finance laws have the same relationships across the board.
Third, I find that term limits increase business donations in all but one instance but that
they have the opposite effect on party donations. This may indicate that these donors
follow a different strategy when contributing to candidates under term limits. In addition,
I find that a presidential election year has a very limited role in the contribution behavior
of businesses and labor unions but that it has a significant effect on party contributions.
Perhaps parties feel more pressure to divide their resources across elections at all levels
of government or to donate more to campaigns at the federal and presidential level. If so,
this would reduce the amount of money available to candidates at the state-level and
could account for this finding.
These comparisons indicate that there are many similarities across donor subgroups in the types of factors that influence whether someone gets a contribution but, at
the same time, every organization is different and these differences will result in groups
weighing some factors more importantly than others.
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Economic Interest
Group Sectors and Ideological Interest Groups
Having now discussed the overall fundraising landscape for candidates raising
money from businesses and labor unions, it is time to see if gender plays a role across the
various economic sectors that encompass business. In addition, I examine whether
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women are advantaged or disadvantaged by contributions from liberal and conservative
ideological interest groups. Below, in Table 6.9 I present the coefficients for gender for
each category according to the per eligible voter contribution received. As with the
earlier models, I present the results for all contested candidates, for contested incumbents,
challengers and open seat candidates separately and finally for uncontested incumbents
and open seat candidates. Given the many different sources examined, this table provides
the coefficients resulting from the multivariable analysis for the gender variable only
(dichotomous 1=woman, 0=man).
Below, in Table 6.9, I divide the economic sectors into those which I hypothesize
are friendly to male candidates and those which might have closer ties to female
candidates. I base these relationships on theoretical arguments that women tend to be
more concerned with social welfare, education, and health care policies while men might
be expected to take an interest in more traditionally masculine pursuits like agriculture or
resource extraction. In addition, lawyers and lobbyists might maintain closer ties with
male candidates given that women are still underrepresented in these professions and men
might have more networks established with these types of donors than women.
On the whole, however, I find again that the results have more to do with the
status of the candidate. Women tend to raise more when they are open seat candidates
and less when they are incumbents. This is generally true regardless of the economic
sector under consideration. Thus, I do not find that women excel in achieving donations
from groups that might be more aligned with women anymore than I find they are hurt by
groups that one might expect would be friendlier to male candidates. If anything, gender
plays almost no role in the calculations of these various health care donors.

156

Table 6.9: Effects of Gender on Funding Raised From Various Economic Sectors and Ideological Organizations
All Contested
Candidates

Incumbents Challengers Open
Seats

Uncontested
Incumbents

Uncontested
Open Seat

Hypothesized to be Friendly to
Male Candidates
Agriculture
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Resource Extraction
Lawyers and Lobbyists

-0.0002
-0.01
-0.0002
0.0004

-0.01*
-0.03*
0.002
-0.01

0.001
-0.003
-0.01*

0.01*
0.01*
0.0002
0.01+

-0.01*
-0.03**
-0.01*
-0.02*

-0.01
0.02
0.03**
0.03

Hypothesized to be Friendly to
Female Candidates
Health
Health Professionals

-0.002
0.002

-0.01
-0.003

0.002
0.001

0.01*
0.01*

-0.01
-0.003

0.02
0.01

Ideological Groups
Liberal Groups
Conservative Groups

0.01***
0.0001

0.01***
-0.001

0.01***
0.001

0.01***
0.001

0.002**
-0.001

0.01*
-0.002

Economic Sectors

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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In terms of advantages and disadvantages, the greatest monetary differences
between men and women can be found in finance, insurance and real estate, resource
extraction, and lawyers and lobbyists, although the differences never amount to more
than three cents per eligible voter. Turning to those relationships which are statistically
significant, I find that female incumbents raise less from agriculture and finance,
insurance and real estate. This outcome may be a function of fewer female incumbents
having ties to these industries or of fewer women being located in districts that have
agriculture as the chief economic constituent profession.
Moving on to challengers, I find that lawyers and lobbyists tend to contribute one
cent more per eligible voter here. They are the only industry where gender seems to
factor significantly into decision-making. Next, in looking at open seat candidates, I find
that women raise one cent more per eligible voter from every donor group save for
resource extraction. However, these relationships are reversed for uncontested
incumbents where all ―male friendly‖ donors contribute less to female candidates.
Perhaps the male candidates in office are simply more closely aligned with the
viewpoints of these industries than are female incumbents or perhaps women are only
aggressive about asking for money from these industries when they are open seat
candidates. Finally, I find that donors affiliated with the resource extraction industry
contribute three cents more per eligible voter to uncontested open seat candidates. It is
unclear to me why this outcome would obtain but it is possible that the composition of
candidates‘ within this group is somehow especially appealing to these donors.
Shifting gears and moving next to ideological interest groups, I had originally
hypothesized that women would raise more from liberal leaning groups and less from
conservative leaning groups. I find evidence to support my hypothesis for liberal groups
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although I also find that conservative groups do not appear to base their funding decisions
on gender. Instead, they pay more attention to factors like party affiliation, majority
party status and party leadership.
Comparing these results to liberal ideological groups, one can see that the
relationship is positive in every case. In addition, the relationships are statistically
significant for every type of candidate under consideration. In these instances women
generally raise one cent more per eligible voter when compared to similarly situated men.
This is a rather stark change from the results presented in the economic sector section.
Clearly, liberal leaning ideological interest groups are consistently more likely to
support women financially, regardless of whether they are incumbents, challengers, or
open seat candidates and may be more open to their candidacies in general. This is not
all that surprising since women may be a better ideological fit with the interests of
ideological interest groups as compared to businesses.
Discussion
Generally, I find that the individual economic sectors presented in Table 6.9 tend
to respond in a similar fashion to male and female candidates as all business contributors
do. This should increase one‘s confidence that my broad measure of business is
capturing the same patterns as one might find in the individual industries. As I find
throughout my analysis, women tend to be disadvantaged when they are incumbents and
female open seat candidates tend to raise more. On the other hand, liberal leaning
ideological interest groups tend to favor women regardless of their candidate status.
These differences point to the importance of separating labor unions from businesses and
ideological interest groups. This is especially so since I find that despite similarities in
contribution factors, there are also differences in how each group allocates funds to
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candidates. This is likely a result of the theoretical differences in contribution strategies,
as well as the diverse policy and ideological objectives of each group.
Conclusion
On the whole, this chapter demonstrates that gender is more likely to play a role
in the contribution decisions of businesses and liberal ideological groups but it has a
minor role in the contribution strategy of labor unions and plays no role in the donor
behavior of conservative ideological groups. Although, liberal ideological groups‘
advantage women and some donors do not pay much attention to gender, it is important
to keep in mind that liberal group donations make up a tiny fraction of all campaign
donations while business donors make up about one-third. As a result, women may still
need to pound the pavement to be successful, especially if they are incumbents.
However, if female open seat candidates can expect to garner more support from these
various donors, then there is little reason to believe they cannot be successful raising
money or winning office. This may be why women opt more into open seat elections
than into races where they are challengers. On the other hand, donors may contribute
more to female open seat candidates because these women represent the most highly
qualified, motivated candidates and these candidates may have selected into a race where
they have a high chance of winning. Thus, donors may be able to pick up on these cues
and may contribute more generously as a result of wanting to gain access to the most
likely winner, which may be a woman.
In the next chapter I turn my attention to the individual candidate as a donor subgroup by examining campaign self-finance. In addition, I also focus my attention on the
size of contributions received by state legislative candidates.
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CHAPTER 7: EXAMINING CAMPAIGN SELF-FINANCE AND
CONTRIBUTION SIZE
After reading the last few chapters, it is clear that candidates raise much of their
campaign money from parties, businesses, labor unions and ideological interest groups.
However, candidates do not always rely exclusively on outside contributors to finance
their election. Candidates also fund their own campaigns. Given that female incumbents
often raise less in both contested and uncontested races, one might expect these
individuals to rely more on self-finance as a way of making up for this shortfall. In
addition, where women have raised more than men, these receipts may have been
collected in smaller contributions. Certainly, in one area where women are advantaged
(liberal ideological groups) the mean donation is just a few hundred dollars. Thus, one
might expect women to raise more in small donations either because they have fewer
political and financial connections than men or because they feel less comfortable asking
for money, especially large donations.
In this chapter I turn my attention to examining campaign self-finance. In
addition, this chapter explores differences in campaign contribution size. Both of these
elements are important to a comprehensive examination of campaign differences as they
can impact the ease with which candidates raise money. A simple comparison of total
campaign receipts may show few differences between male and female candidates, but
this may belie the real story if women have to reach out to more donors to raise the same
amount of money or invest more of their own money into their campaign. In this chapter
I examine what role, if any, gender plays in these aspects and I explore what factors
influence contribution size and the degree of campaign self-finance.
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Previous Research on Campaign Self-Finance and Contribution Size
Campaign self-finance is an important source of funding for candidates at all
levels of government. Presidential and congressional candidates often rely heavily on
their own pocketbooks (Cook 2008; Steen 2000). In addition, a survey of 350 state
legislative candidates revealed that the second largest source of campaign funds came
from the candidate‘s own revenue sources or personal loans (Faucheux and Herrnson
1999). Given the important role of campaign self-finance in the campaign process, it is
surprising and disappointing that this topic has received very little scholarly attention
over the years. The major exceptions to this are Steen‘s (2000 and 2006) works and
Hogan‘s (1999) article.
Steen (2000) examines electoral contests between 1992 and 1998 for the U.S.
House of Representatives. She examines what role candidate self-financing plays in
candidate quality, electoral competition and outcomes, and the incentive to run for office.
First, she finds that self-financers are often politically inexperienced and lack name
recognition and the support of political networks. Second, she finds that the presence of
a self-financed candidate can reduce political opposition. Third, she finds that selffinancing can increase a candidate‘s chances of electoral success but raising funds the old
fashioned way is far more effective. Fourth, she suggests that most self-financing is loan
based, which allows candidates to recoup their losses by either writing off the loan as a
loss or repaying the loan after winning with money from PACs hoping to gain access
after the fact. Finally, Steen shows that the few self-financed candidates who win their
races typically make the transition to traditional sources of funding when they run again
(Steen 2000; Cook 2008).
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These sources provide a great deal of information on campaign self-finance at the
federal level but they fail to address the role this process plays at the state legislative
level. Hogan‘s (1999) article helps fill this void. He examines candidate campaign
contributions in Illinois, Kansas and Wyoming during 1986 and 1988. Like Steen (2000),
he finds that candidates are more likely to finance their own campaign if they are not
receiving enough financial support from various types of donors, especially interest
groups. Hogan (1999) also believes that the need to self-finance may have consequences
for both candidate entry decisions and the profile of the candidate who runs.
Although each of these pieces shines light on what is essentially a very understudied topic, neither examines campaign finance across a large array of states and
neither directly approaches the topic of gender. In this chapter I make an effort to
determine whether gender plays a role in campaign self-finance, particularly after
controlling for a wide variety of candidate, district and state-level factors.
Besides campaign self-finance, one might expect gender to play a role in the size
of the donation received. Much of what we know about contribution size pertains to
individual donors exclusively. Baker (2006) examines races to the United States Senate
between 1998 and 2004. The author finds that women rely heavily on individual donors,
and female donors, and that this dependence is more entrenched for women than men. In
addition, Baker (2006) finds that women receive smaller individual contributions as
compared to men.
Burrell‘s (1994) study also examines individual donations to federal candidates
but from 1980 to 1990.

Her focus is on large contributions (those over $500). The

author finds that male candidates raise more, on average, from large donors than female
candidates in 1980, 1984, 1986, and 1990 while women did better in just one year, 1988.
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However, Burrell (1994) does not find gender to be a statistically significant factor once
candidate status and party affiliation are controlled. Thus, she does not seem to conclude
that women are disadvantaged in the manner that Baker (2006) does.
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Campaign Self-Finance and
Contribution Size
There are reasons to believe that gender will have an impact on the extent of selffinancing as well as on the prevalence of funding from small donors. Beginning with
campaign self-finance, one might anticipate that women will invest more of their own
money into their campaign. As I state repeatedly in this dissertation, women may not feel
as confident in their ability to raise money or they may lack the connections necessary to
effectively raise money from various types of donors, especially those seeking access
(Whiting, 1998; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and
Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). If either or both of these theories pertain, then women may
use their personal pocketbook to achieve two goals. First, using their own start-up money
may help to reduce their level of anxiety about fundraising and buy them more time to
raise money from other sources. Second, these self-made donations may jumpstart their
campaign so that they can get their message out and gain more name recognition. By
using their own money to accomplish these two goals, they should gain the attention of
other types of donors and this may help them to bring in more contributions in the long
run.
Turning next to the size of campaign donations, one might expect women to
receive more contributions from small donors. As discussed in chapter six, women may
lack many of the characteristics that would make them attractive to well-financed accessoriented donors. Women are also likely to rely more on contributions from individual
donors, which are usually smaller in size than those from parties, corporations, and labor
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unions (Baker 2006; Burrell 1994). In addition, women may not feel comfortable asking
for large sums of money or they may face animosity or skepticism from elites about their
ability to get elected and their place in the legislative environment. As such, women may
rely upon a larger number of small donations or they may simply get fewer repeat
contributions (Jenkins, 2007; LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001; Baker 2006; Fox 2007;
Sanbonmatsu 2005).
I now turn my attention to exploring just how accurate these various assumptions
are. I begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of both campaign self-finance
and the size of campaign contributions. Then, I provide a quick overview of my model
and detail my hypotheses as they relate to the various controls in the analysis. Finally, I
perform multivariate analyses that control for other factors that might account for any
differences identified below. The analysis begins with campaign self-finance before
moving on to an examination of donations from small contributors.
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Campaign Self-Finance
Receipts and Contribution Size
Campaign Self Finance
On the campaign finance website, Follow the Money, candidate contributions are
easy to identify and the data include every donation that was made to the candidate‘s own
campaign. Below, in Table 7.1 I present the mean and median contribution, the per
eligible voter mean and median contribution and the percentage of total campaign
receipts donated by the candidate to their own campaign across each type of race in the
analysis (contested and uncontested races) by gender.
As one can see, when candidates do contribute to their campaign, on average the
contribution is fairly sizeable and these contributions make up a higher percentage of
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total campaign receipts than was found for ideological interest group donations in Table
6.2.
Table 7.1: Total Amount Self-Financed by Gender
Contribution Type
Self-Financed Contributions
Mean
Median
Per Eligible Voter Mean
Per Eligible Voter Median
Percentage of Total Receipts

Men

2,308
0
0.05
0.00
6%

Women

Difference

2,364
0
0.05
0.00
5%

-56
0
0.00
0.00
1%

One can also see that women and men contribute approximately the same amount of
money to their campaigns. On average women contribute about $56 more than men to
their own campaign. However, when examining the percentage difference between male
and female legislators, it is clear that self-finance makes up a higher percentage of total
campaign receipts for men as compared to women. Thus, these contradictory estimates
make it uncertain as to whether women or men put more into their own campaign. There
are certainly many reasons to believe that women would self-fund their campaigns at a
higher rate and that this would make up a larger percentage of their total receipts.
However, this is not always the case. From a psychological point of view, it is possible
that male candidates are more comfortable with dictating where the family finances will
go because they may be the primary breadwinners. Similarly, female candidates may be
the primary caregiver in their household and may feel more responsibility for the needs of
their children and may feel guilty contributing large sums of money to their own
campaign because they equate this with taking something away from their family. Later
in this chapter, I explore whether this relationship becomes clearer once other control
variables are considered.
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Campaign Contribution Size
Unlike the measure for campaign self-finance, choosing how to define the size of
campaign contributions was a bit more subjective. I define a small contribution as one
that is $200 or less. Small contributions also include donations from all small and
unitemized party contributions as these donations constitute small contributions from
individual donors bundled together or contributions that are under the reporting threshold.
For my purposes, I consider a medium contribution as one that ranges from $201-$1,000.
Finally, a large contribution ranges from $1,001 to $5,000. To create percentages for
each of these totals, the donor amount was divided by total campaign receipts. It is
important to note that some states allow unlimited contributions and others place limits
on PACs so this may account for some of the variation.
It is also important to note that I did not include all types of contributions in these
measures.10 In examining small contributions I wanted to limit my analysis to group and
individual donors. Since income can come from the candidate themselves (candidate
self-finance, interest income, balance forward) or from outside sources (public subsidies),
or from the party (party PAC expenses, party committee transfer, etc.), where many
candidates will receive a standard contribution, I felt these categories did not represent
sources of revenue where the candidate had to campaign for the donation. The sources I
include represent contributions received from donors where the presumption of giving is
not present, where there is competition between candidates to obtain the donation, and/or
where the source of revenue is not coming from the candidate themselves.

10

The size variables exclude the following contribution sources: balance forward, candidate self-finance,
interest income, non-contribution, public subsidy, candidate committees, Democratic officials, candidates
and former members, joint candidate committee, party committee transfer, party committees, party PAC
expenses, Republican officials, candidates and former members, and Third-Party officials, candidates and
former members.
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Now that I have explained how these variables were created, it is important to see
the amount of variation across the states in the size of contributions received from small,
medium and large donors. This is especially true given the differences in campaign
finance laws. Below, in Table 7.2 I present the mean percentage raised from small,
medium and large donations across each type of race in the analysis (contested and
uncontested races) by state. This table is sorted according to the percentage raised from
small donations.
Table 7.2: Percentage of Campaign Receipts from Small, Medium, and Large
Donations by State

State
Illinois
California
Texas
Florida
Oregon
Kentucky
Michigan
Indiana
Tennessee
Washington
Georgia
New Mexico
Alaska
Rhode Island
Ohio
Utah
Idaho
Pennsylvania
Missouri
Maine
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Iowa
Colorado
Total

Mean Percent Raised
Mean Percent Raised from Mean Percent Raised
from Small Donations
Medium Donations
from Large Donations
(Below Zero to $200)
($201-$1,000)
($1,001-$5,000)
0.12
0.42
0.12
0.14
0.27
0.18
0.15
0.57
0.10
0.16
0.62
0.00
0.21
0.37
0.13
0.23
0.45
0.01
0.23
0.27
0.06
0.24
0.36
0.09
0.26
0.36
0.04
0.26
0.47
0.00
0.27
0.39
0.04
0.27
0.37
0.07
0.28
0.51
0.01
0.28
0.34
0.02
0.30
0.26
0.12
0.32
0.32
0.06
0.34
0.37
0.01
0.37
0.33
0.05
0.38
0.37
0.01
0.40
0.19
0.01
0.40
0.22
0.00
0.42
0.10
0.00
0.44
0.25
0.06
0.60
0.22
0.01
0.30
0.34
0.05
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In examining Table 7.2, it is readily apparent that most campaign contributions do
not exceed $1,000. There are only five states in the analysis where donations over $1,000
constitute 10 percent ore more of the total amount received by a candidate. These states
are Illinois, California, Texas, Oregon and Ohio. Of these states, three are professional
legislatures and three allow unlimited contributions. On the other hand, in approximately
half the states in this analysis, large contributions constitute no more than two percent of
the total amount raised. These differences illustrate the impact of campaign finance laws
on the fundraising landscape and point out the importance of studying campaign finance
at the state legislative level where variation is more pronounced.
In addition to the variation in large donations, one can see that there is also a fair
amount of variation in the first two columns of the table. For instance, in Illinois small
donations make up just 12 percent of a candidate‘s total while they make up three-fifths
of the total amount raised in Colorado. Also, I find that each state varies greatly on the
ratio of contributions from small and medium donors. In some states, the percentage
raised from small and medium donations is almost equal (Missouri, Idaho, Utah,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio) while in others the amount raised from small donations is
approximately twice to three times as high as that from medium donations (Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Maine, Iowa and Colorado).
Although it is important to have a sense of the differences in contribution size
across the states, my primary focus is on whether these differences extend to the gender
of the candidate. Thus, in Table 7.3 I present the average percentage received in small
donations by gender and state. This table is sorted according to the mean percentage
difference between male and female candidates.
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Table 7.3: Percentage of Campaign Receipts from Small Donations by
Gender and State ($200 or less)
State
Male Mean Female Mean Difference
Utah
0.30
0.38
-0.08
New Mexico
0.25
0.32
-0.07
Indiana
0.23
0.30
-0.07
Alaska
0.26
0.32
-0.06
Iowa
0.43
0.49
-0.06
Missouri
0.37
0.42
-0.05
Georgia
0.26
0.30
-0.04
Washington
0.25
0.28
-0.03
Florida
0.15
0.18
-0.03
Kentucky
0.23
0.26
-0.03
Michigan
0.22
0.25
-0.03
Illinois
0.11
0.13
-0.02
Texas
0.15
0.16
-0.01
Idaho
0.34
0.35
-0.01
Colorado
0.60
0.60
0.00
Rhode Island
0.28
0.28
0.00
California
0.14
0.13
0.01
Minnesota
0.42
0.41
0.01
Ohio
0.30
0.29
0.01
Oregon
0.22
0.21
0.01
Pennsylvania
0.38
0.36
0.02
Tennessee
0.26
0.24
0.02
Wisconsin
0.40
0.38
0.02
Maine
0.41
0.37
0.04
Total
0.29
0.31
-0.02
In the above table, one can see that there is also a fair amount of variation
between the genders in the amount obtained from small donors (those contributing $200
or less). Women receive two percentage points more, on average, from small donors than
men do. Overall, men receive more from small donors in one-third of the states under
consideration while women raise more from small donors in the other two-thirds. When
men receive more, the percentage differences are quite small, never going above four
percent. However, when small donors favor women, one can see that the percentage
difference ranges from just one percent all the way up to eight percent in Utah. Finally,
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the differences in Table 7.2 are echoed here. Small contributions tend to make up a
rather small percentage of donations in Texas, Illinois, California, and Florida but
account for a large portion in Iowa, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
Discussion
On the whole, I find that women contribute more to their own campaign in terms
of mean donations but self-finance makes up a larger percentage of total contributions for
male candidates. Thus, it is unclear whether women are more likely to invest heavily in
their own campaign as a means of attracting contributors or to personally finance the
start-up costs of their campaign. On the other hand, I find that small donations make up a
larger percentage of total campaign receipts for female candidates. In addition, in
analysis not shown, I find that men receive about one percent more from medium sized
donations but that men and women receive approximately the same amount from large
donors. Although large donors are financing men and women at about the same rate,
these donors make up a small portion of total campaign receipts in most states. Thus, if
men do better among those that contribute $201-$1,000 and women raise more from
those who donate $200 or less it is certainly plausible that women will have to seek out
more donors to raise the same amount as men.
At this point, these findings need to be examined using a more rigorous
multivariate analysis that controls for other factors. Thus, I now turn to laying out my
expectations in relation to my model and then proceed with a full analysis of the various
factors that should impact campaign self-finance and contribution size.
Control Variables and Hypotheses
In this chapter I examine the percentage of self-financed contributions and the
percentage received from small donors. I think that a number of factors, besides gender,
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play a role in explaining how much a candidate contributes to their own campaign and in
the size of the donations they receive. I now review my hypotheses as they pertain to
these factors.
Candidate-Level Factors
First, for the reasons already discussed I hypothesize women will contribute more
to their own campaign and will receive more from small donors. Second, I anticipate that
incumbents will contribute less of their own money to their campaigns and that they will
receive more from larger donors. I think this will be the case because incumbents should
have enough connections in place to reduce the likelihood they will need to invest much
in their own campaign and they should receive more from larger donors because of their
level of experience in campaigning and in the legislative process. Third, I anticipate that
party leaders, committee leaders, majority party members, and candidates with more
years of service will invest less into their own campaign and will receive more from
larger donors. Again, it is possible that candidates with these characteristics will be
desirable to many types of donors and will, thus, not have to invest as much in their
campaign. I also believe these candidates will raise more from medium and large donors
because those who wish to gain access to these candidates may feel a larger contribution
will achieve this. Finally, party affiliation may also play a role although I am uncertain
which direction it will take. On the one hand, Republicans may invest less of their own
money given that they have done well with the majority of donors examined previously.
However, Republicans, as a group, may have better personal financial situations and may
be able to finance their campaigns to a greater extent as a result. In terms of donation
size, I would expect Democrats to raise more from small donors since they should do less
well with well-financed corporate donors.
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District-Level Factors
On the one hand, candidates running in a historically competitive district, may
need to invest more into their own campaign and may receive more in small donations
because donors may not feel as assured that their investment will reap a reward. In
addition, a competitive race will tend to be more expensive and may require more of an
investment by the candidate. On the other hand, candidates may invest less of their own
money and may get more from larger donors because some donors may invest heavily in
candidates facing tight electoral contests and this may mean that a candidate will not need
to invest as much of their own money if they can secure large donations from other
donors.
State-Level Factors
In examining the many state-level factors, I expect that candidates will have to
finance their campaigns at a higher rate but will receive more in large donations when
running for a seat in a professional legislature. I expect this will be the case because these
races tend to be expensive and may require more of a financial investment on the part of
the candidate. On the other hand, donors may think it is important to have ties to these
candidates because of the innovative nature of the policymaking process and that they
will contribute more to establish or maintain these connections. Second, I expect that
strict campaign finance laws will increase the amount candidates invest in their own
campaign and will lead to smaller donations. If campaign finance laws limit the amount
of money that PACs can give, this will lead to more small contributions and candidates
possibly having to make up the shortfall from their own pocketbook. Third, I anticipate
that strong interest groups will reduce the amount of money candidates invest in their
own campaign and lead to larger donations. I expect this to be the case because interest
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group contributions make up a large percentage of a candidate‘s total amount raised and
when groups are strong candidates should not have to worry about contributing as much
of their own money. In addition, many interest groups, especially corporate donors, are
well-financed and this should lead to larger contributions on average. Fourth, term limits
could have either a positive or negative influence on campaign self-finance and
contribution size. On the one hand, donors may concentrate their donations on members
in their last term in the hope they will pass legislation of interest to the group. On the
other, donors may look elsewhere hoping to establish connections to members that are
not about to depart. Thus, depending on the approach taken by these groups, candidates
will either receive smaller or larger contributions and will either need to finance their
campaigns more or less. Fifth, much like my district-level variables, chamber
competition could have either a negative or positive relationship to these variables for the
same reasons described in the previous section. Sixth, given that my earlier chapters
have shown that candidates tend to raise less from all types of donors in a presidential
election year, I would expect donors to have to make up this shortfall by investing more
of their own money into their campaign and I would expect them to raise more in small
donations as donors may contribute more heavily to federal and presidential races
instead. Finally, it is possible that candidates will invest more of their own money into
their campaign and will receive fewer contributions from small donors when their
opponents are well-financed. If candidates and donors believe a race is financially
competitive, they are more likely to contribute higher sums so that the candidates can
stay competitive.
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Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Self-Finance and
Contribution Size
Campaign Self-Finance
This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the percentage
invested in a candidate‘s own campaign and in the percentage received from donations
that are small (below $200). I begin this analysis with an examination of campaign selffinance and conclude with a look at contribution size. Since campaign self-finance
should be more of a factor in contested races, I limit my analysis strictly to contested
races, and to examining contested candidates (incumbents, challengers and open seat
candidates) separately. However, I examine both contested and uncontested races in the
latter half of the analysis. As its certainly possible that donors will respond differently to
these electoral scenarios and may tailor their giving based on the competitiveness of a
race. Over all, my goal is to see whether gender has any explanatory power once other
factors are accounted for. Below, in table 7.4, I present the coefficients and significance
levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of the candidate, as well as the
gender of the candidate and their opponent.
Table 7.4: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
0.23***

All Candidates
0.23***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation

--0.04***
-0.02*
-0.01
-0.09***
-0.03***
-0.01
-0.07
-0.0001
-0.01

-0.02***
----0.09***
-0.03***
-0.01
-0.07
-0.0001
-0.01
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Table 7.4 Continued
Variable
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

All Candidates
-0.004
-0.0001
-0.004
0.02
0.01
-0.01+
0.01
-0.002***
0.02**
-0.001

All Candidates
-0.004
-0.0001
-0.004
0.02
0.01
-0.01+
0.01
-0.002***
0.02**
-0.001

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.05

6,067
0.05

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In the above table one can see that gender is a statistically significant predictor of
the percentage of contributions that are self-financed. For women, self-financed
contributions make up two percentage points less of their total amount raised. In
addition, self-financing constitutes two percentage points less for a woman than a man
when both face a male opponent, while a woman will put four percentage points less into
self-financing than a man when both face an opponent of the same sex as them. Finally,
in analysis not shown, self-financing constitutes two percentage points less when a
woman faces a female opponent as opposed to when a man faces a female opponent.
This implies that self-financing makes up a smaller share of all total campaign receipts
for women and could imply that women are not investing as much in their own
campaigns as compared to men.
Turning next to the other candidate-level factors, one can see for challengers selffinance makes up a larger share of their total receipts than it does for either incumbents or

176

open seat candidates. This is not surprising since challengers are not as likely to get as
much from other sources and are likely to rely more heavily on their pocketbook to make
up the difference. Otherwise, none of the other factors were significant predictors of the
percentage a candidate invested in their own campaign.
Finally, in looking at state-level factors, I find that candidates contribute a smaller
percentage to their own campaign when interest groups are strong and when chamber
competition is high while they contribute a larger percentage when it is a presidential
election year. Given that candidates tend to raise less when their election coincides with
a presidential election, it is not surprising that self-finance would make up a larger share
of the total. In addition, strong interest groups should contribute more and chamber
competition may attract donors from both sides of the political aisle, both of which
should bump up the total amount a candidate raises and reduce the need to self-finance.
Having now examined what factors affect all contested candidates together, I
examine each group, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates, separately.
Below, in table 7.5 I present the results of each of these models for the gender of the
candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent separately.
Beginning with incumbents, I find that gender does not have a statistically
significant influence in either of my models. In addition, I find that self-finance makes
up one percentage point less of the total raised by majority party members. Given that
many donors value majority party status, one might expect that these candidates will be
well taken care of and will not need to invest as much of their own money. Besides these
factors, I find that the same state-level factors have influence here as was the case in table
7.4, although I also find that incumbents invest a higher percentage of their own money
into their campaign when their opponent does as well.
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Table 7.5: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat
Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
-0.01

Incumbents Challengers Challengers Open Seats
-0.01
0.20***
0.19***
0.25***

Open Seats
0.25***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

--0.01
-0.003
-0.0002
---0.01
0.002
-0.0002
-0.003
-0.01***
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.001
-0.01***
-0.002
-0.003***
0.01*
0.004*

-0.01
------0.01
0.002
-0.0002
-0.003
-0.01***
0.0002
0.0002
0.0003
0.001
-0.01***
-0.002
-0.003***
0.01*
0.004*

--0.06*
-0.04*
-0.03+
------0.01
0.02
0.0003
-0.01
0.04
-0.002
0.01
0.03+
-0.002**
0.02
-0.002

N
2,283
2,283
2,283
2
Adjusted R
0.06
0.06
0.004
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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-0.04**
---------0.01
0.02
0.0003
-0.01
0.04
-0.002
0.01
0.03+
-0.002**
0.02
-0.002

--0.04*
-0.01
0.01
------0.01
-0.02**
-0.001**
-0.01
0.01
0.02**
-0.02**
0.002
-0.003***
0.02*
-0.003

-0.02+
---------0.01
-0.02**
-0.001**
-0.01
0.01
0.02**
-0.02**
0.002
-0.003***
0.02*
-0.003

2,283
0.004

1,499
0.04

1,499
0.04

Looking next at challengers, I find that this model explains less than one percent
of the variance, which is far from ideal, and much lower than the other models.
However, I also find that gender plays a significant role in the rate of challenger selffinance. Self-financing makes up four percentage points less of the total raised for
female candidates. In addition, I find several effects for gender when the gender of their
opponent is factored in. First, I find that male challengers facing an opponent of the same
sex invest a six percentage point higher percentage into self-financing than female
challengers facing an opponent of the same sex. Second, I find that for female
challengers self-financing represents a four percentage point smaller percentage than that
of male challengers when both face a male incumbent. Finally, I find that when a male
challenger faces a male opponent, his self financing is three percentage points higher than
what we observed when a male challenger faces a female opponent. These findings
provide some evidence that campaign self-finance makes up a smaller percentage of total
campaign receipts received by female candidates and that self-finance percentages are
highest when a male challenger faces a male opponent.
Otherwise, I find that term limits increase the percentage that challengers invest in
self-financing. This result may be due to donors investing more heavily in incumbents
when they know they only have one more term to make a connection, thereby, forcing
challengers to invest more in their own campaign. In addition, I find that self-financing
makes up a smaller percentage of all campaign donations when chamber competition is
high. As has been discussed previously, some donors may focus contributions on tight
electoral races as a way of influencing the outcome, which may allow candidates to
invest less into their own campaign over time.

179

Turning finally to open seat candidates, I find that self-financing makes up two
percentage points less of the total raised for female candidates. In addition, I find that
self-financing makes up four percentage points less of total campaign receipts for a
female open seat candidate as compared to a male open seat candidate when both face an
opponent of the same sex as them. Finally, in analysis not shown, I also find that selffinancing makes up five percentage points more of all campaign receipts for a male open
seat candidate as compared to a female open seat candidate when both face a female
opponent. This seems to indicate self-financing makes up a higher percentage of all
campaign receipts for male candidates.
In addition, I find that self-financing will make up a smaller percentage of the
total amount raised when candidates are members of the majority party, when the
previous election was competitive, when interest groups are strong and when chamber
competition is high. On the other hand, candidates will invest slightly higher percentages
into self-finance when campaign finance laws are imposing and when it is a presidential
election year. Most of these relationships are similar to those already discussed for all
contested candidates and incumbents.
As in previous chapters, I also ran these models using state dummy variables in
place of the state-level control variables and using the total amount per eligible voter as
the dependent variable in place of the percentage.11

11

I found very few differences when using state dummy variables. The only difference occurred in the
contested open seat models, where both the gender of the candidate and of their opponent became
insignificant predictors of the percentage invested in self-financing. It is important to keep in mind;
however, that gender was only marginally significant before the state dummy variables were introduced. In
addition, when the alternative dependent variable was used, I found that both types of my gender measures
became insignificant predictors of the amount raised by self-finance across each of the models. The only
difference being that in the contested open seat model, I found that male candidates invest three cents more
per eligible voter in self-finance when facing a male opponent as opposed to a female opponent. These
results are not all that surprising since earlier, in Table 7.1, we saw that the mean contribution to one‘s
campaign was only $56 higher for women but that campaign self-finance constituted one percent more of
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Campaign Contribution Size
Now that I have examined the factors that play a significant role in campaign selffinancing, it is time to turn to another important aspect of the fundraising landscape, the
size of campaign contributions. In this analysis, I examine both contested and
uncontested races by the gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their
opponent. I begin my analysis below, in Table 7.6, with a detailed analysis of all
contested candidates together.
Table 7.6: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small
Donations by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized
Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

All Candidates
0.33***

All Candidates
0.33***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

-0.02+
0.02**
0.01
0.08***
0.01
-0.09***
-0.001
-0.003***
0.004
-0.02**
0.0001
-0.01*
-0.27***
0.03***
-0.04***
0.01
0.001
0.04***
-0.01***

0.02**
---0.08***
0.01
-0.09***
-0.001
-0.003***
0.004
-0.02**
0.0001
-0.01*
-0.27***
0.03***
-0.04***
0.01
0.001
0.04***
-0.01***

N
Adjusted R2

6,067
0.10

6,067
0.10

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
the total amount raised for male candidates. Thus, it appears the differences are more pronounced with one
examines self-financing in terms of the percentage points received.
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Above, one can see that gender does play a fairly significant role in the
percentage of donations received from small contributors. Small donations make up
about two percentage points more of a female candidate‘s total. In addition, regardless of
the gender of the opponent, a female candidate will raise two percentage points more in
small donations compared to a male candidate facing off against a male opponent.
Finally, in analysis not shown, I find that a female candidate facing a male opponent will
raise two percentage points more from small donors than a male candidate running
against a female opponent. These results seem to indicate that women have more success
generating revenue when it does not involve approaching larger donors. This might mean
that women have to work harder at fundraising to stay competitive with men.
Besides gender, candidates raise eight percentage points more in small donations
when they are incumbents but nine percentage points less when they are party leaders,
two percentage points less when they are members of the majority party, and a fraction of
a percentage point less when they are more senior. Although one might expect
incumbents to raise less from small donations, it is quite likely that these candidates are
skilled enough at fundraising that they are able to successfully acquire donations of all
sizes. On the other hand, party leaders may raise more in large donations because they
are expected to distribute some of what they raise to other rank and file party members.
Turning next to my district-level factors, I find that the number of primary
opponents in the previous election negatively impacts the amount received in small
donations. In other words, candidates are likely to receive a higher percentage of
donations from larger donors when the previous primary was contested. This might
indicate that donors pay attention to the electoral environment and tend to invest more in
a competitive electoral environment.
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In addition, I find that many of my state level-factors are significant. First,
candidates running for seats in professional legislatures, tend to raise less in small
donations. As I have stated before, professional races are expensive and candidates that
gain seats in them are quite valuable to donors, thus it is not surprising that they tend to
raise less here. Second, I find that campaign finance laws lead to more small donations.
Again, this is to be expected given that stringent laws reduce the amount that a candidate
can raise from PACs leading to smaller donations over all. Third, I find that when strong
interest groups are in place, small donations make up a lower percent of the total amount
raised. Again, I would expect this since interest groups should be better organized and
better financed and thus may make larger contributions over all. Fourth, I find that
candidates receive a higher percentage of their campaign total from small donors when it
is a presidential election year. Since, earlier chapters have demonstrated that candidates
tend to receive less from donors when it is a presidential election year; it is not surprising
that this leads to smaller donations over all. In addition, donors may feel pressure to
spread their funds out across more campaigns in a presidential election year, which will
lead to smaller contribution over all. Finally, I find that small donations make up one
percentage point less of total campaign contributions when an opponent raises more from
small donors. This may reflect a particular donor making more of an investment in one
candidate over another.
Now that I have examined the factors that influence the percentage of small
contributions received for all contested candidates together, I move to a separate analysis
of each type of contested candidate. Below, in Table 7.7, I present my model for
incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates by the gender of the candidate and the
gender of the candidate and their opponent.
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Looking first at contested incumbents, I again find that gender is a rather
influential predictor. First, as with all contested candidates, small donations make up two
percentage points more of all donations received for female candidates. Second, a female
incumbent facing a male challenger will gain three percentage points more in small
donations than a male incumbent facing a male challenger. Finally, a male incumbent
running against a female challenger will raise two percentage points more in small
donations when compared to a male incumbent running against a male challenger.
Again, these findings seem to imply that women make up more of their total campaign
receipts with donations that are under $200.
As with all contested candidates, I find that party leaders, members of the
majority party and senior members all receive a smaller percentage of small
contributions. I imagine that these characteristics are valued by donors, especially those
wanting to gain access, and that this will lead many donors to invest more than $200 in
order to secure a connection to incumbents with these characteristics.
Turning next to district-level factors, I find that the number of opponents in the
previous primary has a dampening affect on the amount raised in small donations. One
might expect a candidate to focus more on netting larger donations if they believe the
race will be competitive.
Finally, I find that candidates raise a smaller percentage of their total from small
donations when they are competing for a seat in a professional legislature, when interest
groups are strong and when their opponent raises more from small donors. However,
candidates raise more in small donations when campaign finance laws are strict and when
it is a presidential election year.
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Table 7.7: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Incumbents, Challengers and
Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.55***

Incumbents Challengers Challengers Open Seats
0.56***
0.20***
0.20***
0.34***

Open Seats
0.34***

Gender
Woman vs. Woman
Woman vs. Man
Man vs. Woman
Incumbent
Open Seat
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Years of Service
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

-0.02
0.03**
0.02*
---0.07***
0.004
-0.004***
-0.03***
-0.02*
-0.0001
-0.02***
-0.22***
0.03***
-0.11***
-0.01
0.0003
0.04***
-0.02***

0 .02*
------0.07***
0.004
-0.004***
-0.03***
-0.02*
-0.0001
-0.02***
-0.22***
0.03***
-0.11***
-0.01
0.0003
0.04***
-0.02***

-0.02
0.01
-0.002
-----0.03**
-0.004
0.001+
-0.01
-0.22***
0.02*
0.01
0.02+
0.001
0.04***
-0.003+

N
2,283
2,283
2,283
2
Adjusted R
0.26
0.26
0.03
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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0.01
--------0.03**
-0.004
0.001+
-0.01
-0.22***
0.02*
0.01
0.02+
0.001
0.04***
-0.003+

-0.03
0.03*
0.001
-----0.01
-0.03**
0.0001
-0.001
-0.36***
0.03***
-0.03***
0.01
0.0003
0.04***
-0.01***

0.03**
--------0.01
-0.03**
0.0001
-0.001
-0.36***
0.03***
-0.03***
0.01
0.0003
0.04***
-0.01***

2,283
0.03

1,499
0.11

1,499
0.11

Moving on to examining challengers, I find that gender does not have a
statistically significant impact in these races. Given that all challengers tend to start at a
disadvantage without name recognition, one might expect men and women to raise a
majority of their total funds from small donors. Therefore, it is not wholly surprising that
gender does not play more of a role here. Given gender‘s insignificance in this model,
what other factors make a difference in the percentage raised from small donors? First, I
find that Democrats tend to gain a higher percentage from small donors. This makes
intuitive sense given that Republican organizations are often perceived to have a large
fundraising base and individual donors affiliated with the Republican Party may have a
higher income structure to draw from (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Second, I
find that many of the state-level factors mirror those found for the incumbents. The
primary differences being that interest group strength is no longer a significant predictor
while term limits is. Since corporations make up the largest share of interest group
contributions and these organizations tend to be more access oriented, it is not surprising
that this variable is not having an impact here. Also, it is possible that challengers
maintain a higher percentage of small donations when term limits are in place because
donors may funnel larger donations to term limited incumbents.
Finally, moving to open seat candidates I find that gender is once again an
important element. As with all contested candidates and incumbents, I find that female
open seat candidates collect a higher percentage of their total donations from small
donors. In addition, a female open seat candidate will obtain approximately three
percentage points more than a male open seat candidate when both face male opponents.
Also, in analysis not shown, a female open seat candidate running against a male
opponent will raise three percentage points more from small donors than a male open seat
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candidate running against a female opponent. Again, it seems that small donors make up
a larger share of the total amount accumulated by female candidates. Otherwise, most of
the other significant relationships mirror those of challengers. The primary difference is
that interest group strength dampens the percentage a candidate raises from small donors
in much the same way as it did for incumbents.
Having now examined all of the contested races, one can see that there are many
similarities across the models in terms of what factors are most influential. But, it
remains to be seen whether these same influences will hold once a candidate faces no
direct competition in the general election. In Table 7.8, I explore the factors that
influence the percentage of small donations received for both uncontested incumbents
and open seat candidates.
Table 7.8: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small
Donations by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election
(Unstandardized Coefficients)
Variable
Constant

Incumbents
0.66***

Open Seats
0.47***

Gender
Party Leader
Committee Leader
Party Affiliation
Majority Party Status
Years Served
Previous Electoral Competition
Number of Primary Opponents
Legislative Professionalism
Campaign Finance Laws
Interest Group Strength
Term Limits
Chamber Competition
Presidential Election Year

0.02
-0.13***
-0.02
-0.03**
0.01
-0.002*
0.0004
-0.01
-0.01
-0.003
-0.17***
0.04*
-0.001
0.05***

0.07*
---0.05
-0.003
-0.001
-0.01
-0.17
0.002
-0.08**
0.04
-0.001
0.07*

N
Adjusted R2

1,907
0.20

202
0.07

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
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In examining uncontested incumbents, one can see that there are a lot of
similarities between these candidates and contested incumbents. Like contested
incumbents, party leaders, Democrats, and senior members all collect a smaller share
from donors contributing $200 or less. Moving on to state-level factors, I find that
candidates here raise less from small donors when interest groups are strong, when term
limits are not in place, and when it is a midterm election.
Finally, in looking at uncontested open seat candidates, I can see that gender has
the strongest impact here. Female open seat candidates raise about seven percentage
points more in small donations when compared to male open seat candidates. In addition,
I find that candidates tend to raise eight percentage points less from small donors when
interest groups are strong and the presence of a presidential election year leads to a seven
percentage point increase in donations of $200 or less. I also found these relationships
among contested open seat candidates. In addition to conducting my analysis in the
aforementioned manner, I also ran models using state dummy variables and models that
replaced the percentage of contributions raised with the total amount raised per eligible
voter from small donors.12
Discussion
As I find in each of my previous analysis chapters, gender has a significant impact
on the campaign finance environment. Self-finance makes up a smaller share of the total
contributions received by all contested female candidates and by female challengers and
open seat candidates in contested races. In addition, small donations make up a larger
12

In terms of the gender of the candidate, I did not find any differences when state dummy variables were
used in place of the state-level factors. On the other hand, when the total amount per eligible voter was
used in place of the percentage raised, I found that gender lost its impact as a significant predictor of
donation size for contested incumbents but became a significant factor in the contested challenger model.
These differences point to the importance of running the analysis in different ways and using more than one
measure of campaign contributions.
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share of candidate totals for all contested female candidates, for contested female
incumbents, and for contested and uncontested open seat candidates. Although I had
anticipated that self-financing would make up a larger share of women‘s total campaign
receipts this does not appear to be the case. On the other hand, I did find evidence to
support my hypothesis regarding contribution size. It makes sense that women would
raise more from small donors. Women may be disadvantaged by negative stereotypes,
they may not have all of the connections necessary to make inroads with larger donors, or
they may be less confident or aggressive about asking for larger sums of money. The
self-finance finding is more counterintuitive. It is possible that men simply have more
control over their finances and do not face as much opposition from their spouse about
the amount of money they contribute to their campaign. It is also possible that women
may be less confident about their chances of success and simply play it safe when
contributing money to their own campaign. Unfortunately, without interview data, one
can really only speculate about this finding.
Besides gender, I also find that a number of other variables are statistically
significant. On the whole, candidate-level factors did not play much of a role in terms of
self-financing but I did find that party leadership, seniority, and majority party status all
reduced the likelihood one would raise a larger percentage from small donors. This
meshes well with earlier findings which showed that these factors tended to increase
donations from businesses and parties. On the other hand, I find that district-level factors
play a limited role on the percentage received from small donors and almost no role for
the percentage raised by self-finance. This departs most dramatically from my findings
in the chapters on party contributions and business donations. Finally, I find that a
number of state-level factors matter. For starters, I find that candidates tend to invest a
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larger percentage of their own money and raise a higher percentage from small donors
when interest groups were weak and when it is a presidential election year. Next, I find
that candidates invest more into their own campaign when chamber competition is low.
In addition, in terms of predicting the percentage from small donors, I also find that
candidates raise more in small donations when legislatures are less professional, when
campaign finance laws are more severe, and when term limits are in place. This mirrors
many of my earlier findings where candidates raise less from businesses, labor unions,
and parties when campaign finance laws are strict (thereby leading to smaller
contributions overall) but more from businesses when interest groups are strong and
chamber competition is high (thereby increasing the likelihood of receiving larger
contributions).
In short, it is interesting to note the connection between these earlier chapters and
this chapter. In other words, how much a candidate accumulates from various donors
seems to impact the amount of money they put into their own campaign and the
distribution in the size of the donations they receive. In addition, certain circumstances
seem to persist in influencing all aspects of campaign finance either positively or
negatively. For instance, the presence of stringent campaign finance laws tends to impact
both the amount a candidate receives from various donors as well as the overall size of
their contributions. This is what makes incumbents such powerful opponents, they not
only raise more from a wide variety of donors, but they also do not have to invest as
much into their own campaign.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
One thing our field agrees on is that women are under-represented at all levels of
government, including the state legislative level. An examination of representation levels
across all 50 states in 2000 and 2010 shows that on average women make up just 23% of
all state legislative seats in 2000 and 25% in 2010. Thus, on the whole, representation
levels have only increased by two percent in the last ten years. However, examining
representation on a state-by-state basis shows that female representation has actually
decreased over the last decade in approximately one-third of the state houses in the U.S.
Over the years, a host of explanations have been offered to explain this degree of
under-representation. Scholars argue that women hold fewer seats because they are
outnumbered in professions that serve as a conduit to office (Clark 1994; Darcy et al.
1994); they are the primary caregiver and take on more of the burden of running a home
(Robinson and Godbey 19999; Dubeck 1976; Welch 1978; Dodson 1997; Elder 2004),
they are discouraged from running by political elites and the media (Kahn 1996; Bystrom
et al. 2004; Werner 1968; Rule 1981; Fox and Lawless 2004; Carroll 1994; Sanbonmatsu
2005), and they lack ambition and confidence (Fox and Lawless (2004a, 2004b, 2010).
Despite the validity of each of these theories, this dissertation focuses on yet
another hypothesized factor in under-representation, campaign finance. Although there
are some dissenting voices (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006;
Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009; Baker 2006), many scholars argue that women raise as much as
men when various candidate level factors are controlled and similar candidates are
compared (Newman, 1994, Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan 2006, Darcy et al.
1994, Wilhite and Theilmann, 1986, Burrell, 1985, Uhlaner and Schlozman, 1986, Welch
et al. 1985)
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However, I began this analysis with the belief that these findings are the result of
the level at which much of the analysis is run, as well as the manner in which it is
conducted. The state-level is an important place to examine gender differences because
this is often the entry level office for many candidates. In addition, a large scale state
study allows for more variance on state factors and thus, more confidence in the
applicability of findings. Finally, a cursory examination of total campaign receipts might
miss much of the variation going on between donors and in self-finance.
With the goal of rectifying these shortcomings, I began this project with a number
of research objectives. First, I analyze the ways in which the nature of raising money
might be different for men and women. In other words, in what sorts of places might
women be advantaged and in what areas might they be disadvantaged? Second, I seek to
determine what role, if any, gender plays in the campaign finance process. In other
words, it is reasonable to conclude that a woman‘s campaign receipts will be on par with
men‘s so long as various candidate-level, district-level and state-level differences are
controlled for? Third, I seek to gain a better understanding of the way donors react to
incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates, as well as contested and uncontested
races. By the end of this document, I hoped the body of evidence would lead one to
either accept or reject campaign finance as an explanation for women‘s underrepresentation.
I have collected enough evidence to demonstrate that campaign finance is a
reasonable explanation for women‘s under-representation, at least in some contexts.
Beginning with the first objective, I uncover a number of differences in how donors
contribute to men and women at both the descriptive and multivariate level. Beginning
with descriptive differences, I find that some donors are more receptive to female
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candidates while others are less so. In particular, women raise less, on average, in total
campaign receipts, as well as donations from business donors and conservative
ideological interest groups. On the other hand, the average contribution received by
female candidates is higher when it comes from both types of party donors, from labor
unions, from liberal ideological interest groups and from small donors contributing less
than $200. These findings seem to indicate that women raise less from access-oriented
donors but do better with groups that follow more of an ideological strategy. In addition,
women seem to do better when they are raising money from groups that take a more
liberal position on regulatory and policy issues.
Although these differences are very insightful and point to the problem of
examining contributions in terms of total campaign receipts only, one cannot assume they
will hold once other controls are introduced. Thus, my second research objective is about
discovering whether gender maintains its influence once similar candidates are compared
to each other (incumbents with incumbents, etc.) and once other factors known to
influence contributions are added into the model. Below in Table 8.1 I present the
direction that gender took on the various aspects of campaign finance under examination.
A zero indicates that I did not find a statistically significant relationship; a positive
indicates that women earned more contributions or a higher percentage while a minus
sign indicates the opposite. As you will note below, despite adding a host of other
candidate, district and state-level factors into the analysis, I still find many cases in which
gender plays a significant role in the finance process.
Table 8.1 Effect of Gender on the Amount and Size of Contributions

Total

Incumbents Challengers Open Uncontested Uncontested
Seat Incumbents Open
+
+
+
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Table 8.1 Continued
Incumbents Challengers Open
Seat
0
0
0
+
0
0
+
+
+

Party
Business
Labor
Liberal
Ideological
Groups
Conservative 0
Ideological
Groups
Self-Finance 0
Small
+
Donations

Uncontested
Incumbents
0
+

Uncontested
Open
+
+
0
+

0

0

0

0

0

+

0
0

0
+

These findings provide some additional insight into the campaign fundraising
process and may have some implications for the level of women‘s representation,
particularly at the state level, and for the personal decision of whether to run for office.
Women clearly raise the most from liberal ideological groups; however, these groups
contribute some of the smallest amounts. So, women are unlikely to gain a lot of traction
from this advantage. In addition, it is clear that gender plays less of a role in how
candidates contribute to challengers but that donors tend to give more to open seat
candidates and less to incumbents, regardless of the level of contestation.
This may indicate that donors respond to the type of candidate running, as well as the
gender of the candidate under consideration.
These findings may explain why more women opt into open seat races as Table
8.1 illustrates that women tend to raise more than male candidates from several types of
campaign contributors. Given this outcome, one might conclude, as others have, that
women will win when they run (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan
2006 and Darcy et al. 1994). But, to win, women may very well have to invest more time
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into connecting with a wide array of donors (Jenkins 2007). This may discourage many
women from entering office or from running a campaign, especially if they have other
pressing concerns, such as children. In addition, the fact that women tend to raise less as
incumbents, could support earlier findings that women are more susceptible to campaign
competition than men, in part, because female challengers are more drawn to their
campaign and that female incumbents face better funded challengers (Palmer and Simon
2005; Berch 2004). If either of these findings is true, women may eventually feel the
costs of running for office are higher than the reward of holding office, which could
impact representation rates long-term.
Besides gender, I found that a wide variety of other characteristics factored into
donor behavior. In addition, many of these characteristics had more explanatory power
than gender. Thus, while gender is a significant consideration for some aspects of
campaign finance, it is just one of many factors that donors use when deciding who to
give to and how much to give. I also notice that donors concentrate on different factors
when weighing their contribution decisions. Thus, this dissertation largely supports
earlier findings that businesses are more access-oriented, that labor unions follow more of
an ideological strategy, and that parties are more focused on adding to or maintaining
their share of seats in the legislature (Thompson et al. 1994; Hogan et al., 2009; Sorauf,
1992; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1995; Brunell 2005).
I also find that the state environment plays a prominent role in the campaign
finance process. The factors that had the most consistent effect were legislative
professionalism, campaign finance laws, interest group strength, chamber competition,
presidential election year, and opposition candidate funding. Below in table 8.1 I present
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the direction that each of these factors tended to take on the various aspects of campaign
finance under examination.
Table 8.2 Effect of State-Level Factors on the Amount and Size of Contributions

Legislative Professionalism

Campaign Finance Laws

Interest Group Strength

Chamber Competition

Presidential Election Year
Opponent Fundraising

Increase Amount/Size
Total contributions,
Business contributions
(contested incumbents and
uncontested races) Party
contributions,
Small donations

Total contributions, Party
contributions, Business
contributions
Total contributions, Party
contributions, Business
contributions
Self-finance, Small
donations
Total contributions, Party
contributions, Business
contributions, Labor
contributions

Reduce Amount/Size
Business contributions
(contested challengers
and open seat), Small
donations
Total contributions, Party
contributions, Business
contributions, Labor
contributions
Self-finance, Small
donations
Self-finance

Total contributions, Party
contributions
Small donations

As I alluded to at the end of chapter seven, many of these factors impact multiple
aspects of the campaign finance process and tend to compound in either helping or
hurting candidates raise money. For instance, campaign finance laws reduce the amount
candidates raise from multiple donors and thereby increase the amount of small donations
that candidates receive. This might ultimately raise the difficulty involved in generating
campaign funds. In addition to this finding, one can also see that some types of donors
respond more to certain factors than others and some donors are not all that attuned to
any of these factors. For instance, labor is only consistently significant for two of the
above factors while businesses are impacted by five of the six factors above.
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How might these findings compare to today? Over the last decade campaigns
have become increasingly expensive and donors, especially interest groups, have focused
more attention on state legislative elections as a function of legislatures having more state
policymaking power. These conditions might pose fundraising obstacles for women if
they do not feel confident asking for large sums of money and if they do not have the
financial and political networks necessary to generate enough to stay competitive in an
increasingly expensive, high profile campaign environment.
On the other hand, women might face more recruitment and fundraising support
today if more women have ascended to positions of power within the legislature since the
late 1990s. Where women are more prominent members of the legislature, the impact of
the good ol‘ boys network should be reduced and women should face less difficulty in
raising money from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and perhaps even local party
organizations. In addition, there is some speculation that ―Clean Money‖ campaigns may
advantage female candidates as they generally involve public financing and limited
spending (Thomas and Wilcox 1998). This environment may help women by reducing
the fundraising advantages of incumbents and decreasing the amount of money needed to
run a successful open seat election (Thomas and Wilcox 1998).
Future Research
There are a number of questions that remain and a number of ways in which this
project can expand in the future. First, I would like to concentrate more intently on
individual donors. Although my analysis includes an examination of these donors,
ideally, I would like to more thoroughly separate out corporate donors from individual
donors as it is possible that each group is motivated by different factors when making a
donation. In addition, this is an area that could use more state-level research given that
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some of the more prominent studies of individual donors focus on presidential and
congressional campaigns (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). In addition, there are
reasons to believe that gender might play an important role in this process given that
many individual donors are male but that women tend to raise more from small donors
(Baker 2006; Francia et al. 2003; Brown et al. 1995; Fox 2007).
Besides examining individual donors, I would also like to conduct an analysis on
the timing of contributions in order to determine whether gender plays a role in garnering
early money. Although a number of states would have to be excluded for missing data on
this dimension, I should have a large enough sample to examine this factor across the
various types of donors in the dataset. Currently, some organizations (EMILY‘s List,
WISH List, the Alabama Solution, etc.) are founded on the belief that women need early
money to be successful and they need help acquiring it. But, are these groups right to
assume that women need extra help raising early money? Scholarly research on this topic
has been relatively scarce and mixed. At the federal level, Burrell (1994) examines the
average amount raised by candidates during the first two reporting periods for the 1988,
1990 and 1992 elections. She finds that female incumbents, challengers and open seat
contestants outpaced men on average campaign receipts in at least two if not all threeelection periods. In addition, Leal (2003) studies U.S. Senate primary campaigns
between 1988 and 1996 and finds that early money helps to attract donors by signaling to
them that they are worth the investment. However, the author does not find that this
affect is more pronounced for women. At the state legislative level, Mitchell (2009)
examines the contributions to male and female state legislative candidates in the 2006
primaries. He finds that women are disadvantaged in early fundraising, save for open
seat candidates, and notes that this could be especially problematic given the ―low
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information salience‖ of state legislative elections. These contradictory findings point to
the need for more research in this area, especially at the state-legislative level, where
studies are extremely scarce.
In addition to these two aspects, I would also like to examine how the outcomes
found here impact the electoral fortunes of these various types of candidates. In other
words, is there an electoral benefit to gaining more from business donors or to investing
more of your own money into your campaign? Do these things make you more or less
likely to win? Currently, I do not have data on the outcome of these races but that is
something that could be tracked down and added, at least for a subset of states.
Finally, it might be possible to merge up parts of this dataset with the data I have
on bill sponsorship. Although this analysis would involve a smaller subset of states, it
would be interesting to see whether donors who raise the most also sponsor the most. In
other words, does success in connecting with various types of donors, including
lobbyists, impact their ability to pass legislation in the state house? Do candidates feel
more pressure to sponsor legislation in an effort to maintain ties with these various
donors? Besides this, it would be interesting to see if there is a connection between the
amount of money a candidate collects from various types of donors (agriculture, health,
education, etc.) and the type of legislation they tend to sponsor. Unfortunately, the
sponsorship data does not account for the policy area in which a bill is sponsored. But, if
I collect this data I could test this theory.
In short then, there are clearly a multitude of ways in which this project could
expand. Plus, if the campaign finance website where most of my data was collected, ever
decides to release their records to the public or to academic researchers, I can update my
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study with data from more recent electoral periods or branch off into examining the role
of campaign finance in state court and gubernatorial campaigns.
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